The Moral System by James H. Waggoner

The Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Jun 9, 1863

The Moral System.

By James H. Waggoner

I now propose a question which the reckless and the heedless may pass by without particular notice; but the thinking and the candid will admit to be one of immense interest. Will these aspirations, this innate sense of justice, ever be gratified? That they are not, that they cannot be gratified in the present state, need not be argued. Is my moral nature, my sense of right and justice, satisfied to see virtue trodden under foot? to see the libertine mocking over the grave of blighted hopes and a broken heart? to see the priceless treasure of virtuous purity, around which cluster the fondest hopes of earth, sported with as a mere toy of little worth? to see honest toil sink unrequited, and hide itself in squalid poverty and a pauper's grave? to see the vain rolling in wealth accumulated by fraud and oppression? to see vice exalted to the pinnacle of fame? to hear the praises of him whose very presence is loathsome by reason of the filthiness of his iniquity? and when words fail to express the horrors of such and kindred evils, must I smile complacently and say, This is right; in this my soul delights? But this is but a mere glance at the facts as they exist, as they have existed, and are likely to exist in this present state. Is it possible that these aspirations, these discriminations of right and wrong, were placed within our breasts to be mocked—to look and long in vain? Is it possible that the Supreme One, who has so nicely arranged the material world, and subjected it to certain laws, has placed moral balances in our hands to no purpose? that we are to long for, but never see, a vindication of the great principles of justice? Is it not rather reasonable to conclude that he has a moral government, and that our moral sense is evidence that we are within the limits of a moral system? Are not our convictions of wrongs proofs to ourselves of our amenability to such a system?

The very fact that we discriminate between moral and natural laws, as I have shown that all men do, is a recognition of the fact that there is a moral government. Thus, to look above Nature—to acknowledge God as a moral Governor, is necessary, to be true to our own natures—to the convictions planted in every breast. In this great truth our aspirations find rest. Here our sense of justice takes refuge; for a government is a system of laws maintained, and the very idea of a moral government leads us to look forward to a vindication of the right principles or laws now trampled upon. Why should we pronounce upon the nature or demerit of human actions, if there is no accountability for those actions? Our feelings of responsibility (the movings of conscience) are but the expectation of a great assize, in or by which injustice, fraud, and every wrong, will be required, and down-trodden virtue and injured innocence be exalted and vindicated. This is, indeed, but a legitimate deduction from the propositions established, and in this we find a sure vindication of the divine government in regard to the anomalies of the present state.

We find some, even among those who acknowledge the existence of a supreme being, who deny the existence of moral wrong; but the reasonableness of their denial I cannot perceive. It is founded mostly on the alleged inability of man to act except in a given line.

But here again we find them false in their theory, and uniformly so. They will, as readily as others, sit in judgment upon, and condemn, the actions of their fellow-men. They will blame any for encroaching on their rights. But it were surely the hight of folly, the grossest injustice, to blame one for doing what he cannot avoid. And how unreasonable to think that God bestows a moral sense, and plants within us the monitor of conscience, to lead us to do right, and yet compels us to do wrong. We count the man immoral and degraded who disregards the distinctions of right and wrong; what then could we think of a God who would frame a system wherein these distinctions could not be preserved? And yet such is the case, if man has no freedom to act. We all acknowledge the difference between right and wrong, as principles; that it is right to regard our neighbor's life as property; and hence, he that disregards them does wrong. And all are conscious that the wrong we do is of ourselves; and no one ever seeks to throw it back to any other cause until his moral sense is perverted by selfishness and false reasoning.

Akin to the above position is the oft-repeated idea that God is so loving, so kind, that he will not mark to condemn our aberrations from duty. This is contrary to, and of course a denial of, the declarations of scripture. But let me ask the objector, laying the Bible aside. Where is your evidence that God so loves us? You surely do not learn from nature that love is the sole attribute of Deity. How came you by the idea that the Deity must possess love? Reflect on this. Whence do you derive your conceptions of love, and of its necessity in the divine character? Can you tell? Your only answer must be that they are intuitive; that you owe this conception to your own consciousness. You have, in a degree, an innate knowledge of the moral fitness of things; and according to this you clothe the Deity with such attributes as your moral sense determines to be fitting to him. But in the idea above advanced you are only partially true to your higher nature; partially just to your own consciousness, in awarding to Deity only love. For I affirm that our consciousness, our self-judgment of the moral fitness of things, gives us as definite and clear conceptions of justice as of love. All the propositions established in this argument tend to this point. We are apt to lose sight of justice, and to exalt love. This is quite natural with all who have any sense of wrong (and who has not?), for we feel the need of love or mercy, and are ever willing or anxious to screen ourselves from justice. But in this, as before remarked, we do violence to our moral sense, to gratify our selfish feelings. Can any one dispassionately reason and reflect on this subject, and accept the idea of a God of even partial justice? The idea is alike repugnant to reason and to reverence. God must be, strictly, infinitely just. I should choose to be annihilated rather than to possess immortal existence in a universe governed or controlled by a being of almighty power, but lacking justice.

But the thought is humiliating that a word of remark is necessary to prove to any that moral wrong exists. What! must I stop to reason with a man, a human being, with all his faculties in exercise, to prove to him that it is wrong to commit adultery, to murder, or to steal? To argue the question seems to insult the sense of mankind. The real question is how to dispose of the evil with which we meet; how to rescue criminals from the awful consequences of their violations of the law of Him who is infinitely just. I do not ask you to consider whether they might not be suffered to escape by suspending justice, or how they might stand before a being of partial justice; but how they are to stand when justice is maintained and vindicated on the scale of infinity. Let us consider the principles of government, and the means necessary (and possible) to restore the transgressor to favor.

