THE THIRD COMMANDMENT—A QUERY.
By Editor
BRO. SMITH: I have read your remarks on the Third Commandment with much interest. It is a subject on which I have thought considerable, and since I embraced the message I have looked upon it as unlawful to swear, in or out of court. If I apprehend your position, it is that the swearing prohibited by our Saviour in Matt. v, and by James, relates solely to vows or oaths of performance. On this I would inquire, 1. Do not the words of the Saviour in Matt. v, 37 show that he refers to all manner of oaths? "But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for WHATSOEVER is more than these, cometh of evil." 2. Are not all judicial oaths of the nature of vows of performance? As, oaths of office, to faithfully perform the duties of; or, oaths of testimony or witness. These you exclude from this class, but I think improperly, as in these the deponent solemnly swears that he will tell the truth, or truly answer, &c. It has been, and is, my desire that the light on this subject may yet be so clear that we shall all see "eye to eye," wherever the truth is. REMARKS.—We place the swearing mentioned by the Saviour, as will be seen by a reference to the articles on the Third Commandment, in a different vocabulary from that mentioned by James: the former referring to oaths of performance, the latter being brought to view in James iii, 10. To the question, Do not the words of the Saviour in Matt. v, 37, show that he refers to all manner of oaths? with our present view of the subject, we must reply in the negative. We aver then that the Saviour in the language of Matt. v, 37, does not refer to all manner of oaths; because, 1. He only introduces as the subject of his remarks a particular kind; namely, oaths of performance. It had been said, by them of old time, that a person should not forswear himself; that is, swear to perform certain things, and not do them; he might swear if he would perform. But says the Saviour, I say unto you, Swear not at all. In what way? Before a court of justice? We have no reason to infer this, since this is not the subject of his remarks; but, swear not at all, in the manner in which they of old time permitted people to swear; which was to swear to do. This appears to us to be the only legitimate and reasonable inference that can be drawn from the language. 2. There was, under the former dispensation, a plain distinction kept up between judicial oaths, and oaths of performance. The one was simply permitted; [Deut. xxiii, 21, 22;] the other was positively commanded. Deut. vi, 13. If the Saviour had added to what he did say, a declaration something like this: Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, thou shalt swear by God's name; but I say unto you, Swear not, &c., then would the prohibition have been complete. But the sin which he takes up is, forswearing one's self on oaths of performance. He would have his disciples free from this also; and to effectually accomplish this, he extends his prohibition to the swearing itself. Of course, then, if they did not swear at all in this manner, there would be no chance for them to thus forswear themselves. Thus he guards against the sin, by taking away its occasion. 3. The swearing referred to by the Saviour, is connected with our "communication :" doubtless meaning the common intercourse of life. In this connection the Jews were notoriously guilty of common swearing, and that, too, by the very objects specified in our Saviour's language, according to the quotation we gave on this subject in REVIEW, Vol. xii, No. 20. We confidently submit that this language can have no reference to the testimony (not communication) which a person gives in a court of justice. 4. Words apparently universal in their application, are sometimes limited by the scope of the declarations in which they are used. And we confidently believe, and as readily assert, that the word "whatsoever," in the passage under consideration, according to the connection in which it stands, can no more include judicial oath-taking than the words "every day" in Rom. xiv, 5, can include the Sabbath. Every Sabbath-keeper contends, and justly, too, for a limitation of this phrase, every day, so as to exclude the weekly Sabbath. Why? Because, say they, the weekly Sabbath is not connected with the subject of the Apostle's discourse. So we now contend for a limitation of the word, whatsoever, in Matt. v, 37, so as to exclude judicial oath-taking, for the very same reason; namely, that it is not included in the subject of the Saviour's remarks. The two instances are exactly parallel; whatever would break down the limitation in one case, would in the other; if it will stand in the one case, so will it in the other. This may seem to forestall an answer to the second of the queries above proposed; viz., "Are not all judicial oaths of the nature of vows of performance?" We are ready to admit that whatever can be shown to be of the nature of vows of performance, as in use among the Jews, comes within the prohibition