A New Application by Uriah Smith

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · May 30, 1871

A New Application.

By Uriah Smith

NEARLY all our readers are doubtless familiar with the criticism given on Mark 13:32: “But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in Heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.” It is claimed, and we think very justly too, that the word “know,” here is not to be taken in its most literal import, implying knowledge of, or acquaintance with; but that it is used in a restricted sense, signifying to make known, or concern one’s self with; just as Paul uses the word, when he says, “I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified;” 1 Cor. 2:2; that is, he determined not to make known, or concern himself with, anything else.

One of our exchanges which believes in the conscious state of the dead, while heartily endorsing the criticism, endeavors to draw from it further consolation, by using it to dispose of one of the principal texts which lie against the last-named theory. It says:—

“There are other passages beside those above quoted, in which the word, “know,” is obviously used in the sense here developed. Expressions, for example in Eccl. 9:5–10, ‘The dead know not anything,’ &c.

This is certainly a new application. We cannot say of it as is sometimes said when a new invention is brought out, simple, yet ingenious and useful, “Strange that nobody has thought of this before;” for in this case the strangeness consists in the fact that it should have been thought of at all. It gives very apparent evidence that the view under consideration is laboring hard under that combination of circumstances which is “the mother of invention,” sometimes called necessity.

“The dead know not anything.” “Obviously,” says this writer, the word “know,” in this case, is to be taken in the sense here developed; that is, in the sense of making known or concerning one’s self with. “Obviously,” we reply, the word is to be taken in the same sense in this expression, that it has in the first part of the same verse, which says, “The living know that they shall die.” That which “knows,” in the first sentence of the verse is that which “knows not” in the second sentence. And it is the same kind of “knowing” in both instances. In what sense, then, do the living know that they shall die? Is it not in the sense of being aware of, having acquaintance with, that fact? In the same sense, then, the dead know not anything: they are not aware of anything, have no acquaintance with anything.

But how will the passage sound if we apply to the word “know,” here, the sense which evidently pertains to it in Mark 13:32: “The living know [that is, make known, or concern themselves about, the fact] that they shall die; but the dead know not [do not concern themselves about] anything.” In this sense, the first declaration in the majority of cases is not true; and the second only brings to view a state of voluntary, instead of forced, inactivity.

Solomon is plainly contrasting the condition of the living and the dead. In life there is intelligence, knowledge, and the exercise of all the different emotions of the mind. In death there is nothing of this kind, “for,” says he, “there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave whither thou goest.” The living intelligent man is addressed; and Solomon’s testimony must be impeached, or the doctrine of utter unconsciousness in death is unequivocally established. Obviously the criticism in question, does not, and cannot, apply to this passage.

There are only two other ways in which efforts are, or can be, made to nullify its force. The first is, to say that Solomon speaks only of the body in the grave as knowing nothing, finding no work, device, wisdom, or knowledge, while the immortal entity, the intelligent part, is enjoying in intensified consciousness, all the glories of the heavenly world. But this is making Solomon speak of one part of man while he is living, and of another part when he is dead, giving us meantime no intimation of this change in his subject; and this part which he speaks of as knowing nothing when dead, namely the corporeal substance, is that which of itself is not claimed by any one to know anything while living; so that, on this hypothesis, Solomon might just as well have said that the living know not anything, as to have made that affirmation of the dead. This makes sad havoc with Solomon’s logic, and materially detracts from that degree of wisdom which is usually conceded him. This point may therefore be dismissed.

The next position is, to assert that Solomon is here stating the Epicurean argument, and denying all future existence! This is the last effort of despair. If Solomon had designed to be so understood, he had ability so to express himself that there should be no mistaking his meaning. But as he has given it as his own language, and moreover affirmed, chap. 12:10, that that which was written was upright, even words of truth, we must take it as a plain straightforward statement of the facts in the case, as authoritative as if found in any other portion of the sacred record, or from any other one of the inspired penmen.

U. S.