More About the Oklahoma Trial by I. A. Crane

Review and Herald Publishing Association · Takoma Park Station, Washington, D. C. · Oct 28, 1915

More About the Oklahoma Trial

By I. A. Crane

The conscientious keeping of God’s commandments is no longer to be admitted as a defense against religious laws in Oklahoma, if the decision of the court in the case of the State against J. G. and I. G. Krieger is allowed to stand. This trial, as many of our readers know, occurred at Watonga, Okla., August 3 and 4.

The statute which was intended to protect Seventh-day observers, and under which these men could hope to claim exemption, reads as follows:— “It is a sufficient defense for proceedings against servile labor on the first day of the week to show that the accused uniformly keeps another day as holy time,” etc.

The State constitution also makes the following declaration against the enforcement of religion:— “Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested on account of his or her mode of religious worship.”

These statutory and constitutional guaranties would certainly seem sufficient protection to the conscientious observer of the seventh-day Sabbath. We shall speak later of the weakness of these two provisions, supposed to guarantee liberty in religion. We wish to show that they failed entirely in this trial to supply the protection which they are supposed to give. The reason will be apparent as we proceed.

All through the trial, whenever the attorney for the defense asked a question that was calculated to show that the accused belonged to a church which keeps another day as holy time, and that they did in fact uniformly and conscientiously keep that day, it was opposed with the utmost determination. In the first part of the trial some of these objections were overruled by the court; later, things seemed to turn, and all testimony bearing on the subject of the religious faith of the individuals was ruled out entirely.

We give herewith a few questions bearing on this feature of the trial as they appear in the transcript of the evidence from the court records:—

“Direct examination of Isaac Krieger by Attorney Woolman for defendants:—

“Question.—What is your name?

“Answer.—Isaac G. Krieger.

“Ques.—Where do you live?

“Ans.—At Hitchcock.

“Ques.—How long have you lived there?

“Ans.—Little over ten years.

“Ques.—Are you one of the defendants in this case?

“Ans.—Yes, sir.

“Ques.—State to the jury of what religious faith you are.

“By Mr. Boardman: State objects to the question as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial; not defensive matter to the issue in the case.

“By the court: Sustained.

“By Mr. Woolman: Excepted.

“Ques.—Did you on the twentieth of June, 1915, belong to any religious sect?”

We quote only the following questions, as the State’s attorney made the same objections to each question, and the court sustained the objection, which was declared irrelevant by the court:—

“Ques.—I will ask you if at that time you kept and believed in another day as holy day, except Sunday, commonly called the first day of the week? . . .

“Ques.—Did you at that time and were you observing your day as holy day, and doing so from a conscientious belief of your religion? . . .

“Ques.—I will ask you, if you on June 20 and at any time within the last three years, have you ever performed any secular work on Saturday, commonly known as the seventh day of the week?”

At this juncture, the attorney for the defense asked that the jury be excused from the room while he made a statement to the court. In this statement he showed why he wished to produce the evidence which was being ruled against by the court. He showed that these men were conscientious observers of the seventh day, and that in no case had they violated the day they kept as holy time, and that for this reason they claimed the right to continue their work on the first day of the week. To all this the State’s attorney objected, and was sustained by the court.

We leave the reader to judge for himself as to the justice of the objections and the rulings of the court. To the writer, it certainly appears that in the

face of the foregoing exemption, as well as the preceding quotation from the Oklahoma State constitution, there must be something radically wrong. If the spirit and intent of these statements are not calculated to protect the seventh-day Sabbath keeper, we ask, What do they mean?

Leaving this court decision against these Sabbath keepers, let us notice the defects in the statute and constitutional provision. In the first place, to one who is acquainted with the persistency by which a State-enforced religion seeks to rule or ruin, the decision of this court is no surprise. The evil is not so much a weakness in the statute calculated to exempt Seventh-day observers as it is a wickedness of the law which in this free land seeks to enforce the keeping of any day as the Sabbath. When the State of Oklahoma seeks to enforce a sabbath day, be it the true or the false, it has entered the realm of conscience and religion; and so long as it follows this course, it will do what every other State or nation has done when it has engaged in the same undertaking—it will foster deeds of injustice and bigotry against its most loyal and unoffending citizens. There is no alternative; it must deny the work begun, or follow it to its ultimate end. Unfortunately, its constitution makes it only willing to “tolerate religious sentiment,” instead of granting to all within its realm the fullest degree of religious liberty. We are sure these faults in the Oklahoma statutes were not intended by the people of the State, nor even by those who took part in their enactment; and we sincerely hope that the result of the above-mentioned trial may lead many to see and love the principles of religious liberty more than ever before.

I. A. CRANE.