"Irenæus," in a late issue of the New-York Observer, gives the following statement of some of the main points in the morality now taught by Romanists. It will well repay a perusal. He says:— The Roman Catholic Tablet, of London, gives prominent insertion to a letter addressed by Leo XIII., the present Pope, to the Redemptorist Fathers Dujardin and Jacques, expressing his high approval of their labors in translating into French the works of S. Alphonsus Liguori. In this letter the Pope states that "these writings have been spread throughout the whole world, with the greatest profit to the Christian cause, and it is to be wished that they should become still more and more popular, and be placed in the hands of all. For with the greatest skill he directed and promoted the moral training of all, and they may be all perused by the faithful without any danger of stumbling." What is the character of these works? In the Mechlin Edition of Liguori's Moral Theology, 1845, we find set forth a series of doctrines and principles, which injuriously affect the best interests of society, sap the foundations of morality, and outrage decency—principles of equivocation, lying, perjury, of "doing evil that good may come," and which inculcate as a duty the extermination of Protestants. Liguori informs us that the rules of the Congregation of the Index provide for the visitation of booksellers' shops and printing-offices, and amongst the prohibited books, the reading of which is forbidden under pain of excommunication, he names the Bible—"the Scriptures and books of controversies may not be permitted in the vernacular tongue; as also they cannot be read without permission" (Moral Theology, Vol. X., p. 236). Concerning dissimulation, Liguori says: "When you are not asked concerning the faith, not only is it lawful, but more conducive to the glory of God, and the utility of your neighbor, to cover the faith than to confess it; for example, if concealed among heretics, you may accomplish a greater amount of good" (Moral Theology, Vol. II., n. 14, p. 117). He teaches, also, the principle of doing evil that good may come. He says: "It is lawful to induce another to commit a less evil, that he may be impeded from a greater" (Vol. II., cap. 3, n. 77). Thus, as Liguori teaches, a man may supply an opportunity of stealing to his children or servants for the purpose of detection and punishment (Vol. II., n. 58, c. 2, pp. 176, 177). Servants also may lawfully assist and co-operate with their masters in the commission of crime, if they do so under fear of death or loss, "for example, lest he should be badly treated by his master, incur his displeasure, or be expelled from his house" (Vol. II., n. 66, c. 2). On Theft and Restitution, Liguori says: "It is certain that he who is in extreme want may steal the property of another" (Vol. III., n. 519, lib. 4, p. 237). Again he writes: "Note here the thirty-seventh proposition of Innocent XI., which said, 'Domestic servant men and women can steal from their own masters, for the purpose of compensating themselves for their own labor, which they judge to be greater than the salary they receive.'" He then goes on to say that a servant can compensate himself "if, from necessity, for the purpose, doubtless, of alleviating his own misery—he agrees upon a salary notably less than just. The reason is, because the pontifical decrees are not designed to lay servants under an unjust obligation" (Vol. III., n. 522, p. 245). Again, "A servant can, according to his own judgment, compensate himself for his labor, if he, without doubt, judge that he was deserving of a larger stipend" (Vol. III., n. 524, p. 246). On Equivocation, Liguori says: "A confessor can affirm, even with an oath, that he does not know of a sin heard in confession, understanding that he heard it as the minister of Christ and not as a man, as St. Thomas Aquinas, 2, 2, 9, 70, art. 1, ad. 1, Lug, disq. 22, teaches," who however, 75, explains, in another manner, the words, "he does not know it," through "a knowledge which may be made use of for the purpose of answering" (Vol. II., n. 163, p. 319). Again, "A poor man, absconding with goods for his own support, can answer the judge that he has nothing" (Vol. II., n. 158, p. 321). Again, "It is asked whether an adulteress can deny adultery to her husband," and Liguori answers this proposition, "If sacramentally she confessed adultery, she can answer, I am innocent of this crime, because by confession it was taken away" (Vol. II., n. 162, p. 322). On Oaths, Liguori, in considering the question, whether "he who swears without the intention of binding himself is under an obligation to keep his oath," answers, "Such an oath is not a true oath, both because it wants the necessary condition to the nature of a promissory oath, such as is the intention of binding one's self, and because an oath follows the nature of the promise which it confirms, as is certain from Busenbaum. But a promise without such an intention is not, indeed, a promise, but a mere purpose; therefore, the promise being evanescent, the oath is also such, and is considered as made without the intention of swearing, which certainly, as we have seen, is null and void. But if no oath exists, there is no obligation of fulfilling that oath" (Vol. II., p. 330). Again, he says: "He who hath sworn to a judge, that he would speak what he knew, is not bound to reveal concealed things" (Vol. II., p. 340).