SADDUCEEISM | AdventAI

Publishing Committee · Battle Creek, Mich. · Apr 5, 1860

SADDUCEEISM.

MAN is not omnipotent. He cannot create something from nothing. He attempts to make the Bible prove that man has immortality and eternal life, of himself, independent of the Son of God; but there is nothing there, and he cannot succeed. He may redouble his diligence, and multiply his hours of research, but like the fabled "philosopher's stone," or the "elixir of life," the evidence eludes his grasp; and no theological alchemy will ever be able to produce it.

A striking illustration of this may be found in a tract entitled as above, which purports to be a refutation of the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked, by Rev. Israel F. Warren, the book of which we spoke two weeks since. We have just given the work a careful perusal; and, viewed as a whole, we are sorry to be compelled to say that it descends to a depth of unfairness and misrepresentation which is truly painful. This may perhaps seem like a grave charge; but if the specimens which we herewith present do not bear it out, the reader is at liberty to discard it, and hold us to censure.

"The doctrine, then," says the writer, "which is popularly known as 'annihilation'—which denies the immortality of the soul, and teaches that it perishes at death with the body, is in its main features Sadducceism. There have indeed of late been added to this certain other sentiments, apparently of wholly modern origin." And what are these sentiments which he elsewhere styles "only appendages of the ancient faith?" They are those items in which all believe who hold the consistent view of man's nature and destiny; namely, a coming resurrection, a future life, and future rewards and punishments; and to say that these are only appendages to that ancient faith, we aver is a very grave misrepresentation, since they diametrically oppose that faith, the leading feature of which was, no resurrection, no future life. Our Lord in his association and contact with the Sadducees, found no fault with their views of the state of the dead; but when they proceeded to deny them any future life whatever, by denying the resurrection through which alone they could have it, then he takes occasion publicly to refute and reprove them. In the resurrection and a future life we joyfully believe; and hence in the main feature of Sadducceism, that which alone our Saviour saw fit to disprove and condemn, we are not Sadducees.

"Death in its true and proper import does not mean extinction of being." p. 11. He then gives Webster's definition of death, which is "a total and permanent cessation of all the vital functions," and immediately adds, "Observe, not the cessation of existence, not 'extermination of being,' but a cessation of certain functions." Thus, only three lines from Webster's definition, he attempts to limit that definition. Webster says, "A cessation of all the vital functions." He says, "A cessation of certain functions." If he will adhere to the definition so fatally introduced from Webster, a significant query will still stare him in the face; viz., When all the vital functions are extinct, what is there left to live on in conscious existence?

He next attempts to confound our view of the destruction of the wicked as conscious beings, with the annihilation of matter. He is eloquent in exposing the absurdity of the latter notion, and attempts to fix its stigma upon us; but he either knows or ought to know that we entertain no such view more than he; yet it will be admitted by all that a thing may be destroyed, yes, annihilated, if you please, as to specific form, and still its substance all remain. Demolish a house, and as a house it no longer exists, though its parts may all be in existence. Convert a tree into fire-wood, and as a tree it no longer exists. Go further and put that wood through the furnace and it is decomposed still further, and as wood it no longer exists, but has passed into other forms. So of the wicked: when they are burned up root and branch, when their "root shall be as rottenness, and their blossom go up as dust," they will cease to exist as conscious intelligent beings: they will be ashes under the soles of the saints' feet. Mal. iv, 3.

On page 14, our author further confounds conscious existence with existence of matter as such, and he confounds literal death with a death in sin, and tauntingly asks if such are nonentities. A specimen of this jargon the reader must see for himself.

"When we ordinarily speak of any substance as dead, we do not mean that it has no more existence; we mean only that certain powers and functions have ceased in it, and that is all. It has gone into another form of existence; its essence, its substance, are just as truly in being, just as real as ever before. Neither does death in the Scriptures, in other applications than to the subject before us, have any such meaning as is alleged. 'Let the dead,' said Christ, 'bury their dead.' Did he mean to say that non-existence should bury non-existence? 'She which liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth.' 'You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins.' Are persons who are living in pleasure and sin already annihilated? 'So then death hath passed upon all men,' not shall pass hereafter, but hath passed already. Have all men suffered 'extinction of being?'"

