SOME COURT DECISIONS

Pacific Press Publishing Company · Oakland, California · Sep 17, 1902

FromSigns of the Times, Vol. 28, No. 38.

SOME COURT DECISIONS.

[These epitomes of cases are furnished by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn. Full reports of any case will be furnished for 25 cents.]

Insular Cases.—

By far the most important of the recent cases are the so-called “Insular Cases,” decided by the United States Supreme Court on May 27 last. In brief, the prevailing opinions decided that Porto Rico was territory of the United States from the date of the signing of the treaty of peace; that prior to that event, during the military occupancy, the President, as commander-in-chief of the army, could levy such taxes as he deemed expedient; that, being territory of the United States, and not being one of the States, Congress had power to levy such taxes as it saw fit; and, last, that between the time of the signing of the treaty and the passage of the Foraker tariff act no tariff duty could be legally levied. The majority and dissenting opinions in all of the cases may be found in 21 Supreme Court Reporter, pages 742 to 827, inclusive.

Dissenting Opinions.—

A unique procedure provided for in the State of South Carolina has recently been put into effect by the Supreme Court of that State in the case of Wilson v. Southern Ry. Co., 38 Southeastern, 865. In cases where there are differences of opinion among the members as to the question under consideration, they may call in all the judges of the Circuit Courts for aid and advice in order to finally determine the question involved. We are hardly prepared to suggest that the Supreme Court of the United States resort to this procedure, and call to their assistance all of the Circuit and District Court judges for consultation, whenever they are hopelessly divided in the settlement of an issue, but some such step might happily tend to avoid the cheapening influence of the dissenting opinion.

Use of Return Coupon of Railroad Ticket.—

In the case of Tiedy v. Erie R. Co., 49 Atlantic Reporter, 427, the plaintiff, who was riding from Newark to New York, was arrested for refusing to pay cash for his passage after the conductor had refused to accept his ticket marked “New York to Newark.” The court holds that he is entitled to prove the custom of the company to honor such tickets, and that he might reasonably and honestly believe that the ticket so written was a lawful payment of his fare, and that, having this belief, he did not incur the penalty or subject himself to the arrest sanctioned by the statute.

Deprivation of Liberty.—

The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled, in the case of Simon v. Craft, 21 Supreme Court Reporter, 826, that a person is not deprived of his liberty without due process of law by being adjudged a lunatic in his absence, where the sheriff has served a notice to have the person present, if consistent with his health and safety, and a certificate of a practicing physician is produced by the sheriff at the trial, showing that in the opinion of the physician it would not be safe to produce the alleged lunatic.

Courts of Hawaii.—

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that under the Act of April 30, providing for the government of the territory of Hawaii, suits in admiralty pending in the courts of the republic when the Act took effect must be continued to final judgment in such courts, and are not appealable to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States. This point was held in the case entitled Wilder S. S. Co. v. Hind, 108 Federal, 113.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment.—

It has been held in the case of Territory v. Ketchum, 65 Pacific, 169, recently decided in the Supreme Court of New Mexico, that the law prescribing death as the penalty for assault upon a railroad train with intent to commit murder, robbery, or other felony, does not prescribe a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court said: “The provision of the Constitution was never designed to control the legislative right to determine upon the adequacy of the punishment, but is merely applicable to the modes of the punishment.”