Theological License of Language.
By J. Panton Ham
BY J. PANTON HAM, ENGLAND.
"If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? So likewise ye, except ye utter by the tongue words easy to be understood, how shall it be known what is spoken? for ye shall speak into the air."—PAUL, to the Corinthians. Whatever may be the views of our readers in reference to our treatment of those topics which concern the human constitution, and the future reward and punishment, it must at least have been observed by them that our theological language is marked by a definiteness and precision which give an obvious distinctness and coherence to our opinions. It is always recognized as a maxim that, in scientific discourses, a well-defined vocabulary be employed, so that words shall never be used in a vague and dubious sense. The purpose of language is to communicate ideas, and unless this purpose be fulfilled, language is no longer an instrument of the thoughts and emotions of the mind, and is therefore useless. It may be generally accepted as a fact, that when the language of a writer or speaker lacks this quality of scientific accuracy, the ideas which he professes to impart are but very confusedly apprehended by himself. Confusion of language is generally the expression of confusion of thought, for it is seldom that a mind possessed of clear ideas, fails to make those ideas intelligible to others. The remarks on the necessity of scientific accuracy in the employment of language, have been suggested to us by observing its frequent disregard in theological treatises and discourses. Even when theology is discoursed of controversially, as well as popularly, we have observed this considerable defect. The very best theological writers will furnish us with examples, and we think we shall be rendering a service to the cause of truth, to call attention occasionally to the inaccuracies of language which their works contain. We beg, however, at the outset, to disclaim any intentional discourtesy towards the10witnesses we may have occasion to quote, and trust, that by conscientiously abstaining from any improper mangling of their works, we shall escape the odium of perpetrating a literary injustice towards them. Our object, we repeat, is very far from the gratification of a paltry, carping disposition; we seek only by honorable extracts from some of the more accredited of our theological authors, to justify our statement, that confusion of thought must have underlaid the obvious confusion of language, which in the calmness of their studious moods, they have penned and transmitted for the instruction of posterity. The discriminating mind of the pious Philip Doddridge, escaped, no more than others of less accurate modes of thought and writing, the inconsistency of which we speak. In his paraphrase of Matt. x, 28, he writes, "But much rather fear, lest you should incur the displeasure of 'him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell,' and has power at the final judgment to condemn both to everlasting misery in that infernal prison." His own paraphrase, it is of course understood, is designed to explain the scripture text, for that was his object in furnishing his paraphrases. The reader will observe that this emphatic passage, where God is represented by our Lord as being able, and therefore by implication, being determined, in the case of the wicked, "to destroy," or cause to perish, "both soul and body"—even the whole man, in the flames of hell, Dr. Doddridge explains to mean, that God will inflict on the wicked the punishment of "everlasting misery!" Is it possible that both soul and body shall be destroyed, and yet preserved alive to endure "everlasting misery?" The Dr.'s exposition involves the absurdity, that a being may be destroyed, and yet preserved at one and the same time. We turn to the pages of the eloquent John Howe, who, writing on the same subject, says, "Destruction from the Almighty; what a terror must that be! . . . and not for aught you know to have a handbreadth, not more than a breath, between you and eternal woes and flames!" Here the same strange sense of language is apparent. Can that punishment, according to the common usage of language, be called "destruction," which is described by this eminent man as the endurance of "eternal woes and flames?" Surely he must be curiously sensible that he is not destroyed, who is enduring woes and flames that shall be eternal! President Edwards, one of the most awful preachers of the doctrine of endless misery as the punishment of the wicked, furnishes us with a large number of examples of verbal inconsistency in his printed discourses. Take the following illustration:—"Their souls they think are precious; it would be a dreadful thing if they should perish, and burn in hell forever!" What idea could this eminent, but sadly mistaken, man have had when he uttered this language? The word "perish," here surely is a very improper word to employ of those who shall "burn in hell forever." It is a strange violence done to language, to say that a man has perished who is burning in hell in conscious misery, and will continue to burn forever. Now the word "perish" is a term used in scripture to describe the future punishment of the wicked, but not so the phrase, "burn in hell forever." This last is the strange explanation which president Edwards gives of, the scripture word perish. The reader will judge for himself