If the reader can see in this any of that fairness and candor which ought to characterize discussions of so grave a subject, he is blest with more powerful optics than we possess.

Having expatiated on the idea that matter as such never ceases to exist, he asks, "Why should this be affirmed only of the soul?" Just as though the soul was an entity distinct from the body, and the living and the dying of the two were distinct. This gives a wrong impression. He should first have proved that man has any such distinct part as he understands by the term soul, and told us how and whence he derived it. It will greatly aid us to guard against false distinctions, to keep man in view as a unit being, as the Bible represents him, wholly dependent on his organization, for the exercise of any of his functions; and when that organism is destroyed, unconsciousness ensues.

There is also in Mr. W.'s remarks an utter obliteration of all distinction between the first and second death. Speaking of the declaration of the Lord by Ezekiel, "The soul that sinneth it shall die," he says, "What force has this if the soul that sinneth not shall also die? for it is claimed that the soul in all cases dies with the body." He here refers to the first death. We have only to reply that Ezekiel refers to another event altogether, and that the soul that sinneth not shall not die the death there threatened. This will appear as we proceed to reply to another of the gentleman's questions, when in reference to the resurrection of the wicked, he asks, "To what end should the wicked once annihilated be thus 'raised'?" He proceeds to call such an act, unnecessary, needless, cruel, and the author of it a monster, and adds, "What shall we say of such profanations and caricatures of the most solemn truths of revelation?"

If he utters all this seriously, he is certainly to be commiserated for the insignificant range of his mental perceptions; if not, his dishonesty deserves rebuke. We supposed everybody knew that the death which comes upon us in the present state, we suffer on account of the mortal nature entailed upon us by Adam, and not on account of our personal sin. This death comes upon all alike irrespective of character. Our deeds have nothing to do with it, and hence it is not a punishment for our personal sins. Mark this. But we supposed that everybody knew also that there is a punishment threatened against the evil deeds which we personally commit here in the body. We are to be judged according to the deeds done in the body, and the wicked punished accordingly. And what is that punishment? The same that Ezekiel says, "The soul that sinneth it shall die." And this death those who do not sin will not suffer; for the righteous shall enter into life eternal; but the wicked shall be burned up root and branch, be devoured by fire [Rev. xx, 9], and become as though they had not been. Obad. 16. Thus it will be seen that a resurrection and second death must necessarily take place.

Let the reader for a moment imagine before him the whole human race. We see them all die, on account of the death which the sin of our first parents introduced into the world. But Christ intervenes to release us all from this; "for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." We therefore behold the whole race resurrected to life again. They are then beyond the effects of Adam's sin. What next? Then comes the settlement with them for their personal sins, which could not till this time come into account. Then those who are found sinners, receive the punishment awarded to sin, which is death again—eternal death, from which no resurrection is ever again to bring them; and the righteous who have confessed their sins, and been forgiven, meet no such fate, but enter upon everlasting life. And this, forsooth, is unnecessary, cruel and monstrous!

"Suppose," says he, "a judge could galvanize the dead body of a criminal into life, who, by once dying, had fully satisfied all the ends of justice, for the sole purpose of executing him again, what would be thought of such a man? Would not the voice of universal humanity cry out against him as a monster?"

There is not a particle of parallelism between this illustration and the case of the wicked who are raised to receive the reward of their deeds. When a criminal is hung it is in direct punishment for his crime, (notwithstanding some have the hardihood to contend that death is no punishment,) and to raise him and hang him again, would be a mere wanton repetition of the punishment, and as such unjustifiable; but in case of the wicked the death which they first experience, as we have already seen, is not in punishment for their sins; hence their resurrection and assignment to a second death is not a repetition of punishment, but only the just penalty of their sins which had not before been inflicted.

And since Mr. W. is fond of illustrations, we also will introduce one. As he is struck with such horror at the idea of a judge's raising a criminal and hanging him again, let us suppose that another judge should sentence a criminal to the gallows, and should then by a direct exertion of a power which he possessed, keep that criminal alive, quivering with torture, and writhing in the death struggle on that gallows, not for a day or a week merely, but forever and ever! "What would be thought of such a man?" Which would "the voice of universal humanity" pronounce the monster? This one or the former? We submit the question. Judge ye. More next week.