COMPARISON OF NATURE AND MORALITY
By Editor
An Atonement Consistent with Reason. COMPARISON OF NATURE AND MORALITY
THAT the laws of nature have no penalties must be apparent to all if we consider the fact that they are never accepted as, or considered, a judicial system. In executing penalties there must be a consideration of the just desert of the crimes committed. But there is no such consideration, there is no discrimination whatever in the case of a consequence of the violation of natural law. In this respect the operations of natural law are as blind and unreasoning as nature itself. There is implanted in man a sense of justice, or convictions of right, to which he finds no counterpart in the operations of nature. These convictions are entirely on a moral basis. This sense of justice is erected in the human mind as a tribunal, a judgment seat, whereat we determine the nature and desert of actions. And mark this truth: before this tribunal we always arraign the actions of intelligent agents, but never the operations of natural law. And in this, what is true of one is true of all; and it shows that all, whatever their theories may be, do in fact and in practice make a proper distinction between moral and natural laws. This should be well and carefully considered. The prime distinction between moral and natural laws is this: the first has respect to intention—the other has not. Fire will burn us, and water will drown us, whether we fall into them accidentally or rush into them madly. The little child, who is yet unconscious of any intention of good or ill, suffers as certainly and as keenly on putting its hand into the fire, as the man of mature mind who presumptuously does the same thing. And should the man willfully and maliciously set fire to his neighbor's house, and the child, playfully and without intention of wrong, do the same thing, all would blame the one and not the other. And were a judge, in the administration of law, to visit the same penalty upon the man and the child, because the actions and results were the same, all would detest such a perversion of justice. Thus we not only find men acting upon the difference between moral and natural laws, but we find them also with great unanimity judging of the actions of moral agents according to their intentions. But the operations of natural law cannot thus be judged, and its consequences, often miscalled penalties, have no regard whatever for the claims of justice. As before said, the child is burned in the fire as certainly as the man; the good suffer under a violation of nature's laws as severely as the most hardened and brutal. The idea cannot be too strongly impressed upon the mind that, confined in our reasoning to the present state, to observation without a written revelation, justice cannot be attained unto nor vindicated. A moral system is necessary, and the idea of probation must be accepted, in order to meet the requirements of justice. Another point should be noticed. When the demands of a moral law and a natural law conflict, as they often do in this mixed state of good and evil, men always give preference to the former, unless their sensibilities are blunted. And they are often false to the theories which they have adopted to be true to this fact. We sometimes meet with men who deny these distinctions; who assert that there are no laws aside from the laws of nature; yet they act in harmony with the propositions herein set forth. Should one refuse to attempt to rescue his fellow-man from impending destruction by fire, and plead in extenuation that it would have involved the violation of law, as he must have been somewhat burned in the effort, they would, as readily as others, abhor his selfishness. Here they recognize the distinction claimed, and place the moral duty of assisting our neighbor above conformity to natural law. HAVING sufficiently shown that there is a distinction between moral and natural law, and that all men recognize it and act upon the fact, even if they do not admit it in theory, we have a question of great importance to propose. None but the reckless and unthinking can pass it by without giving it attention. The candid must admit that it is one of great interest. It is this: Will these aspirations for the right, this innate sense of justice, to which we have referred, ever be gratified? That they are not, that they cannot be gratified in the present state, scarcely needs further notice. Is my moral nature, my sense of right and justice, satisfied to see virtue trodden under foot? to see the libertine mocking over the grave of blighted hopes and a broken heart? to see the priceless treasure of virtuous purity, around which cluster the fondest hopes of earth, sported with as a mere toy of little worth? to see honest toil sink unreputed, and hide itself in squalid poverty and a pauper's grave? to see the vain rolling in wealth accumulated by fraud and oppression? to see vice exalted to the pinnacle of fame? to hear the praises of him whose very presence is loathsome by reason of the filthiness of his iniquities? And when words fail to express the horrors of such and kindred evils, must I smile complacently and say, This is right? in this my soul delights? But this is but a mere glance at the facts as they exist, as they have existed, and are likely to exist in this present state. Is it possible that these aspirations, these discriminations of right and wrong, were placed within our breasts to be mocked—to look and long in vain? Is it possible that the Supreme One, who has so nicely arranged the material world, and subjected it to certain laws, has placed moral balances in our hands to no purpose? that we are to long for, but never see, a vindication of the great principles of justice? Is it not rather reasonable to conclude that he has a moral Government, and that our moral sense is evidence that we are within the limits of a moral system? Are not our convictions of wrong proof to ourselves of our amenability to such a system? The very fact that we discriminate between moral and natural laws, as we have seen that all men do, and that all pronounce upon the right or wrong of the actions of mankind, is proof of the general recognition of the existence of a moral Government. And so to look above nature, to acknowledge God as a moral Governor, is necessary, to be true to our own natures, to the convictions planted in every breast. In this great truth our aspirations find rest. Here our sense of justice takes refuge; for a Government is a system of laws maintained, and the very idea of a moral Government leads us to look forward to a vindication of the right principles or laws now trampled upon. Why should we pronounce upon the merit or demerit of human actions, if there is no accountability for those actions? Our feelings of responsibility (the movings of conscience) are but the expectation of a great assize, in or by which injustice, fraud, and every wrong, will be requited, and down-trodden virtue and injured innocence be exalted and vindicated. This is, indeed, but a legitimate deduction from the propositions established, and in this we find a sure vindication of the divine Government in regard to the anomalies of the present state. It must, however, be admitted that there are some who deny the existence of moral wrong, and, of course, of accountability for our actions. But their denial or our admission does not weaken our argument, for the denial is only in profession, not in practice. The denial is based on the alleged inability of man to act except in a given line. Man (say they) is a creature of circumstances; the motives which impel