The Atonement by Albert Barnes

The Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Aug 27, 1861

The Atonement.

By Albert Barnes

BY ALBERT BARNES.

[The following argument on the Necessity of an Atonement deserves especial attention at the present time, when there are so many rising up to scout the idea of an Atonement as an unnecessary and foolish arrangement, and who base their hopes of life and salvation on other grounds. This is one of the great forms of the skepticism of the present day, which every lover of the Bible should fortify himself against. Mr. Barnes shows the utter fallacy of all these claims, and demonstrates that our only hope is in the shed blood of the Redeemer, without which there is no remission.—U. SMITH.]

NECESSITY OF AN ATONEMENT.

THE necessity of an atonement is founded on such considerations as have been already referred to in this Essay,—the difficulties in the way of pardon and in the restoration of an offender to favor. We have seen what those difficulties are, (1) if pardon is never extended to the guilty; (2) if it is often extended to the guilty; (3) if it should be always extended to the guilty; and (4) in any case by its coming in conflict with the regular administration of justice. We have noticed some of the embarrassments to which governments are subjected for the want of an atonement, and some of the devices, clumsy and ineffectual in their character, to which they are compelled to resort in order to escape from those embarrassments. We have considered what must be done by an atonement: that it is necessary that it should confirm, and not set aside, law; that it should carry out,

and not set aside, the real purpose of the penalty of the law as expressing the sense entertained by the law-giver of the value of law and the evil of violating it; that it should secure the reformation and future good conduct of him who is pardoned; that it should preserve a community from harm if any number of offenders should be forgiven; and that it should furnish in its own nature a proper representation of the character of him who has appointed the atonement. And we have seen that there were antecedent probabilities that such an atonement would be provided in the divine administration; or that there were such grounds of presumption that some arrangement would be made to remove the evils of sin as to excite an expectation extensively in the minds of men that such an arrangement would be made.

The failure of everything else to remove the necessary evils of sin and to restore an offender to the divine favor lays the foundation for the necessity of an atonement. An atonement is necessary because there is nothing else that will remove the difficulties in the way of pardon, or because there is no other way by which it can be consistent for God to forgive an offender and to restore him to favor.

It becomes proper, therefore, to inquire why, in this point of view, it is necessary that an atonement should be made; that is, why sinners cannot be saved without it; or why, in the language of the Bible, "without shedding of blood is no remission." Heb. ix, 22. If there is any other way by which the difficulties in the case can be met and sinners saved, then of course an atonement is unnecessary. It is proper, therefore, to inquire on what they who reject an atonement rely for salvation, and to see whether such grounds of reliance furnish security of happiness hereafter. If sinners may rely on the mere mercy of God for salvation, then an atonement is unnecessary. If they can offer sacrifices for their own sins which would constitute a proper expiation, then there would be no need of a higher sacrifice such as is implied in the idea of the christian atonement. If they may depend on the efficacy of repentance, and if that is all that is necessary to restore them to the divine favor, then also an atonement would be unnecessary. If men are punished in this life as much as their offenses deserve, and if all that is implied in the penalty of the law is satisfied on earth, or if the same thing should occur in a future world so that they would exhaust the penalty of the law and expiate their sins by their own sufferings, then in like manner there would be no need of an atonement. If offenders can claim admission into heaven on the ground that they have—by their own abundant good works, or by the merits of eminent saints made over to them by the power of a priesthood—made amends for the past, then also there would be no need of an atonement. And if it is a principle in the divine administration that the maladies of the soul may be repaired, as the diseases of the body may be healed, by a recuperative arrangement in the very system itself, then also there would be no need of an atonement.

It is indispensable, therefore, in inquiring into the necessity of an atonement, to examine each of

these points; for these are the things on which men who reject the atonement of Christ actually rely; these comprise all the grounds of the hope which they entertain in reference to a future world. Thus Dr. Priestley says, "We are commanded to forgive others, as we ourselves hope to be forgiven; to be merciful as our Father who is in heaven is merciful. But surely we are not thereby authorized to insist upon any atonement or satisfaction, before we give up our resentments toward an offending penitent brother. Indeed, how could it deserve the name of forgiveness if we did? It is only from the literal interpretation of a few figurative expressions in the Scriptures that this doctrine of the atonement, as well as that of transubstantiation, has been derived; and it is certainly a doctrine highly injurious to God; and if we who are commanded to imitate God should act upon the maxims of it, it would be subversive of the most amiable part of virtue in men. We should be implacable and unmerciful, insisting upon the uttermost farthing."