whether the explanation is a suitable one. Here is a comparison from the pen of the same author, in his discourse on "The Justice of God." "What more base and vile treatment of God can there be, than for you, when justly condemned to eternal misery," &c. "It is more abundantly manifest that it is just that you should be destroyed." It is evident to the least reflective, that only one of these statements can be accepted. If it is just that the wicked be destroyed, then it certainly cannot be just that they be afflicted with the agonies of an eternal misery, and vice versa; although it would be hard to persuade a rightly balanced mind that it could be possibly just to subject any human being to the endurance of the latter punishment. But what a total disregard of our conventional idea of the word destruction does J. Edwards exhibit when he interprets it as synonymous with eternal misery! The following is another passage in point:—"How just therefore is it, if, now at length, God ceases to oppose you, and falls in with you, and lets your soul be ruined; and as you would destroy yourself, so should put to his hand to destroy you too! . . . and at last cast you into a lake that burns with fire and brimstone; to be there to eternity, having no rest day nor night." How a being can be destroyed, and at the same time burning forever without intermission day and night, exceeds our comprehension. To effect such a ceaseless burning of the human being, our author should surely have represented God as putting forth his hand to render its subject indestructible. The word destroy is the last word he should have used. The next example we shall present from the same author is the very extreme of extravagance—it is language turned lunatic—the very raving of rhapsody. "O then, how would your hearts sink, if you knew that you must bear it forever and ever! that there would be no end! . . . This is the death threatened in the law. This is dying in the highest sense of the word. This is to die sensibly; to die and to know it; to be sensible of the gloom of death. This is to be undone; this is worthy of the name of destruction!!" Here is a punishment which is to be consciously borne forever and ever, whose horrid endurance will know no end, and this punishment president Edwards assures us in what we must call the delirium of this declamation, is the death threatened in the law! This ever living is declared to be dying in the highest sense of the word! This miserable existence in acute anguish which can experience no end, "is worthy," so writes Jonathan Edwards, "of the name of destruction."!!! The popular commentator, Albert Barnes, has fallen into the common orthodox snare. His "Notes" supply among others, the following examples: On the text, "Whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life," he observes, "They are in danger by nature of perishing, that is, of sinking down to the pains of hell." By "pains of hell" he means, as he elsewhere states, a condition in which "the wicked will be miserable forever." We should be glad to be informed on what authority Mr. Barnes perverts the meaning of the word perish to signify a being miserable forever. Could any one, save a theologian, calmly assure his readers, that perishing means a sinking down to the pains of hell to be made miserable forever! Passing strange it is that two such contrasts in sense should be closely yoked together by the explanatory link, "that is," "Perishing, that is, sinking down to the pains of hell!" On the passage on Matt. iii, 12.—"He will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire," Mr. Barnes remarks, The "unquenchable fire is fire that shall not be extinguished, that will utterly consume it." (the "chaff.") "By the chaff," he says, "is represented 'the wicked.'" "They, (the wicked,) are represented as chaff which the fire consumes." And yet with strange inconsistency he sums up his note on this passage with the following words: "By the unquenchable fire is meant the eternal suffering of the wicked in hell." Mr. Barnes recognizes the comparison of the wicked to the rapidly perishable chaff; he deliberately tells us that the unquenchable fire is the agent "that will utterly consume," or burn up the chaff-like wicked, and then, anon, confounding the agent of punishment with the being punished and forgetting all he had said about the wicked being chaff, and being consumed—he coolly tells us, "By the unquenchable fire is meant the eternal suffering of the wicked in hell."!: Such are a few out of the many examples which might be adduced to show the extremely unsatisfactory state of theological terminology. If theology aspires to the dignity and utility of an accurate science, it must revise its vocabulary, not only in relation to the subject of which this paper treats, but also in relation to other highly important topics of sacred interest. If the foregoing quotations, and our comments thereon, shall suffice to arrest the attention of the thoughtful reader, we have no fear but he will come to the same conclusion as ourselves, and that is, when a theological dogma can only be upheld in its appeals to the scripture by such marvelous abuses of language, there is strong presumptive evidence that the scriptures do not sanction that dogma, and that its real authority lies nowhere but in a mere tradition, handed unreflectingly down from the times of a dark and somewhat remote antiquity.