of the Saviour's language; but we must still claim a wide distinction between the latter and oaths of a judicial nature. Oaths of evidence are appeals to God as witness to the truth of what we affirm. Such is the definition of an oath. All can see the difference between calling God to witness to the truth of what we say, and vowing to do some act in the future. But the above query, ingeniously, it must be confessed, puts the question in a different light. It says, "Deponent solemnly swears that he will tell the truth, &c., that is, do some act." Does this differ from oaths of performance? Materially. In the latter we pledge ourselves to do some future act which we are not certain of ever being able to perform. Circumstances over which we can have no control may prevent our accomplishing what we would do. It is this uncertainty, this hazard which we run, which, if we mistake not the import of the Saviour's words, makes these oaths unlawful in their nature. But can any circumstance transpire to prevent our telling the truth? By no means: no one will be willing to admit that any combination of circumstances can compel a man to lie. Concerning things which have come within our personal observation, we have absolute knowledge. The truth of the declarations we make concerning them, we know with unwavering certainty; and therefore when we appeal to God as witness of their truth, and imprecate his vengeance in case of their falsity, we incur no hazard. There is this difference then between oaths of testimony and performance: in the one case we have perfect knowledge of the truth of the declarations we utter; in the other we have no knowledge that we shall be able to perform the acts we vow to do: in the one case we run no risk; in the other we do. But the querist would probably be ready with the declaration here, that though a man may know the truth, he does not know that he will be able to tell it. We reply, He does not swear that he will tell it! This may seem like a strange and contradictory assertion; but let us analyze a judicial oath, and see if it will stand. When a person takes his oath that he will "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," how far does he involve himself? Does he bind himself to tell everything he knows concerning the matter on which he is called to testify? He might talk perhaps for six hours, and tell a thousand things, all true, but irrelevant to the evidence. It cannot mean this. All that is required of him is to give an impartial answer to the questions proposed. This only, then, is the latitude of the phrase "whole truth." Therefore the obligation which a person imposes upon himself by a judicial oath, is simply this: he binds himself, so far as he does testify, to speak in accordance with the truth. The oath relates to the truth in the abstract, and not to any particular saying or declaration which he is going to utter. He swears that whatever he speaks, shall be in accordance with truth. Now suppose it should so happen that the witness, after taking his oath, should not utter a single syllable; would he break his oath? Not at all. Should he be struck dumb, or the court be dispersed, without his giving in his testimony; would he break his oath? No: because he did not bind himself certainly to say something or that he would positively give in some testimony, but only that what he did say, (if he said anything,) should be in accordance with truth. This shows that he comes within the limits of his oath, when he begins to testify, and not before. Therefore it is not of the nature of oaths of performance, which relate to future actions. We wish all to hear in mind this plain distinction; and we are willing to expose ourself to the charge of redundancy, for the sake of repeating it. We say again, then, that if a judicial oath is of the nature of an oath of performance, an individual must bind himself by it to positively make such and such declarations, at a future time: this however he does not do; but only that his declarations so far as he makes any, shall be in accordance with truth. Therefore the two are essentially different in their nature. The same distinction applies, in a less degree perhaps, to oaths of office. Not considering it probable that the remnant would hold any civil offices under the jurisdiction of the Two-horned beast, we have not felt called upon to take into special consideration oaths relating thereto. We do not think, however, that they come under the head of oaths of performance mentioned by the Saviour. An oath of office, is an oath to perform the duties of the office, whatever they may be, according to the constitution of the United States. The oath relates rather to the agreement of the acts with the constitution, than to the acts themselves. In the desire expressed by the writer of the above queries, "that the light on this subject may yet be so clear, that we shall all see 'eye to eye,' wherever the truth is," we heartily join; we may also add the comforting belief that this desire will yet be realized.