In considering the necessity for an atonement, the question is not what God could or could not have done if an atonement had not been made. We are not to go back of all the arrangements that are actually made, and to inquire whether the course of things might not have been different, or why the present arrangement has been adopted. In inquiring, for example, why labor is necessary for the husbandman if he would secure a harvest, or why the law of gravitation is necessary in the physical system of the universe, we are not to ask whether it might not have been otherwise,—whether God, for example, might not have provided food by his own direct agency without toil on the part of man, or whether he might not have carried forward the operations of the universe without such a law as that of gravitation. The question relates rather to matters of fact: why, as things are, is labor necessary for man if he would have a harvest? or why is such a law as that of universal gravitation necessary in this universe, constructed as it is? There is undoubted force and truth in the remarks of Bishop Butler. "Certain questions," he says, "have been brought into the subject of redemption, and determined with rashness, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government. And, had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just persons over the face of the earth for whom Manasses in his prayer asserts repentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous; and neither of them can properly be answered without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have followed if God had not done as he has? may have in it some great impropriety, and ought not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conception of things."

The inquiry on this subject cannot be pursued on

the principle of an a priori argument. We are not to, for we cannot go back of the actual arrangement of things in the divine economy, and attempt to ascertain what God could or could not have done; we cannot determine beforehand whether it would or would not be proper that such a disposition of affairs should be allowed to exist as would make an atonement necessary; we cannot argue that, because sin is an infinite evil, therefore an infinite atonement was necessary, or that it was necessary that he who should make the atonement should be infinite in his nature. But we may argue from the existing state of things. We may look upon the fact that man is fallen; that sin has come into the world; that the law of God has been violated; that the penalty of the law has been incurred; and that there are intrinsic difficulties in the way of pardon. We can look upon the course of events, and see what is the fact in regard to the effect of those things on which men do rely as securing salvation, and argue from the failure of those things as to the necessity of some higher mode of intervention. We can ask whether it will be safe for men to reject the atonement and rely on those things? We can see in the failure of all those things to meet the circumstances of the case—if they do fail—an argument for the necessity of an atonement. In this there can be no presumption; for we are here manifestly pursuing an inquiry of the deepest interest to ourselves, and which lies within the proper range of human investigation.

Such a course of inquiry it is proposed to pursue in this chapter. The necessity of an atonement will be argued from the failure of all else on which men are accustomed to rely for salvation; or, in other words, by showing that no reliance can be placed on those things to meet the circumstances of the case, it is proposed to demonstrate the necessity of an atonement.

The question relates to the salvation of sinners; and it is to be assumed in this discussion that men are sinners. Apart from the atonement, the only other methods of salvation by which it could be supposed that sinners could be saved are the following: The mere mercy of God; repentance and reformation; punishment; repairing the evils of the past by subsequent good conduct; sacrifices offered for sin; and a process of restoration in regard to moral evils—a recuperative process—similar to the healing of diseases in the body.

These methods of salvation it is proposed now to examine. There are no other methods, besides that of reliance on the atonement of Christ. These exhaust the subject. If a sinner may rely on any one of these methods, there is no need of an atonement. If all of these fail, then there must be an atonement, or the sinner must perish.

I. The mere mercy of God.

As this is perhaps the most general ground of reliance for salvation among men, it is important to examine it with care.

It is undoubtedly true that large classes of men—men of all classes and conditions—profess to rely on the mercy of God as a safe and sufficient ground of hope in relation to the future world. The most general ground of the hope of happiness hereafter is, probably, that which is founded on good works; on an upright character; on honesty and fidelity in the relations of life; on amiableness, kindness, and courtesy in the intercourse with each other; on the belief entertained by many that they have wronged no one, that they have defrauded no one, that they are just in their dealings with men, that they are faithful in the discharge of their duties as husbands, fathers, neighbors, citizens. But this ground of hope may be laid out of view now; for we are not inquiring whether it would be possible for men to be saved if they were perfectly righteous,—of which there could be no doubt,—but in what way a sinner may be saved. The question is, How

may one who is conscious that he has violated the law of God obtain his favor again? how may he approach him with the hope of pardon? The first of these grounds of hope is dependence on the mere mercy of God, with no reference to an atonement; and it is undoubtedly true that multitudes do profess to trust to this as a safe resort. The man who is externally moral, and who aims to lead an upright life, and who prides himself on his virtuous character, trusts that the few and unimportant errors of his life may be forgiven, and that he may safely rely, in respect to these, on the mercy of God. The skeptic—the denier of the truth of revelation—also relies on the mercy of God, and thinks that he may safely make it an article of his creed that God is merciful, and that he may in safety trust to that mercy for salvation. The Universalist is loud in his proclamation of the mercy of God, and in the expression of his belief that all men will be saved through that mercy; and even the dissolute, the profane, and the abandoned, when all other hope of salvation fails, take refuge, on the bed of death, in what they regard as the illimitable compassion of God.