him to action are outside of his own will; he is led of necessity to do just as he does, and he cannot do otherwise. Therefore he is not responsible for his actions. But we affirm that this is only their professed belief; not their actual belief. For in practice we find them uniformly false to their theory. They will, as readily as others, sit in judgment upon, and condemn, the actions of their fellow-men. They will blame any for encroaching on their rights. But it were surely the height of folly, the grossest injustice, to blame one for doing that which he cannot avoid. And how unreasonable to think that God bestows a moral sense, and plants within us the monitor of conscience, to lead us to do right, and yet compels us to do wrong. We count the man immoral and degraded who disregards the distinctions of right and wrong; what contempt, then, is thrown upon the originator of the present system by the theory which admits that these distinctions exist; that of right they should be preserved, yet affirms that they cannot be preserved to any extent whatever. Admitting the existence of a God (and we now speak to the consciences of some), what shall we, what must we, think of a God who would frame a system wherein these distinctions could not be preserved? And yet such is the case, if man has no freedom to act. We all acknowledge the difference between right and wrong, as principles; that it is right to regard our neighbor's life and property; and hence, he that disregards them does wrong. And all are conscious that the wrong we do is of ourselves; and no one ever seeks to throw it back to any other cause until his moral sense is perverted by selfishness and false reasoning. Akin to the above position—at least in its unreasonableness—is the theory which admits the existence of God the moral Governor (though this admission is not essential to the theory), and admits that man is responsible for his actions, and admits that all violations of law are certainly punished, and yet denies a future judgment. This is intimately connected with, or is the outgrowth of the error that there are penalties to natural laws; and that all penalties are inflicted immediately upon the violation. Thus (they say), if a man puts his hand in the fire he violates a law of his being; and he does not wait to an indefinite future time for judgment and punishment; he suffers immediately and certainly; and for the violation there is no atonement or forgiveness. This, to some, appears to be truth, for they advance it; to us it seems like a puerility. We repeat, the suffering from contact with fire is not a judicial infliction to serve the ends of justice, as penalty is; it is but a consequence of the violation of natural law; and that it falls as certainly and as severely on the innocent as the guilty. The innocent and unconscious babe suffers by the fire as readily, as certainly, as the willful man. And we can go further in the illustration: the man in cruel malice may hold the hand of the child in the fire; the child does not offend against law, for it did not put its hand in the fire, and it vigorously tries to withdraw it. Here the man does all the wrong, and the child suffers all the penalty! Such is the wisdom, such the justice of this theory. The truth is, that the child suffers as a consequence of the man's wrongdoing. He deserves punishment (the infliction of a penalty) for the action; and if justice is ever vindicated, he will be punished, according to his intention and his commission of a great moral wrong. The admission that all sin will be punished makes necessary the admission of a future judgment; for without that, justice will never be vindicated, and our aspirations for the right will never be satisfied. But one more fallacy of this character we will notice. It is found in the oft-repeated idea that God is so loving, so kind, that he will not mark to condemn our aberrations from duty. It is not necessary to say that this is a denial of the Scriptures in regard to the character of God. But, laying the Bible aside, where is the evidence that God so loves his creatures that he will not mark their faults or maintain the justice of his government? Surely it is not learned from nature that love is the sole attribute of Deity. How came any by the idea that the Deity must possess that degree of love supposed in the statement? Whence do they derive their conceptions of such love, and of its necessity in the divine character? Can any tell? They may reply that these conceptions are intuitive; that they are evolved from their own consciousness; that they have an innate knowledge of the moral fitness of things, and according to this, they clothe Deity with such attributes as their moral sense determines to be fitting to such a Being. Our reply to this is twofold. 1. We deny that such ideas are developed by intuition. The intelligent skeptics of this land and in this age do not derive their knowledge of right, and of the abundance of love in the character of Deity, from the light of nature. They derive them from their surroundings; from the prevalence of Christian influences and Christian literature. To show just what man can learn from nature and by mere intuition, we must take him entirely separated from the influence of the Bible and Christianity. And we hazard nothing in saying that, where Christian example and the teachings of the Bible were entirely unknown, man never developed an exalted idea of Deity. To the contrary, where men have trusted to the light of nature and to the power of human reason, their conceptions of Deity were low and base, generally vile; and this was the case even where there was considerable proficiency in philosophy and the arts. Many deny the Scriptures who are indebted to them and to their influence for very much of the knowledge of which they are proud. 2. In thus exalting love in the divine character at the expense of other attributes, they are only partially true to their higher nature; partially just to their own consciousness. Our consciousness, our self-judgment of the moral fitness of things, gives us as definite and clear conceptions of justice as of love. All the propositions established in this argument tend to this point. We are apt to lose sight of justice, and to exalt love. This is quite natural with all who have any sense of wrong (and who has not?), for we feel the need of love or mercy, and are ever willing or anxious to screen ourselves from justice. But in this, as before remarked, we do violence to our moral sense, to gratify our selfish feelings. Can any one dispassionately reason and reflect on this subject, and accept the idea of a God of even partial justice? The idea is alike repugnant to reason and to reverence. God must be strictly, infinitely just. Who would not choose to be annihilated rather than to possess immortal existence in a universe governed or controlled by a being of almighty power, but lacking justice? Many professed believers in the Bible manifest the same tendency, to exalt the love of God above his justice. It is a great perversion of the gospel. God is infinite in every perfection. His love cannot be more than infinite. If his justice were less than infinite, he would be an imperfect or finite being. The gospel plan was not devised, and Christ did not die to exalt his love above his justice, but to make it possible to manifest his infinite love toward the penitent sinner, without disparagement to his infinite justice; “that he might be just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus.” Rom. 3:23–26. But this will be examined when we come to the Biblical argument.377EDITOR.