PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS.
By Prof. B. L. Aldrich
By our subject is meant that class of philosophical arguments which are usually adduced in support of the doctrine of the immortal soul. In these articles they will be taken up one by one, and their reliability as proofs tested, not by Scripture but by philosophy itself. We shall philosophize over the philosophizings of others on this subject. It used to be said that without the Bible it was impossible to show the immortality of man; but as so many able students of biblical truth have recently exposed the want of such proof, philosophical evidences are now, with more than ordinary earnestness, brought forward. Reason now endeavors to make up for the short-coming of Scripture. The wisdom of men reveals an important appendix to the volume of the wisdom of God. Old and honored Plato was about the first who originated the syllogism that as all men desire immortality, they will all, therefore, obtain it. This curious argument has been handed down through many generations, assuming, under the manipulations of different minds, as many varied forms of statement as language was capable of; and it has had the good luck of eluding the challenge of most people, whether true or false. Error has a cautious way of getting along so as not to excite suspicion. This argument first assumes that all men obtain what all men desire. This major premise, however, is not usually expressed. Its absurdity is too apparent. Then, as to the next assertion, that all men desire eternal life, a little reflection will show it to be false. It is very evident from the manifestations of ordinary human life, that there are very few persons who look forward to an eternal existence, much less expect it with desire. The glory of such an estate when possessed, or the terrible wretchedness of it, in the event of banishment from God, is incompatible with the way men now conduct themselves, if they are expecting either. For me to desire an object and at the same time do all I can to keep myself from obtaining it, seems contradictory; or, to expect eternal pain while striving to make it doubly sure, would indicate any one to be insane. The man who can preach the eternal pain of the wicked while preserving the calmness of his feelings, or even jest and smile while laboring under such a conviction, with the populous realms of writhing human wretches beneath his feet, or anywhere else, his own offspring perhaps included, certainly lacks the sincerity and sympathy to suit him for the realms of the blest. But such a conviction is not profound with anyone. Teachings of that kind belong to the incubus of superstition with which men in all ages are apt to load down their religions. Eternal pain for punishment undoubtedly grows out of the pagan notion that men are possessed of immortal souls. I say pagan, because no belief is more characteristic of heathen religions than this; and it originated with them while denied by revelation. Again, since all men desire eternal life, they should expect it to come in a condition of perfect felicity; but the fact that so few take any pains whatever to insure it such, and so many waste their brief probation groveling in earthly pride or debasing vice, the only sensible conclusion is that this desire is an exceedingly weak and imperceptible one. If they desired riches that way, all men would be whelmed in poverty. If the immortality is to be estimated according to the desire for it, it is pretty near, if not quite, no immortality at all. This sort of reasoning then amounts to nothing, because the first premise is purposely suppressed on account of its plain absurdity, and the second has the difficulty about it of not being true. If the Bible asserted, which it does not, that man in his sins was immortal, I should say it contradicted both itself and reason. It has been often asserted that we are all conscious of an indestructible soul within us, and that proves its certainty. Philosophy based on consciousness has been the field of much disagreement of opinion, and in many instances, is unreliable. It is often a question what we are conscious of—the object, or its representation. Men are sometimes conscious of things that have no reality. It is to be seriously doubted whether anyone is conscious of the possession of an indestructible soul. The idea of such an inward recognition must be very vague to all who experiment with it. One would find himself in the condition of the snake that tried to swallow itself. He could not distinguish the thing called soul from his whole organism, if he could try it. Whereabouts do you feel your soul; in your head, or your stomach, or your feet? Does it seem hard or soft, rough or smooth round or square? What do you call consciousness? Consciousness of pain does not make it a substance, nor an essence. There is no such thing as thirst, unless it happens to be a temporary condition. But we know of these, and of touch, and the like. Joy, love, fear, are palpable conditions, but do you feel a condition of immortality? You assume merely that the soul is the seat and origin of these things, you do not know. Who is conscious that the so-called soul is lifting the valves of his heart, or prompting the operations of his brain? The animal thinks, its heart beats, it feels; shall we therefore affirm that it has a soul? There may be laws of the organism which account for these phenomena much more satisfactorily. No one can by his consciousness touch his soul, nor measure it. All he can get is consciousness of consciousness. Let us not get silly in our philosophizings, and say we are conscious of an indestructible soul. I should inquire how you came to know it was indestructible if you cannot tell its qualities. You cannot define its shape; much less can it be expected that you are conscious of the more mysterious property of its future experience. When you say that your consciousness tells you that you have an indestructible soul, I reasonably say your knowledge is very partial to some matters very remote, and wanting about others close at hand. All philosophical arguments advanced in support of the chimera of the natural immortality of man, lack any deeper foundation than the ipse dixit. They are based wholly on unaided, arbitrary assertion. They have not even the aid of altruism. What a man happens to think, what occurs to him as an opinion, is of no value as a proof, especially when it concerns so profound and unseeable a matter as the life. In the next article, we shall take up the argument of development, genius, and susceptibility.