And yet it may be doubted whether any of these persons really rely for salvation on the mercy of God. If the moral man, conscious as he may be of a few errors and follies of life, were questioned, he would say that he does not believe that he deserves eternal death, and that it would be wrong in God to consign him to future woe; and thus he is depending for salvation not on the mercy but on the justice of God. The skeptic, also, if questioned on the subject, would not allege that he had any communication from heaven to assure him that he might safely trust to the mercy of God,—for all such revelation he on principle rejects; but he would maintain also that it would be wrong in God to consign him to eternal death, and thus he relies for salvation not on the mercy but on the justice of God. The Universalist, also, loud as he is in praise of the mercy of God, and stoutly as he maintains that through that mercy all mankind will be saved, yet as loudly and as stoutly maintains that it would be wrong in God—that it would be horrible injustice—to consign men to everlasting punishment; and thus he also relies not on the mercy but on the justice of God for salvation; and, after all that he says in favor of the mercy of God, he has no belief that there is any occasion for the exercise of mercy in the case, but his system would be practically the same, and his hope would be precisely the same, if God were possessed of no such attribute as that of mercy, but were severely and only just. In like manner, also, even the abandoned and profligate sinner would maintain that it would be wrong in the God who made him to doom him to everlasting death for the sins of this short life; and thus he, at last, also finds refuge and hope not in the mercy but in the justice of God.

But, if it were true that men really relied on the mercy of God for salvation, would this be a safe ground of hope for a sinner?

In reference to this question, let the following considerations be borne in mind.

(1.) Mercy cannot be safely relied on by an offender in any human administration. We have seen, in a previous chapter, that no government could safely offer unconditional pardon to offenders, and that pardon can in no case be administered under a human government without doing much to weaken the strong arm of the law. Mere mercy can in no case be made a ground of hope under a human government. When pardon is extended to the guilty, it is in most, if not in all, cases, done not on the ground of mere mercy, but on the ground that there was some defect in the process of the trial; or that the sentence of the law was too severe; or that there were some extenuating circumstances in the case; or that there was something in respect to the age, the sex, or the previous character of the offender which made it proper to interpose with executive clemency; or that there was evidence of such a reformation as to make it proper to remit the remainder of the

sentence or to commute it; or that there was evidence that the punishment had answered all the ends contemplated by punishment; or that there was some new testimony in favor of the offender which was not before the court on the trial, and which might have modified the verdict; or that there is reason to suppose that, if all the testimony in the case had been before the court, the accused would have been acquitted: that is, so far as these circumstances bear on the case, the pardon is in fact an act of justice, and not of mercy.

(2.) It is to be borne in mind, in regard to dependence on the mercy of God for salvation, that there are other attributes in the divine character than mercy, and that, so far as appears, they are as essential to that character as mercy is, and that it is as important for the good of the universe that they should be displayed as it is that the attribute of mercy should be exhibited. "A God all mercy is a God unjust." There is as certain evidence that God is just as there is that he is merciful. In estimating the character of a neighbor, a merchant, a professional man, a magistrate,—in forming our conception of a perfect man,—we think of truth, and purity, and justice, and uprightness, as really as of kindness. We regard these as essential to a perfect character. We have no conception of a character as entitled to high respect and confidence where these are not found. If we could conceive of a case in which there were no traces of these attributes, we should say, however merciful or amiable the man might be, his character was radically deficient. If we could conceive of a case where the attribute of justice is never exercised,—where a man in his dealings with others always disregards its claims,—however amiable or kind he might be, we should say that such a character was worthy only of universal detestation.

It is worthy of special remark, as bearing on the point before us, that, when we say that the attribute of justice is essential to our idea of a perfect character, we say at the same time that it is essential to our idea of such a character that the attribute should be exercised or displayed. It would be of no value as a dormant attribute, any more than a dormant attribute of mercy or goodness would be. On suitable occasions, it is as proper that the attribute of justice should be displayed as the attribute of mercy; and, if there is any evidence furnished by our instinctive sense of what is essential to the character of perfection in God, that one of these attributes will be displayed, there is the same evidence, so far as that source of proof is concerned, that the other will be.

