TRUE AMERICANISM by Editor

Pacific Press Publishing Company · Oakland, California · Aug 24, 1904

FromSigns of the Times, Vol. 30, No. 34.

TRUE AMERICANISM.

By Editor

The Right to Labor.

REPEATEDLY have we said that our sympathies are with the workingmen, the daily, the weekly, the monthly wage-earners, with the corner-grocery men, and the small dealers.

We have no sympathy with the trust idea in commercialism or religion. This does not mean that we should not possess convictions of truth and right and duty, but it does mean, also, that because we do possess these, and demand the equal right of their exercise in justice and equality, we also demand the same just and equal rights for our opponents. The true man asks no more favors for himself from government than he demands for all his fellow-men.

Because we believe this, because this is the conviction of our souls, our sympathies for the laboring man are not for a class, but for all.

A trust in labor, monopoly in labor, is as wrong, as unjust, in the ranks of labor, as it is in the banks of capital. It breeds the same spirit of arrogance, of class hatred, of contempt of men, of disregard of law, to compass a coveted end, in both cases.

Therefore, he who opposes the capital trust from principle must, to be consistent, oppose the labor trust—yclept "union"—from principle. The "tie-up" and the "lock-out," the "boycott" and the "black list," the "freezing out" and the "picket-ing," are all fruit from the same tree, grown in the same soil, the natural, selfish heart of man. All are unchristian, and against every principle of primitive Americanism.

In harmony with these principles is a recent decision of Hon. J. Hunt, judge in the Superior Court of San Francisco, in a recent decision granting permanent injunction against striking stablemen, in the case of E. G. Pierce versus the Stablemen's Union. The judge reviews at length the picketing, the rowdyism, the violence, the intimidation and injury of non-union workingmen, the ruination of business, the utter irresponsibility of the Stablemen's Union, and sets forth the impossibility of the prosecution of all, or even the greater part, of the offenders. Judge Hunt therefore contends that the act passed in 1903, by the state Legislature, preventing interference by injunction in "trade disputes" between employers and workingmen is, in some of its provisions, unconstitutional, because—

First, it violates that provision of our state constitution which declares that "all men have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." This provision is contained in the Declaration of Rights, and it forever safeguards the rights of persons and rights of property.

Freedom is the spirit and essence of the Constitution, but the freedom thus guaranteed to the citizen no more implies a license in one man, or in any combination of men, to harass or injure another in the pursuit of his lawful business, than it implies a license to deprive him of his personal liberty. The Constitution alike protects natural freedom and industrial freedom. If the right of property is inalienable, the right to labor is inviolate.

Right to Labor.

Therefore, these rights can not be impaired by legislation. He further says:—

The right to labor is a right of property, and the duty to protect it is the highest office of our laws.

In 127 Cal., 13, the Supreme Court quotes with approval the following extract from State vs. Goodwill, 33 W. Va., 179:—

"The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolate."

Hence, no syndicate of employers or union of employees can bar one of the right to labor, for the right to labor is the right to live; but how can it be said that a right is inviolate if, when violated, the law affords no redress? For the law to declare a right and then deny it all means of enforcement would be to—

Keep the word of promise to our ear, And break it to our hope.

But such a reproach does not rest upon the law, for it is one of its oldest and best maxims that "where there is a wrong there is a remedy." Hence, when a property right is violated, and the common law affords the injured party no remedy, equity will intervene to redress the wrong.

To deny the plaintiff equitable relief for the invasion of his rights of property is to deny him of process of law; and to violate a fundamental principle of the constitution of the state; for a right without a remedy is no right at all.

Special Legislation.

Judge Hunt declares the act of 1903 unconstitutional, as we declared at the time, because it is special, or class, legislation. Among other things he declares:—

The provision [of the act of 1903] is special legislation because in matters of "trade dispute" it denies to employers an equitable remedy which it accords to the non-employing class. It applies to "trade disputes" a rule not applicable to other disputes.

One class of property and of property owners, under certain conditions may obtain equitable relief which, under the same conditions, this act denies to another class of property and property owners.

The owner of real estate is entitled to an injunction against a trespasser whose acts threaten his possession, but under this legislation, the man who owns a business under like conditions, is denied relief.

The provision is special legislation because it applies only to a particular class and makes employees the immunes of the law. The constitution of the state provides that no citizens or class of citizens shall be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.

If the acts herein complained of were committed by an organization of men between whom and the plaintiff the relation of employment never existed, the plaintiff's right to equitable relief would be undoubted, but under this provision, if one or more of his employees, in combination with others, commit these acts, the equitable remedy does not exist. In my opinion, there can be no legal support for such legislation, undermining and destroying, as it does, a constitutional right.

Makes Impotent the Court.

Third, the provision in question is void, because it seeks to deprive the Superior Courts of a judicial prerogative conferred upon them by the Constitution.

The Constitution provides that "the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of all cases in equity."

If the Legislature can deprive a court of equity of the right to issue an injunction in a case like this, then it could deprive it of the right to issue an injunction in any case; it could absolutely divest the court of what is and always has been one of its most potent remedies, thus nullifying its powers and making impotent its decrees.

Legislature Can Not Destroy Remedy.

It is undoubtedly true that the Legislature, as was held in these cases, may alter or regulate remedies and procedure, legal and equitable; but it can not destroy a substantive remedy, nor can it defeat the enforcement of a constitutional right by depriving the injured party of the only remedy that the law can award for its violation.

This case is manifestly one of equitable cognizance, for the reasons already stated; and in 24th Cal., 409, the Supreme Court declared that "in matters of equitable cognizance, powers granted by the Constitution can not be taken away by legal enactment."

For each and all of the reasons herein before stated, I am of the opinion that, insofar as the Legislative act in question attempts to deprive a court of equity of the power to issue an injunction in cases of this character, it is unconstitutional and void.

Now, all this seems to us, not only reasonably, soundly just, but good, ordinary common sense. It is a noteworthy decision which ought to be felt throughout the country; and we can not help feeling that every lover of justice among union men will respond in his heart, tho he dare not say it with his lips, a hearty Amen.