PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LAW.
By W. Hastings
Primary law has its foundation in the nature and relations of things, and cannot be changed in any other way than to change the things in which the law exists. Deep down from nature, and from our relations to God and to each other, emanate those great and eternal principles that underlie the government of God, and form the true basis of all moral obligation, and are therefore as unchangeable as the sources from which they spring. The written law of God, or ten commandments, forms a perfect embodiment of natural law, and is true because it was given in exact harmony with its principles. Were God to alter one jot or tittle of his law, those constitutional relations must bend into conformity with the change, or that part of his written law would thereby become false. Let us try the first commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." Ex. xx, 3. Were it possible for the time ever to come when God would see fit to give up his claims to the supreme affections of his creatures, and give them liberty to go in search of other gods and to worship them, and thus make an entire surrender of his authority as the supreme God of the universe, and give it over into other hands to the subversion and final overthrow of his government, then might man with some propriety begin to talk about the abrogation of the law of God. This is a code of laws which sustains a certain relation to primary law, and a certain other relation to some temporary object, for the accomplishment of70which it is instituted; and when that object is secured, and the circumstances in view of which it is enacted cease to exist, it becomes obsolete. The theocratic law of the Jews, a part of which was ceremonial and written in the book of the law [Deut. xxix, 20, 21], was of this class and contained two kinds of commandments, the first of which exists in primary law or sustains an inseparable relation to it, and is therefore binding upon men under all circumstances. The following passages of scripture will serve as specimens. Lev. xix, 11, 18, 35, 36; xx, 6, 7; xxii, 6. The second class were those which had their foundation in the circumstances of the Jews as a nation, and their connection with the earthly sanctuary. From these two sources they derived all their inherent validity; and when these circumstances ceased they were no longer obligatory. These commandments comprised the services of the sanctuary together with their feasts, new-moons, ceremonial sabbaths &c. Lev. xxiii, 4, 44; Col. ii, 14, 17; Eph. ii, 15, 16. An objection may arise here in the minds of some because the perpetuity of the decalogue is claimed on the ground of its inseparable relation to primary law, while the secondary law, here referred to, contained the same in substance and was abolished. The following illustration is to the point: A man to secure some temporary object builds a wall, in the construction of which he uses a quantity of stones in connection with certain perishable materials. Now the building of this wall (of materials already in existence) illustrates the enactment of secondary law. The pulling down of the wall after it had served the purpose for which it was intended, would show the abrogation of such law. The stones used in it set forth the first mentioned class of commandments, inasmuch as they have not undergone the least change in consequence of the temporary use to which they have been put, and are as valuable to use in a future structure as though they had not been used before. Hence the conclusion that primary law is the inherent nature of principles, and is therefore immutably fixed; while secondary law consists only in arranging and using those principles for a specific purpose, and can be set aside at any time by the lawgiver by merely disarranging and ceasing to use them with reference only to that particular object. And of the two classes of commandments which existed in connection with the law under consideration, it was the second one only that was essentially affected by its abrogation; while the change in relation to the first class, was only a relative one. Wright, Mich., July, 1861.