In the actual dispensations of providence, moreover, there are more proofs of justice than of mercy; there are more things occurring that can be properly traced to the infliction of penalty, and that should be regarded as proofs that God is just, than there are that can be regarded as proofs that he is merciful. In other words, there are more specific things that can be directly and certainly traced to the idea that God is just, than there are that can be traced to the specific idea of mercy. There are, indeed, numerous proofs of goodness, numerous evidences that God is benevolent, and that he desires the happiness of his creatures; but it is to be observed that these, for the most part, are found in the original constitution of things, or in the arrangements made anterior to the commission of crime, and therefore they cannot with propriety be referred to in this argument, for the arrangements which we are seeking for in the inquiry about the mercy of God are not general original arrangements of benevolence, but specific arrangements contemplated as following the violation of law; and the remark which is now made is, that, placing ourselves in that position, or regarding crime as committed, there are in fact more arrangements for the infliction of justice than for the exercise of mercy.

In other words, judging merely from the course of events under the divine administration, there is more to be dreaded by a sinner than there is to be hoped for; more that should lead a violator of

law to fear what is to come than to cherish hope.

There is no other mercy promised to men in the Bible than that which is founded on the atonement. There the offer of salvation is ample; but it is limited in the most absolute manner to mercy dispensed through the blood of the Redeemer. It is a great principle, also, in all things, that when God has revealed one method of obtaining his favor, or proposed one mode by which it is to be secured, all others are, of course, excluded. That fact is proof not only that it is the best mode, but it is proof that there is no other mode; and, whatever we may suppose may have been abstractly true about the possibility of any other mode originally, yet the fact that that mode has been selected and revealed to man as the mode in which God is willing to bestow his favors excludes, of course, all other methods, and is at the same time a demonstration that that is not only the best, but that it is the only one. The business of man is not to find out what method there might possibly have been of securing the divine favor, and then to infer that that is now a possible method: it is to find out what God has chosen and prescribed; and that ends the matter. If, therefore, God has said that mercy shall be bestowed through an atonement, that excludes all other methods; and speculation as to what might have been becomes vain, if not improper.

There is no evidence furnished in death that men can be saved, or are saved, by mercy irrespective of the atonement.

The death of all christians, as before remarked, is to be laid out of view here; and the death of no others furnishes such evidence as the case would demand that they who reject that atonement are saved.

Two reasons may be given why this is so: (1.) one is, that men who profess to rely on the mercy of God for salvation without reference to the atonement, but who, as we have seen above, really rely on the justice of God and believe it would be wrong in God not to save them, are often greatly alarmed when they come to die,—showing that, so far as the evidence in their case goes, this cannot be regarded as a safe ground of trust. The fact that such men are alarmed when they die, and that they then seek for some other ground of hope, is at least so common as to show that no one can certainly anticipate that he will himself regard this as a safe ground of reliance when he dies. This fact is such as to vitiate any argument that may be urged in favor of the position that men may safely rely on the mere mercy of God without an atonement; for if this is a safe ground of reliance for salvation, it ought never to give way under any circumstances. In the prospect of passing over such a river as that of death, what we want is not a bridge that may break down, but a bridge that never will break down and that never does. In the prospect of the storms that may beat around our dwellings, what we want is not a foundation that may give way when "the rain descends, and the floods come, and the winds blow and beat upon the house," but such a solid rock that it will never give way, however vehemently the storm may beat upon us. Such is the Rock on which the christian builds his hopes. It never gives way when he dies; for no true christian ever doubts the sufficiency of that trust on which he relies, never doubts that if he is a christian he is safe. Can it be said that no infidel, skeptic, philosopher, ever doubts, when he comes to die, that, if he is an infidel, a skeptic, a philosopher, he is safe? (2.) The other consideration is, that, even if it were a matter of fact that they who reject the atonement have no misgiving about the foundation of their hope when they lie down to die, this would not prove that this is a safe ground of reliance. Freedom from alarm and from the dread of death may proceed from other causes than that of safety, or from any well-founded assurance of future happiness. The calmness and peace of the dying skeptic may be accounted for satisfactorily on some other supposition than that he is actually going to heaven, or that he

will be saved by the mercy of God without an atonement. In the sternness of the stoic, in the studied and cultivated purpose of the infidel philosopher, in the stupidity which sin engenders, and in the paralyzing influence of disease as men pass away from life, may be found a sufficient explanation of the fact that such men die calmly. If it be said that the same solution might possibly, or with equal reason, be applied to the calm death of the christian, it may be replied that we do not refer to that calmness in death as the main proof that he is safe; for the reliance of the christian is on what he regards as a promise made to men that if they repent and believe the gospel they will be saved. Their hope is based on that. Their calmness in death is not the ground of their hope: it is the fruit or result of a hope founded on the promise of God.