THE WAR IN THE EAST

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Feb 28, 1878

THE WAR IN THE EAST.

It was on the 24th of April, 1877, that Prince Gortchakoff, the Chancellor of the Russian Empire, requested Tavfek Bey, the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires at St. Petersburg, to “be so kind as to inform” his Government that from that day Russia considered herself in a state of war with the Porte. The substance of this polite notification was simultaneously communicated by circular to the great powers. Without a moment’s delay the Russian armies, which, for some months, had been gathering on the frontier, crossed into Turkish territory. And thus began the war which within nine months has brought the Porte to the feet of the Czar.

Unable to put down the Herzegovinian revolt or to satisfy Servia with promises, the matters were, by mutual consent, referred to a neutral commission of inquiry, which accomplished nothing, and was followed by a joint request, known as the Andrassy note, which was sent to the Porte by the powers and elicited the usual half-assenting reply. Then came the fanatical Moslem outbreak at Salonica, the Bulgarian massacres, and open war with Servia. It was speedily evident that Turkey was more than a match for the Servians, and an armistice was arranged through the intervention of Russia. Further negotiations succeeded, ending with a protocol of the powers, to which the Porte testily replied in substance that, “Strong in the justice of her cause, and trusting in her God, Turkey had determined to ignore what had been decided without her and for her.” Then was it that Russia came to the decision of independent action, and gave the order for the crossing of the Turkish frontiers.

The average familiarity of the reader with the map of the confines of Europe and Asia is sufficient for the understanding of the geographical outlines of the war thus precipitated. The peculiar geographical conditions determined the plan and conduct of the campaign entered upon by Russia, compelling her to pursue two lines of advance instead of one,—to cross both the European and the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey; thus by one way or the other to circumvent the Black Sea barrier, and threaten the objective point of Constantinople far to the southward.

As we now look back over the conduct of the war, the European advance is plainly the one most vigorously conducted, and the one marked by the most important events. The entrance into Asia has more the appearance of a feint on a large scale, designed to draw Turkish attention in that direction and to furnish some necessary occupation for a considerable part of the Ottoman armies.

Three critical steps marked the campaign of European Turkey. The first of these was the crossing of the Danube. This majestic river, full of the associations of romance and history, after traversing a large section of Turkish territory nearly from west to east, turns sharply to the north just before reaching the Black Sea, into which it finally empties by several mouths. The last seventy-five miles or so of its course constitutes the boundary between Turkey and Russia. The long and narrow neck of land formed between the later course of the river and the Black Sea is called the Dobrudscha. Along the river, above this, and stretching westward almost to the confines of Austria, is a line of Turkish fortresses, the most important of which are Widin, Nikopol, Sistova, Rustchuk, and Silistria. Further to the southward, and in quadrilateral relations with Rustchuk and Silistria, are the fortresses of Shumla and Varna, the latter lying upon the Black Sea. Russia’s first move was to get beyond this immediate barrier of nature and military art. One army crossed into the Dobrudscha, and took up a watchful possession of that territory as far south as the bend in the Danube. Thus supported on the left, the remaining forces crossed the Danube at Soninitza, opposite Sistova. The crossing was made the latter part of June, after long delays and with much finesse, and not without peculiar difficulty and some armed opposition; but on the whole far more easily than was to have been expected. Immediately upon the passage of the river an army of Rustchuk was formed to watch the fortresses of the quadrilateral. The army of Rustchuk and the army of the Dobrudscha thus formed a protection upon the left flank of the main forces of the Russians headed to the southward.

The second critical step of the Russians was the passage of the Balkans. This was effected by cavalry, under Gen. Gourko, in July, through a pass which the Turks had strangely left unguarded. Had the Russian generalship been better, the main army might probably have followed Gourko, and subsequent events would have taken a different turn, and led to a speedier conclusion. As it was, Gourko was obliged to re-cross the Balkans, and then, growing out of the attempts of the Turks to follow him, ensued the series of terrible battles for the possession of the Shipka Pass, which the Russians finally succeeded in holding. This was in July, August, and September.

The third critical period of the campaign in Bulgaria, was that of the battles around Plevna. The Russians, once fairly across the Danube, and pushing somewhat eagerly onward down across Bulgaria, to cross the Balkans, overlooked the presence of a large Turkish force at Widin, on their extreme right. As they advanced, their force advanced, and they soon found themselves menaced by it in their right rear. The first battle of Plevna was fought with the Russian intent of destroying this menacing force. It was a defeat for the Russians. A second and bloodier battle was fought with the same result. And then a third in which the Russians were again defeated, and with sorer loss than ever. This brought the campaign well into September. Under the direction of the famous engineer Todleben, regular siege was now laid to Plevna, and its surrender at last followed, the date being the 10th of December.

These general outlines of the campaign are very faintly drawn, and include, of course, an infinite variety of marchings and countermarchings, of engagements ranging from battles of considerable importance to the slight skirmishes of parties of reconnaissance, of cavalry raids and artillery duels, of torpedo warfare and Cossack exploits. The crossing of the Danube furnished many a picturesque and striking scene. The occupation of one Bulgarian village after another was marked by incidents romantic and pathetic by turns. The cruelties practiced by Kurd and Bashi Bazouk had pleasing relief in the predominant kindliness of the Russian regular. The piled-up masses of the Balkans and the fertile plains and valleys below combined to form a remarkable landscape. Great reputations were made and lost by generals and other officers on both sides, as in our own war of the rebellion. There were displays of incompetence by bureau officials and higher commanders, and useless sacrifice of brave and devoted men through blunder or caprice. Turkish elan was often more than a match for Russian obstinacy. And though by midsummer it seemed as if the Russian army was staggering under the load it had lifted, with the opening of 1878 came evidence that what had always been deemed the probable issue of the war would be the actual one.

The campaign in Asia, though on a smaller scale than that in Europe, furnished in some respects a striking parallel to it. There was at first the same easy and triumphant advance of the invading forces, marked by the capture of Bajazid and Ardahan; then a period of struggle and disaster and check, lasting from the middle of May up to September; then a new impulse forward, with the overwhelming defeat of the Turks under Mukhtar Pasha in October, and the capture of Kars in November.

The events since the fall of Plevna and of Kars are too recent to call for review here. The swift advance of the Russian armies beyond the Balkans, through Roumelia, past Philippopolis and Adrianople, and so on toward Constantinople, has filled up the month of January with an exciting chapter of current history. And as these words are written the victorious armies of the Czar are practically in possession of the Turkish capital.

In the circumstances of its origin; in the prestige and power of the two nations party to it; in the gravity of the political, social, and religious interests involved; in its recondite relation to the prophetic voice of the Christian Scriptures; in the concern with which it has been regarded by all of Europe; in the historic character of the ground upon which it has been fought; in the magnitude of the armies which it has brought into conflict; in the number and sharpness of its battles; and in the heroism and military skill which it has witnessed,—this Russo-Turkish war of 1877 deservedly takes place among the memorable wars of all time; and its effects upon the European fabric are likely to be of the most permanent description.—Christian Union.