Untitled article by J. O. CORLISS

Pacific Press Publishing Company · New York · March 3, 1892

FromThe American Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 9

The Powers of a Commonwealth.

By J. O. CORLISS

THE distinctions between sin and crime are many, but to make the discrimination it is necessary to mention but a few. 1. Sin is “a breach of the law of holiness, a lapse out of the likeness to the divine form,” while crime is any act in violation of civil law. 2. Sin is defined by the moral law, crime by the civil statutes. 3. The penalty for sin is always the same, while penalty for crime varies according to time and circumstances. It is true that sin, in some forms, may be crime, and crime may be identical with sin, but not necessarily so. For instance, civil laws permit the acquisition of property. But when one labors to that end, the State does not question whether covetous motives induced the effort or not. Property is disposed of, and handsome profits realized, but the civil law does not demand a portion of the proceeds for charity. In his greedy desire to accumulate money, one may withhold from a prospective customer the knowledge of an existing flaw in that which he is selling and thereby secure the best of a bargain. It is dishonest to take such a course, in fact it is a sin, yet the law does not oblige such an one to give the purchaser an equivalent, because that method of dealing is not counted a crime. Again a man’s covetousness may lead him to marry for money. He has violated a plain command of God, and so committed sin, yet the marriage is regarded lawful by the State. On the other hand, it is possible for one to be convicted of crime by the civil law, when he has violated no precept of the moral law. In their zeal to protect what they call their own interests, some governments make laws of an oppressive nature, for which those on whom they operate harshly can see no good reason. To illustrate: The United States has exclusion laws which forbid certain persons, from other countries, to land on its shores. But suppose one of these unfortunates, in defiance of the law, pursues happiness by quietly seeking to better his fortunes on forbidden territory, what precept of morality has he violated? Yet such an one is apprehended by the civil law, and his liberty restrained, just the same as the most pronounced criminal

offense to aid one of those bondmen to escape to English soil, or to harbor one while thus running the gauntlet for liberty. All along the northern borders of the slave States, benevolent Quakers, and others, operated what was then known as “under-ground railways,” for the purpose of secretly helping the unfortunate blacks into freedom. But in every case they exposed themselves to the penalty of six months’ imprisonment, a fine of $1,000, and civil damages to the same amount. To thus befriend a fellow-creature, held in forced bondage, and for no fault of his own, was then considered a crime worthy of severe penalties, yet who can say that the self-sacrificing acts of those men, in defying the rigors of the civil law, were sin before the law of Jehovah?

Another, and a very substantial reason why a civil government can not treat crime as sin is that, the attempt to do so would completely overthrow the social fabric. While the moral law calls for an extreme penalty upon its transgressor—even death itself, no one need suffer the punishment prescribed, however great his sin, provided he accepts certain conditions of amnesty freely offered to all. The conditions are, that any one convicted of sin by the moral law may, upon genuine sorrow and repentance, attested by humble confession in the name of Christ, have instant pardon. See Ps. 32:1-5; 1 John 1:9. This done, the sinner is free from the penalty of the moral law.

But suppose the State should regard crime as sin, and attempt to punish it as such,—as a representative of God’s government,—what could it do in the case of one who, on being apprehended for crime, and brought before the judge, should declare, with acceptable evidence, that he had already been absolved from the offense by the Court of Heaven? If the State, in its judicial work, acts as the agent of Jehovah, would it not be legally bound to recognize the validity of the prisoner’s plea, and discharge him? Carry the matter a step farther. Suppose the prisoner has not, up to the time of his conviction by the civil court, acknowledged his guilt. But upon the verdict to that effect being rendered by the jury, he immediately, with tears, makes open and hearty confession of his sin, and then declares that by faith he has received full forgiveness of God for the same. Could the court then, if in session for the purpose of discovering moral guilt, refuse the prisoner his liberty? It certainly could not, for when God makes one free he is “free indeed.”

That would never do, one may say; such a course would destroy the power of the State to bring any one to justice. It certainly would, and that without remedy. But still it would be the only logical outcome of an attempt to make the civil law punish crime as sin against God; and all because the State, which is at best but a human power, assumes to exercise the attributes and authority of Jehovah.

Does any one suppose for a moment that because a set of fallible men are chosen by their fellows to represent their will in the management of a civil government, that therefore God really confers upon them divine power to be used at their discretion, as ministers of the divine will? If so, then it follows that all the wickedness of civil rulers is committed by God’s authority. Who does not know that many of the rulers of this world have been the worst of tyrants, and that they unstintingly perpetrated cruelty and wrong upon their defenseless subjects? To make God responsible for this, is to impeach his character and blaspheme his name.

If it be said that civil governments represent the authority of God only when they do right, that is virtually saying that they have just as much divine authority as a banking establishment when it does right. It certainly could mean no more; for in the words of Samuel T. Spear, D. D.: “All moral beings, whether kings on thrones, or peasants in cottages, have a divine warrant for doing right, in the sense of being obligated thereto by the law of God. This warrant includes the civil ruler; but he has no special application that distinguishes him from other men. Justice rendered by the private citizen is as really divine as justice rendered by the magistrate.”

“To say that governments, established by iniquity and perpetuating the iniquity in which they originated, are the executives and representatives of the divine will in any other sense than that of existing in the providence of God, is to place his authoritative sanction upon the most horrible abominations found on the pages of history. The divine right of civil rulers would be a mere assumption without proof even if all rulers had been wise and pure; but when we put the Alexanders, the Neros, the Caligulas, and all the bloody tyrants of history into the catalogue of civil rulers, then the doctrine is rendered impossible by the attributes and moral character of God.” J. O. CORLISS.