An Atonement Consistent with Reason.
By Editor
By examining the foregoing points, it will be perceived that the acts of abolishing the law, and pardoning the transgressor, cannot in any case be united. One would be a nullity if both were attempted. This will be better appreciated when we consider the conditions under which pardon may be granted, and how the Government (which must ever be the first and chief concern) will be affected thereby. § III. PARDON SUPPOSES OR RECOGNIZES, 1. The guilt of the condemned. This is evident. To pardon an innocent man would be preposterous. Human Governments sometimes professedly do this, as when it is ascertained that a man, who is in prison for a term of years, is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, the Governor issues a pardon as a means of his release. But it is a misnomer, and really an insult to the innocent man. The law should make provision for release from unjust confinement without subjecting a man to the disgrace of receiving a pardon when he had committed no crime. 2. The power of government. This is equally evident. To pardon is to remit a penalty which might be inflicted. It would be a mere farce to offer a pardon to those whom the Government had no power to punish. 3. The justice of the law transgressed. This is nearly parallel with the first proposition, and like it, evident; for to pronounce a man guilty is to say that he has done wrong. And if a violation of law be wrong, the law violated must be right. An unjust law is, in a moral view, a nullity. When a law is found to be unconstitutional, or a nullity, the prisoner under it is not really pardoned; he should be released from false imprisonment; and such release is of justice, not of mercy. But pardon is of favor. Thus it is clear that the justice of the law is acknowledged in the article of pardon. Now as pardon supposes the guilt of the prisoner, the power of the Government, and the justice of the law, in all these it may be made to honor the Government and vindicate its integrity. But there are other principles involved. The act of pardon recognizes the claims of law, by recognizing its justice. Thus far it honors the Government. But the question still remains, Are those claims satisfied as well as acknowledged? According to a plain truth before noticed, the sinner ought to be punished; justice imperatively demands it. How then can pardon be granted, and strict justice be administered? In this case there will arise two conflicting interests; one of sympathy for the accused, leaning toward mercy; the other, strenuous for the integrity of the Government, leaning toward justice. How can these principles be reconciled? Can both parties be satisfied? Here is a difficulty; and this will lead us to notice the conditions or restrictions under which pardon may be granted with safety. For an indiscriminate, unconditional pardon is dangerous to the Government. Closely examining this subject we find § IV. WHAT THE GOVERNOR MUST DO IN GRANTING PARDON. He must do one of the following things:— 1. Disregard the strict claims of law and justice. But this, of course, is evil in its tendency, giving license to crime, and favoring lawlessness, rather than restraining it, which latter must remain the true object of government. This, indeed, is the very thing we have all the time been guarding against. We cannot admit this, it being dangerous to the Government. Because if the claims of the law may be disregarded in one case, they may be in many—they may be in all; and then government is at an end. And if the executive sets the example of disregarding the claims of the law, others may thereby be led to follow his example, or all may; and the result is the same—lawlessness and anarchy. And all this from following the example of him who occupies the throne of justice! The very thought is, in the highest degree, abhorrent. Only one way remains possible by which pardon may be granted without trampling on justice, and endangering the Government; that is 2. Make satisfaction to the law by voluntary substitution. If the substitution be voluntary, so that the substitute be satisfied, and the full penalty of the law be inflicted, so that the law and justice be satisfied, all must be satisfied—all conflicting interests and feelings must be reconciled. Let no one say, to oppose this, that such is not the case when pardon is granted in human Governments; for these are imperfect, and instead of conforming strictly to justice they can only hope to approximate it. The interests above referred to are never harmonized in human Governments. In these, if the prisoner is punished less than the penalty indicated by the law, then the law is deprived just so much of its due. In such case, justice is not reconciled or vindicated; it is suspended. All must see at a glance that the means herein proposed alone obviates all difficulties. Let us further examine its effects. § V. VOLUNTARY SUBSTITUTION, 1. Recognizes the claims of law. We have supposed substitution wherein all parties are satisfied—all conflicts reconciled. But if the law were unjust, if the accused were not really guilty of a wrong, the act of condemning would be tyrannical. There could then be no satisfaction, either to justice, or to the condemned, or to his substitute. Hence, to obtain the desired result, there must be acquiescence in the justness of the proceeding, which is a recognition of the justice of the law which condemned. 2. It honors and maintains the Government. It must be admitted that every infringement on the claims of law, every departure from strict justice, is a violation of common rights, and endangers the Government. Whatever honors and vindicates the claims of law and justice, tends to maintain the Government; and of course to vindicate personal rights under it. This voluntary substitution does, as has been shown. 3. It dispenses mercy, which could not otherwise be offered consistently with the great principles of right and justice. Hence, all the objects of government—justice and mercy, truth and love,—meet in this arrangement. This is precisely the idea of an Atonement—not a thing to be deprecated, as some have vainly imagined, but to be loved and esteemed, as a certain vindication of right and justice, and a beneficent dispensation of love and mercy. In the examination of principles thus far we have found that the Atonement affects our relation to the Government in two respects, looking to the past and to the future. To the past, in that it frees from condemnation for past offenses; and to the future, in that it recognizes the claims of the law, thus binding us to future obedience to the law. But some affect to discover no harmony between these objects, though it is plain that a proposed Atonement which should lose sight of either would leave the sinner condemned, or dishonor the Government. It may, however, be noticed further, § VI. WHY AN ATONEMENT IS NECESSARY. 