The War Prospect in Europe

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The Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · May 5, 1868

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 31, No. 21.

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The War Prospect in Europe.

A LATE Paris letter says that shrewd political observers think that Napoleon means war, and they base their belief upon the incessant activity displayed in all the military and naval departments of that empire, and more especially in the zeal evinced by the Minister of War in the organization of the Garde Mobile:
It is remarked that gradually but surely the best troops in the service of the empire are being massed upon the eastern frontier; that this season there are to be numberless camps formed in addition to that of Chalons and Vincennes, for the purpose of exercising the men in the use of the new Chassepot rifle, and rifled cannons. Also, that the officers are to camp out with the men, in short, that the elite of the French troops are at certain stated intervals during the spring and summer of 1868 to remain on a war footing. Even the Generals of brigade have received orders to remain at the camps with the troops. It were useless to deny that all this looks terribly like war, and that the comments of the independent and opposite journals are far from re-assuring. On the other hand, the semi-official journals and the government speakers assure the world at large that the empire means peace. I need scarcely add that as these semi-official denials and assurances take place whether or no, they have little effect, and do not allay the fears of the people. The Emperor has not as yet had an opportunity of speaking on the subject. No great ceremonials, no imperial tours, have taken place, wherein His Majesty might address to his subjects any promise or explanation, and unless he does so this summer at the Havre Exposition, the general suspense must continue. It is a pity that some patriotic and wise men could not prevail upon the Emperor Napoleon to do that which would increase his popularity and secure his dynasty, more than all the warlike victories in the world, namely; that he should propose a general disarmament; that he should set the example, and then to crown the edifice, grant to France such liberties as are not incompatible with real and lasting prosperity. Were he thus to disarm opposition, the masses would then have the opportunity and the will to become acquainted with all that Napoleon has done for France, and his influence and glory would be enhanced, indeed. But as things stand at present, the government irresistibly pushes on its way, and the opposition in the same determined manner attack it. The people, who cannot always judge dispassionately, of course side with the Opposition in such a matter as that of the Garde Mobile, and the Emperor becomes unpopular, where, on the contrary, he should increase his hold upon the nation. If some great change does not take place in the imperial policy soon, a war will become almost imperative. The people will grumble at the needless expense in getting up such armies and navies for no purpose, and the Emperor will have to make use of them to silence the popular clamor. It is this result which is most to be feared, and it is upon this contingency that the Liberal and Opposition journals dwell at present so forcibly.