From the war there is nothing new of great importance, though much that is highly interesting. At Sevastopol the only immediate indication of the long expected assault upon the Malakoff and Redan is the opening of fire upon them on the 17th ult. It was continued throughout the day, and the effect produced was as much as was anticipated. The Russian fire which at first answered briskly, became by evening feeble. The British loss was 138. We are told, also, that the English advances are within sixty yards of the Russian outworks, while the French on the right of the Malakoff are within thirty yards. Indeed, if we may judge by a dispatch from Gen. Pélissier, they are still nearer, for he informs us that on the 24th ult. they captured a Russian ambuscade on the very glacis of the Malakoff, and turned it against the fortress. Meanwhile the slaughter in the works is daily very large. The English say that they alone lose sixty men every day on the average.
Of the battle of the Chernaya, or as it is now called, the battle of Traktir Bridge, fought on Aug. 18, the Russian attack was a deliberate effort to raise the siege of Sevastopol, and if the Russians had succeeded in holding the heights on the Allies' side of the river, they intended further to attack the Allies from four points, namely: a main attack on Balaklava, another on the British Camp, and another simultaneously on the extreme right and left of the French lines. Documents found on the body of a Russian General indicate this. Gen. Simpson estimates the Russian forces at 55,000 infantry, and 6,000 cavalry, with 160 guns. The French had only 12,000 men and four batteries engaged. The Sardinians had 4,500 men and 24 guns engaged, while the English had only one battery in play. Gen. Simpson says the Russians advanced three times with the most determined bravery. Thrice they carried the bridge and crowned the heights, but were thrice driven back. Gen. Pélissier calls the French loss, 17 officers killed and 53 wounded, 172 men killed, 150 missing, and 1,160 wounded. The Sardinian loss was 250. The loss of the Russians was 3,000 killed, and 5,000 wounded, including 1,600 wounded prisoners in the hands of the French and 200 in the hands of the Sardinians.
In this battle it is plain that Pélissier was taken by surprise, and that but for the important aid rendered by the Sardinian artillery the French might have fared very badly. Indeed, such is the opinion in Paris, where people do not regard him with admiration just at present. With respect to the Russians it is equally notorious that in this instance they maintained their long-standing reputation, and were beaten according to the rule which prevails whenever they come in contact with European troops. The same system which they tried at Inkermann with such fatal results was here experimented upon again. Dense masses of men were flung upon the enemy as if to overwhelm him by sheer quantity of weight, but on these masses the Sardinian artillery, which took them in the flank, and the rifles of the Zouaves did the most murderous execution, and they were obliged to yield. The same absence of generalship, and of all manœuvres calculated to facilitate the struggle and assure the desired victory was conspicuous here as at Inkermann. The men fought bravely but the incapacity of their commanders rendered their courage vain. Indeed, while we incline to agree with an opinion which a Brussels journal attributes to Omer Pasha, we must extend its application. According to this authority, “Omer Pasha freely expressed himself at Constantinople that the allied commanders—especially Gen. Pélissier—were humbugs, and that he should twice have lost his army if he had followed their advice.”
Omer, by the way, is going with his army to Asia, to fight there against the Russians, now under Muravieff besieging Kars.