The Abiding Sabbath by A. T. J.

International Tract and Missionary Society · Oakland, California · Feb 11, 1886

“The Abiding Sabbath.”

By A. T. J.

SOME FIVE-HUNDRED-DOLLAR LOGIC.

It will be borne in mind that the book entitled “The Abiding Sabbath” was written to prove “the perpetual obligation of the Lord’s day;” and that by the term “Lord’s day,” the author of the book means, in every instance, the first day of the week. Therefore, “being interpreted,” the book “The Abiding Sabbath” is an argument to prove the perpetual obligation of the first day of the week. It is likewise to be remembered that the trustees of Dartmouth College paid the Fletcher prize of $500 for the essay which composes the book “The Abiding Sabbath.” This certainly is tangible proof that those trustees, and the Committee of Award appointed by them, considered that the object of the essay had been accomplished, and that thereby the perpetual obligation of the first day of the week had been proved. But we are certain that those of our readers who have read the two preceding articles on this subject, will wonder how, in view of the arguments there used, the author can make it appear that the first day of the week is “the abiding Sabbath.” Well, to tell in a few words what we shall abundantly demonstrate, he does it by directly contradicting every sound argument that he has made, and every principle that he has established.

In the first chapter of the book, from the scripture, “God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made” (Gen. 2:3), he proves the institution of the Sabbath at creation, and says: “Whatever institutions were given to man then, were given for all time.”

And again: “ ‘God rested the seventh day,’ and by so doing has given to the law of the Sabbath the highest and strongest sanction possible, even to Deity. . . . It is therefore bounded by no limits of time, place, or circumstance, but is of universal and perpetual authority.”

It was the seventh day upon which God rested from the work of creation; it was the seventh day which he then blessed; it was the seventh day which he then sanctified; and he says, “The seventh day is the Sabbath.” Now if, as Mr. Elliott says, this institution was given to man “for all time,” and that, too, “with the highest and strongest sanction possible even to Deity;” and if it is bounded by no limits of time, place, or circumstance, how can it be possible that the first day of the week is “the abiding Sabbath”? It is clearly and absolutely impossible. The two things cannot stand together. God did not rest the first day of the week. He did not bless, nor did he sanctify, the first day of the week. He has never called the first day of the week the Sabbath; nor as such an institution has he ever given it any sanction of Deity, much less has he ever given it the “highest and strongest sanction possible even to Deity.” Then upon no principle of truth can it ever be made to appear that the first day of the week is the abiding Sabbath.

Then in Part II., on the fourth commandment,—the “Sabbath of the law,”—he says of the Sabbath therein given to Israel when God brought them out of Egypt:—

“The first institution of religion given to the emancipated nation was the very same with the first given to man.”—P. 110.

He says that it has “a meaning not for the Hebrew alone, but for the whole race of mankind;” that “the reason of the commandment recalls the ordinance of creation;” that “the ideas connected with the Sabbath in the fourth commandment are thus of the most permanent and universal meaning;” and that “the institution, in the light of the reasons assigned, is as wide as creation and as eternal as the Creator.”—Pp. 116, 128.

And yet into this commandment, which says as plainly as language can speak, “The seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God,” Mr. Elliott proposes to read the first day as “the abiding Sabbath.” Before noticing his reasons for such a step, we would insert one of his own paragraphs:—

“Long should pause the erring hand of man before it dares to chip away with the chisel of human reasoning one single word graven on the enduring tables by the hand of the infinite God. What is proposed? To make an erasure in a Heaven-born code; to expunge one article from the recorded will of the Eternal! Is the eternal tablet of his law to be defaced by a creature’s hand? He who proposes such an act should fortify himself by reasons as holy as God and as mighty as his power. None but consecrated hands could touch the ark of God; thrice holy should be the hands which would dare to alter the testimony which lay within the ark.”—Pp. 128-9. And so say we.

After proving that the ten commandments are of universal and perpetual obligation, he discovers that the decalogue “contains transient elements.” He says:—

“It may be freely admitted that the decalogue in the form in which it is stated, contains transient elements. These, however, are easily separable. For example, the promise attached to the requirement of filial reverence, ‘that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee,’ has a very evident reference to Israel alone, and is a promise of national perpetuity in possession of the promised land.”

But just here he discovers that this is not a “transient element,” and that it has not “reference to Israel alone;” for he continues in the very same paragraph:—

“Even this element is not entirely of limited application, however; for Paul quotes the commandment in his letter to the Christians at Ephesus (Eph. 6:2), as ‘the first . . . with promise,’ evidently understanding the covenant of long life to have a wider scope than simply the Hebrew nationality. And it is clear that nothing can be imagined which could give more enduring stability to civil institutions than that law-abiding character which is based on respect to superiors and obedience to their commands.”—Pp. 130, 121.