1. Future obedience will not justify the guilty. To argue this seems hardly necessary, as it has been shown that justice and mercy meet in no way but by an Atonement. But some deny the use, by which it is presumed they mean the necessity, of obeying a law which will not justify the guilty. But the deficiency lies only in their own oversight. They make no distinction between justifying the innocent and the guilty. The innocent are justified by law; the guilty cannot be. But the innocent are justified by law only if they remain innocent; that is, if they continue to obey. While the transgressor, already condemned, is not freed from condemnation of past offense by future obedience. In this, no more is claimed than is settled as a principle of action in legal and even in commercial transactions. He who killed, last year, cannot offer in justification that he has not killed, this year. The judge has no right to listen to the plea of the thief, that he has not recently stolen, while the evidence of his past guilt is clear. It does not release a man from a debt to pay for what he buys to-day. Present justice and present morality simply answer a present demand, leaving the past unsettled. But we have a question to ask to those who think it is not required to keep a law because it will not justify the transgressor. If the law condemns a thief, and he can only be cleared by pardon, does the granting of a pardon release him from obligation401to keep the law, and leave him free to steal thereafter? 2. We have no ransom to bring. The demand of the Government is obedience; and the duty is perpetual. Any cessation or suspension is a break in the chain that we cannot restore. We cannot on one day perform the duties of another, in such a manner as to suspend obligations on that other day. Presenting this idea on a moral basis purely, we will be better able to appreciate it. The obligation to love God with all our heart binds us every day of our life. Suppose we fail on one day, it would be absurd to say we could make amends by another day's obedience; for that would be to love God that other day with more than all the heart, so as to apply some of our superabundance of love to the past! Hence the transgressor could not save himself, even though he retained all his original strength to obey; but the following truth is well known:— 3. We are incapacitated by immoral practices. In this, appeal is made to the consciousness of every candid, reflecting mind. We all acknowledge ourselves to be subjects of temptation, and often find in ourselves a proneness to do that which our convictions forbid. If we allow ourselves to do wrong, these feelings become still stronger, and we are less able to resist the temptation. Wrong-doing becomes a habit, hard to resist or overcome. Thus, he who has a moderate desire to drink ardent spirits will find that desire greatly strengthened by indulgence; and it will finally, if indulged too far, bring him completely under its control. This is the tendency of all wrong-doing. Now we all feel conscious of having done more or less wrong; and it is but reasonable to say we have done more than we are conscious of, inasmuch as we have not been sufficiently tenacious of the right, nor very watchful to observe our own wrongs. And, according to the plain truth herein stated, we have become weak according to the wrong we have done, and so much the more need the assistance of a third party to set us right with the power we have offended. An Atonement must not only unite justice and mercy, and reconcile the transgressor to the law, but the perpetuity and stability of the Government should be the first consideration, as they are first in importance in our relations and duties, because on them the perpetuity of all private relations and rights depends. We all assent to this, that public good should be held paramount to private interest. But these only come in conflict when we place ourselves in opposition to the Government. Hence, if our interest conflicts with the Government, which is the conservator of general rights, it is proved to be a selfish interest. For, had we honored and sustained the Government in our lives or actions, it would justify or sustain us; but if our rights are forfeited by disobedience, wherein is the Government to blame? Because the transgressor has sacrificed his own rights, it is not therefore reasonable to ask that justice be dishonored, and the rights of others be sacrificed for his benefit. As right should be the first consideration in all transactions, the interest of the Government, which is right, should certainly be held paramount to the good of the transgressor, who is wrong. Therefore, in making an Atonement, the upholding of law—the maintaining of governmental authority—should be held as of the first importance. This is the only manner in which an Atonement can honor the Government in behalf of which it is made. By a single violation of law, we forfeit our rights and privileges; but by persisting in such violation, or inducing others so to do, and thus disregarding the authority of law, we take the rank of rebels or traitors against the Government. Our relation to the Government while we are in that position, and our relation to the means of our restoration, should be considered with great carefulness and candor. § VII. THE SINNER MUST ACCEPT, NOT MAKE, CONDITIONS. This proposition must be evident to all, for 1. Treason is the highest crime. He who commits murder takes a life, but he who seeks to subvert the law, seeks the destruction of life's safeguard, of that which is to protect life by preventing and punishing crime. Hence, it is the aggregation of all crimes. 2. The Government has the sole right to free therefrom. By this is meant that the Government has the sole right to dictate the terms or conditions by which rebels may be restored to citizenship. This is true, also, in regard to all crimes for which pardon is desired. And this right, Government ought to exercise. No criminal has any right to dictate the terms of his own pardon, or the means by which he may be restored to the favor of the Government. And no one who has any regard for violated rights, for down-trodden justice, for the sacred principles of law and order, could be willing to see the traitor unconditionally restored to place and favor. No Government would be safe pursuing such a course; neither could it command respect. 3. He who will not accept the conditions is a traitor still. If the Government has the sole right to dictate terms to rebels, which all must allow, then the transgressor can only change his relation to the Government by accepting those terms; and if he refuses to accept them, he, of course, persists in maintaining his position in rebellion. Or to substitute terms of his own would be no better, but rather an insult to the Government, a denial of its right and authority. If a criminal were to dictate how crimes should be treated, government would be a farce and become the contempt of honest men. Therefore two things must be required of a transgressor or rebel, which only can be accepted, to wit:— 1. UNQUALIFIED SUBMISSION TO THE LAWS WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSGRESSED, and, 2. A HEARTY ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN OR CONDITIONS OFFERED FOR HIS RESTORATION. (To be Concluded.)
EDITOR.