The rôle played by money, in warfare, is an important one. Vast outlays of means are required for the support of the soldiery, for ammunition, military stores, the mobilization of troops, and their equipment, and countless other war necessities. For this reason it is that one of the greatest war captains of modern times declared that the three essentials to success in modern warfare are: “Money, more money, and, finally, still more money.” In order to obtain the necessary war funds, nations are obliged to borrow of their wealthy citizens or friends, paying interest upon the amounts thus secured.
So far as can be ascertained, Russia is the only nation upon the earth to-day that is not obliged to borrow her sinews of war from private individuals or syndicates. Of course, she may do so as a blind; but the fact is, she is not obliged to borrow. In the May issue of the Arena, Mr. Malcolm J. Talbot informs us that the Russian government has succeeded in hoarding the enormous sum of four billion dollars [four thousand millions! think of it!] as a “Sacred Fund.” It seems that, for the sake of secrecy, “all official reports are silent as to the existence of such a fund, but it is vouched for by an attaché of the late czar, and affirmed by one of the highest church functionaries of St. Petersburg. This fund was founded at the close of the Napoleonic wars, and has been built up to its present figure by the Russian Church. Every year for almost a century an average amount of fifty million dollars has been added to this fund, which has never been intrenched upon to the extent of a single ruble. Every subject of the czar makes a regular contribution to the Church, and this is one source of increment to the ‘Sacred Fund,’ while from the product of the gold mines worked by the government, many millions of dollars of which no public record has been made, have been directed in this same channel.” It must also be remembered that the government of Russia taxes every trust or corporation that enters its domains, and has many other means of revenue not known to those not in its employ.
This vast amount of hoarded wealth gives Russia an immense advantage in case of war. Secure as she naturally is, owing to her unique position in the northern parts, she could devote her entire energies to offensive warfare or to strategy, as the occasion might demand. Again, she would not need to consult any of her subjects, rich or poor, regarding her war policy, as would England, France, or other borrowing nations, who are constrained to advise with the great bankers of Europe before undertaking to fight.
In order to form a faint idea of what Russia could do, in case of war, with the vast means at her command, it may be of interest to note merely one of the pranks she might have played upon England during the strained relations between the two countries about twelve weeks ago. Had the annoying incident in China been sufficiently serious to provoke a declaration of war, Russia might have succeeded in conquering her enemy by the process of starvation. To-day England is absolutely dependent upon the outside world for her food supply. Her annual consumption of breadstuffs is about 230,000,000 bushels, of which amount only 50,000,000 bushels are produced at home. She depends upon the United States for about 100,000,000 bushels each year, and receives from Russia and eastern Europe 40,000,000 more, and from her own colonies about 25,000,000 bushels. Having declared war, Russia would, of course, refuse to send any breadstuffs to England. Then, should she be able by means of secret agents on the Chicago Board of Trade, for instance, to buy up all the wheat the United States had to spare, famine prices would at once prevail in England, and the latter country would have not only Russia to fight abroad, but might have to face bread riots at home. One or two shrewd capitalists, such as young Mr. Leiter, or Mr. Phil Armour, have already been able to “corner” the American wheat market. That being so, why should Russia not be able, by the use of a dozen or more secret agents having Russia’s “Sacred Fund” of four billion dollars to back them, be able easily to secure all the surplus wheat or other breadstuffs of this country?
Commenting upon this possible situation of affairs, Mr. B. W. Snow, a Chicago journalist, states that “the urban population of England is about 25,000,000, and of this number at least 8,000,000 souls barely manage to exist under present normal conditions of food prices. The middle working class, who live in fair comfort so long as the industries of the country furnish steady employment, constitute about 13,000,000, leaving about 4,000,000 in the well-to-do class, who would not immediately suffer if opportunity for employment were limited, or food prices suddenly advanced to a high range. Any serious change in food prices would at once make the first class of 8,000,000 a public charge to be fed by the nation. A great war with a Continental Power would cut off much of England’s trade, and to that extent would withdraw steady employment from a considerable part of the second class, promptly reducing a portion at least to the class of public charges. In 1863 our Civil War, by shutting off one half of England’s cotton supply, threw 400,000 starving people upon public charity in Lancashire alone, and, if such conditions should now413arise throughout the industrial communities of the country, it would mean that the government must feed 15,000,000 or 20,000,000 of its people. . . . A deal of this character would cost money, but if the purchases extended even to 200,000,000 bushels, and the price went up fast enough to make it average $1.50 per bushel, the amount involved would only reach $300,000,000; and when the war was over, the property would sell for at least half that sum, so that the total loss of the coup, which would neutralize England’s magnificent navy and win the supremacy of the world by starving her [Russia’s] rival, would cost Russia $150,000,000, a mere bagatelle, as modern warfare goes.”
As to the length of time that England would be able to hold out under such circumstances, the same writer asserts that “should such a campaign be inaugurated immediately after harvest, the English crop and stocks available in that country would suffice, with economical use, to feed the country for perhaps six months. If it was begun in April, the similar supply would suffice for perhaps four and one-half months. In any case, with the American surplus bought up, and the Russian supply garnered by that government, the task of feeding, for even a short time, the millions of people who, under no condition, could endure any material advance in the price of their daily loaf, would test to the limit the endurance of the British government. If it is difficult to maintain an efficient commissary department for a highly organized army, the task of organizing, under stress of war pressure, a commissariat to feed one third of the people of the country, may well be regarded as appalling, if not impossible. Certainly no aggressive action would be possible against an enemy of equal power, in the face of starvation, riot, and possible revolution at home.”
Of course, these are possibilities, not necessarily probabilities; but possibilities may at any time become probabilities. While it is true that for years the studied policy of the British government has been to maintain a navy equal to “the combined strength of any two possible rival Powers,” still a new combination of circumstances, of alliances, might break even her command of the sea to such an extent as to jeopardize her daily supply of food. As Mr. Smith says, “a campaign of starvation is not a new one to the Russian. He conquered Napoleon by such a policy, even after he was no longer able to face the French legions in the field. The Russian military bureau, studying English trade returns in foodstuffs, is in a position to repeat the observation of the Russian farrier who exclaimed, upon being shown a shoe from a French cavalry horse, ‘No ice points, and winter here. We will win without fighting.’” However that may be, the contemplated movements of Russia, whether possible or probable, will always be of great interest to the student of prophecy and of history. She is already so powerful that one word from her is sufficient to stop most of the Powers, and to check any one of them—the United States included—in any moves they may have on foot that do not suit her. The mere fact that her diplomats, spies, or secret emissaries infest every land, sending her detailed information concerning her enemies—accounts minute enough to include even grocery and meat-market bills—this of itself makes her still more to be dreaded. This great Power is mentioned in prophecy, the words “Rosh,” “Meshech,” and “Tubal” in Ezekiel 38, 39, R. V.—from which are derived the words “Russia,” “Moscow,” and “Tobolsk”—having undoubted reference to the land of the czar.