His proposition is that “the decalogue contains transient elements.” And to demonstrate his proposition, he produces as an “example,” a “transient element” which he immediately proves is not a transient element at all. Then what becomes of his proposition? Well, by every principle of common logic, it is a miserable failure. But by this new, high-priced kind, this five-hundred-dollar-prize logic, it is a brilliant success; for by it he accomplishes all that he intended when he started out; that is, it is a piece of literary legerdemain by which he puts aside as a “transient element” the seventh day, and swings into its place the seventh part of time. For after proving that his example of a transient element is not a transient element at all, he continues:—

“This serves to illustrate how we may regard the temporal element in the law of the Sabbath. It does not bind us to the precise day, but to the seventh of our time.”

To the trustees of Dartmouth College, and to the Committee of Award which they appointed, and to the American Tract Society, it may serve to illustrate such a thing; but to anybody who loves truth, sound reasoning, and fair dealing, it only serves to illustrate the deplorable weakness of the cause in behalf of which resort has to be made to such subterfuges.

Besides this, his admission that the decalogue contains transient elements is directly contrary to the argument that he has already made on this very subject. On page 116, he has already written of the ten commandments:—

“These statutes are therefore not simply commands of God; for God may give commandments which have only a transient and local effect; they are in a distinctive sense the word of God, an essential part of that word which abideth. . . . By the phrase ‘ten words,’ as well as in the general scope of Hebrew legislation, the moral law is fully distinguished from the civil and ceremonial law. The first is an abiding statement of the divine will; the last consists of transient ordinances having but a temporary and local meaning.”

Yet directly in the face of this, he will have it freely admitted that the decalogue “contains transient elements.” Are there transient elements in the divine will? Can that which abideth be transient? And if the decalogue contains transient elements, then wherein is it “fully distinguished” from the “civil and ceremonial law,” which “consists of transient ordinances”? The genuine logic of his position is (1) The ceremonial law consists of transient ordinances; (2) The decalogue is fully distinguished from the ceremonial law; (3) Therefore the decalogue consists of nothing transient. But with the aid of this five-hundred-dollar-prize logic it is thus: The ceremonial law consists of transient ordinances. The decalogue is fully distinguished from the ceremonial law. Therefore it may be freely admitted that the decalogue contains transient elements!! And so “with the ceremonial system vanished the Jewish Sabbath,” which he defines to be the seventh day, p. 177, 190. By one argument on these transient elements, he manages to put away the precise seventh day, and to put in its place “the seventh of our time;” by another he is enabled to abolish the precise seventh day as well as the seventh of our time, by which he opens the way to insert in the commandment the precise first day as the “abiding Sabbath” and of “perpetual obligation.”

Again we read:—

“While the Sabbath of Israel had features which enforce and illustrate the abiding Sabbath, it must not be forgotten that it had a wholly distinct existence of its own. . . . Moses really instituted something new, something different from the old patriarchal seventh day.”—P. 135.

With this read the following:—

“The first institution of religion given to the emancipated nation was the very same with the first given to man.”—P. 110.

How the Sabbath of Israel could be the very same with the first given to man, and yet have a wholly distinct existence of its own; how it could be the very same with the first given to man, and yet be something new 2500 years afterward; how it could be something different from the old patriarchal seventh day, and yet in it there be “still embodied the true Sabbath,” we cannot possibly conceive; but perhaps the genius that can discern in the decalogue transient elements which it proves are not transient at all, could also tell how all these things can be.

Just one more illustration of the wonderful efficacy of this five-hundred-dollar-prize logic, and we shall close this article. On page 135, he says:—

“In the Mosaic Sabbath, for the time of its endurance and no longer, was embodied, for a particular people and no others, this permanent institution which was ordained at creation, and which now lives with more excellent glory in the Lord’s day.”

That is to say: 1. In the Mosaic institution, “for

the time of its endurance [1522 years] and no longer,” was embodied an institution which is “rooted in the eternal world” (p. 28), and which is as eternal as the Creator (p. 126); 2 In the Mosaic institution, which was “for a particular people and no others,” was embodied an institution whose “unrelaxed obligation” extends to “every creature,” “to all races of earth and all ages of the world’s history” (pp. 122, 124).

In other words, in an institution that was for a particular people and no others, for 1522 years and no longer, was embodied an institution that is eternal, and for all races in all ages of the world’s history.

Now we wish that Mr. Elliott, or some one of those who were concerned in paying the five-hundred-dollar prize for this essay, would tell us how it were possible that an institution that is as eternal as the Creator could be embodied in one that was to endure for 1522 years and no longer; and how an institution that is of unrelaxed obligation upon all races in all ages, could be embodied in one that was for a particular people and no others. And when he has told us that, then we wish he would condescend to inform us how in the Mosaic Sabbath there could be embodied three such diverse elements as (1) The “permanent institution which was ordained at creation,” which was the seventh day; (2) “Something new,” which he says was “not improbably a different day;” and (3) “The institution which lives now with more excellent glory in the Lord’s day,” which he says is the first day of the week.

We have not the most distant idea, however, that Mr. Elliott, or any one else, will ever explain any of these things. They cannot be explained. They are absolute contradictions throughout. But by them he has paved the way by which he intends to bring in the first day of the week as the abiding Sabbath, and they are a masterly illustration of the methods by which that institution is made to stand.

Next week we shall notice his Sabbath of Redemption.