SOME MORE ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORY
Of Rome’s assertion of authority over the Greek states, and of her dealings with them whom she had freed from the oppressions of kings, the ancient history records:— The Romans rendered themselves the sovereign arbiters of those whom they had restored to liberty, and whom they now considered, in some measure, as their freedmen. They used to depute commissioners to them. . . . They soon assumed a magisterial tone, looked upon their decrees as irrevocable decisions, were greatly offended when the most implicit obedience was not paid to them, and gave the name of rebellion to a second resistance. . . . We shall hear one of the chief magistrates in the republic of the Achæans inveigh strongly in a public assembly against this unjust usurpation, and ask by what title the Romans were empowered to assume so haughty an ascendant over them; whether their republic was not as free and independent as that of Rome; by what right the latter pretended to force the Achæans to account for their conduct; whether they would be pleased should the Achæans, in their turn, officiously pretend to inquire into their affairs; and whether matters ought not to be on the same footing on both sides. All these reflections were very reasonable, just, and unanswerable; and the Romans had no advantage in the question but force. With that bit of ancient history, now read the following bit of modern history as published in the Manila correspondence of the Hongkong Telegraph, in August, 1900. The Mr. Mabini of the account was formerly minister of foreign affairs and premier of the provisional Filipino government:— At four o’clock this afternoon Mr. Mabini was taken to the Ayuntamiento, and introduced to the North American commission. There were present President Taft, two other members of the commission, the interpreter, and a shorthand writer. Mr. Mabini asked for this conference in order that it should not be said that he had confined himself to an imperious position without seeking means of approximation and intelligence, according to circumstances. When the session was opened, he said: “I have been imprisoned since December last, and not allowed to be set free without previous recognition of the American sovereignty. The word ‘sovereignty’ in international law has not a precise nor fixed definition. So that in the South African trouble England claims to have sovereignty in the two republics, notwithstanding the recognition of their complete independence made by her with respect to their internal administration. My efforts in favor of my country have no other object but to obtain the most solid guarantee for the liberties and rights of the Filipinos. I therefore asked for a conference to find out to what extent American sovereignty will restrain that which naturally belongs to the Filipino people.” Mr. Taft, having heard the remarks of his companions, replied as follows: “The American sovereignty has the object of giving the Filipinos a good government. The sovereignty that the United States of America claims is the same as that which Russia or Turkey would claim if they occupied the Philippines, with the only difference that the exercise of this sovereignty will be inspired by the spirit of the Constitution. The commission will endeavor51to establish in the Philippines a popular government after the style of that adopted for Porto Rico.” To this Mr. Mabini replied that the principles on which the American Constitution rests declare that the sovereignty rests with the people by natural right; that the American government, by not contenting itself with restraining the sovereignty of the Filipino people, but with completely nullifying it, commits an injustice that sooner or later will demand reparation or explanation; that there can not be a popular government where the people are not given a real and effective participation in the constitution and performance of that government. The commission replied, saying that they were not authorized to discuss abstract matters, as they had orders to make their views prevail by force, when the views of the Filipinos are heard. Then Mr. Mabini said he considered the conference as closed, for he thought it useless to discuss matters and give his views to those who did not want to listen to the voice of reason. Mr. Taft asked him if he wanted to help them in the study of the taxes that may be imposed on the people of the Philippines. Mr. Mabini replied that, considering unjust every tax imposed without the consent of the representatives of those who are to pay it, he could not take part in such study without the representation and command of the people. Mr. Mabini said that he saw the Americans persisted in reducing the Filipinos to the hard alternative of dishonesty or death; and that since this was so, he would prefer to behave himself as an honest man, who puts above all his duties his honor. Between dishonesty and death, it was his duty to prefer the latter. To what pass has the government of the United States come when by its highest possible representative, the personal representative of its president, the chosen standard of comparison in government is “Russia and Turkey”! Is that the government founded by the Fathers? And the commission “are not authorized to discuss abstract matters,” such as “the principles upon which the American Constitution rests”—“sovereignty rests with the people by natural right,” etc., etc., but have “orders to make their views prevail by force, when the views of the Filipinos are heard”! But from whom did the commission get such “orders” as these? Bear in mind that that commission was not created by Congress; it is the “personal representative of the President.” The commission, not being created by Congress, has not from Congress any “orders” of any kind, nor any instruction of any kind. Being the “personal representative of the President,” all the “orders” the commission could receive, could be only from the President himself. Then from whom did the commission receive “orders” to make their views “prevail by force”? And this without any authority, and instead of any authority, to discuss the principles upon which the American Constitution rests: making these only “abstract matters”—the metaphysical; and “their views prevail by force” the concrete—the practical. That commission, not being the creation of Congress, and so having no instructions or directions from Congress, is not a creature of law. The Constitution being held not of its own force to extend to the Philippines, and it not having been extended itself by Congress, the commission is not a creature of law, either statutory or Constitutional. The commission being only the “personal representative of the President,” receiving its “orders” only from him, and that not from him as commander-in-chief of the armies and navies of the United States, but only as civil executive; because the commission is entirely civil, not military,—this makes the commission only the creature of will, and its government only a government of will, and not of law. And will anybody say that this is not a repudiation by the United States of the principles of its Constitution as a Protestant and republican government? As a matter of fact it is the repudiation of all Constitutional principle clear back to Magna Charta, and even of the principle of Magna Charta itself, and at the time was repudiated by the pope, and ended by the king. So that, as we have before shown in these columns, the present colonial course of the United States is not merely a going back from American principles to British, it is a leap over and beyond all Anglo-Saxon history and principle to the times beyond Magna Charta, and to the Roman only. The issue that brought forth Magna Charta was simply that “a king should rule in England by law, and not by force, or rule not at all.” And this principle written out and signed by the king, in Magna Charta, King John, of England, had to accept, or not be crowned. True, the pope repudiated it, and released the king from his oath and the binding obligation of his signature; but against pope and king, the kingdom of England held the principle, and the Charter. John’s son, Henry III, also rejected the Charter, and thought to repudiate the principle, declaring: “Whensoever, and wheresoever, and as often as it may be our pleasure, we may declare, interpret, enlarge, or diminish, the aforesaid statutes, and their several parts, by our own free will, and as to us shall seem expedient for the security of us and our land.” But he, as John, was firmly met by the kingdom’s insistence upon the right of the people and the supremacy of the law. In answer to the king’s pronunciamento, an English judge, Bracton, set the voice of English law in words that are important to be remembered to-day, and by all generations. He declared: “The king must not be subject to any man, but to God and the law, for the law makes him king. Let the king, therefore, give to the law what the law gives to him, dominion and power; for there is no king where will, and not law, bears rule.” Again: “The king can do nothing on earth, being the minister of God, but what he can do as Law: . . . so that, if the king were without a bridle,—that is, the law,—they ought to put a bridle upon him.” Upon this it has been well observed: “Let no Englishman, who lives under the rule of law, and not of will, forget that this privilege has been derived from a long line of forefathers; and that, although the eternal principles of justice depend not upon the precedents of ages, but may be asserted some day by any community with whom a continued despotism has made them ‘native, and to the manner born,’ we have the security that the old tree of liberty stands in the old earth, and that a short-lived trunk has not been thrust into a new soil, to bear a green leaf or two and then to die.”