I. SIN OUGHT TO BE PUNISHED.

In considering this I claim a clear distinction between mere consequences and penalties. I speak of

this because so many disregard it. The penalty gives force to the law, and without it law is a nullity. No matter what consequences may result from the violation of law, the criminal is not punished till the penalty is inflicted. We might find many cases in our courts where the accused has suffered consequences more severe than the punishment which the law inflicts; but the judge cannot regard these—his office is to see that the penalty prescribed by the law be inflicted. He who violates the law risks the penalty and the intermediate consequences. In behalf of the affirmation that the transgression of the law ought to be punished, I offer the following reasons:

1. It injures the subjects of the government. One great object of government is the good of the subjects. The imprisonment of the thief, the robber, the murderer, answers a double purpose, punishing the crimes, and preventing their further preying upon our property and our lives. The same law that restrains the evil-doer, secures the rights of the well-doer. Hence, every violation of the law of a government is an invasion of the rights of the subjects thereof. Its tendency will be more clearly seen if we imagine for a moment that the law be disregarded by not only one, but by many, or by all. Then all rights, all safeguards, would be trampled down, and the objects of government entirely defeated. This, of course, is the tendency of every transgression.

2. It brings contempt upon the government. At this time (1863) the force of this can be appreciated, while thousands are offering their lives to save our government from reproach. They well know that if the government cannot maintain respect, it cannot maintain its authority. Hence, all the evils referred to in the preceding reason are involved in this.

3. It insults and abuses the Creator and Governor. So blinding is the influence of sin that men despise the authority of God, and insult him daily, without any apparent compunction. All violations of law are insults to, and abuse of, authority. Every individual has rights in his own sphere, and there is no right more sacred than that of the Supreme authority to claim the respect and reverence of the subjects. And if the Governor be not respected, his government cannot be; and if that be not respected, of course the rights of the subjects under it will not be. Consider again, if this example was followed by all—by all the intelligences of the universe; if all the men on earth and all the angels in heaven should unite in abusing and insulting the God of heaven, his government would be turned into one vast field of anarchy, and individual rights would no longer be recognized. No one could consent that God should suffer such a state of things to continue without making an effort to reclaim the government, and to maintain and vindicate right laws. Of course all agree that sin ought to be punished.

II. CAN THE SINNER BE CLEARED?

This question is of the greatest importance, and I hope all will examine it with care. I think the sinner cannot possibly be cleared, unless one of the following things takes place:

1. The law be trampled upon with impunity. This, of course, should not be permitted, for reasons given above; and we may say, will not be permitted if the Executive has a proper sense of right and justice to himself and to his subjects, and requisite power to enforce his authority. But the divine attributes must be a sufficient guarantee to guard this point.

2. The law be abolished. But this would be an acknowledgment of weakness or error on the part of the government rather than evidence of wrong on the part of the transgressor. Or if the law was not acknowledged to be wrong, nor the government in error, the case would be equally bad, presenting the pitiable spectacle of a government abolishing a good law to accommodate a bad subject—one of rebellious tendencies. This would not be restraining sin; it would be rather favoring or licensing sin, and justifying the sinner in his evil course. And it would have a tendency to bring in all the evils of anarchy and ruin that we have considered as the unavoidable results of destroying governmental authority. Such libels I dare not throw on the government of God; and consider myself safe in declaring these suppositions inadmissible.

3. The Governor pardon. This is a prerogative that may, under proper restrictions and conditions, be safely exercised. Therefore we must accept this as the only alternative: as the only means whereby the sinner may escape from the punishment of his crimes.

By examining the foregoing points it will be perceived that the acts of abolishing the law, and pardoning the transgressor, cannot in any case be united. One would be a nullity if both were attempted. This will be further seen by answers to the following questions: What are the conditions under which pardon may be granted? and how will the government (which must ever be the first and chief concern) be affected thereby?

III. PARDON SUPPOSES OR RECOGNIZES

1. The guilt of the condemned. This is evident. To pardon an innocent man would be preposterous.

2. The power of the government. This is equally evident. To pardon is to remit a penalty which might be inflicted. It would be a mere farce to offer a pardon to those whom the government had no power to punish.

3. The justice of the law transgressed. This is nearly parallel with the first proposition, and like it, evident; for, to pronounce a man guilty is to say that he has done wrong. And if a violation of law be wrong, the law violated must be right. An unjust law is, in a moral view, a nullity. When a law is found to be unconstitutional, or a nullity, the prisoner under it is not pardoned; he is released from false imprisonment; and such release is of justice, not of mercy. But pardon is of favor. Thus it is clear that the justice of the law is acknowledged in the article of pardon. Now as pardon supposes the guilt of the prisoner, the power of the government, and the justice of the law, in all these it honors the government and vindicates its integrity.

But there are other principles involved. The act of pardon recognizes the claims of law, by recognizing its justice. Thus far it honors the government. But the question still remains, Are those claims satisfied as well as acknowledged? According to a plain truth before noticed, the sinner ought to be punished; justice imperatively demands it. How then can pardon be granted, and strict justice administered? In this case there will arise two conflicting interests; one of sympathy for the accused, leaning toward mercy; the other, strenuous for the integrity of the government, leaning toward justice. How can these principles be reconciled? Can both parties be satisfied? Here is a difficulty; and this will lead us to notice the conditions or restrictions under which pardon may be granted with safety. For an indiscriminate, unconditional pardon is dangerous to the government. Closely examining this subject we find

IV. WHAT THE GOVERNOR MUST DO IN GRANTING PARDON.

He must do one of the following things:

1. Disregard the strict claims of law and justice. But this, of course, is evil in its tendency, giving license to crime, and favoring lawlessness, rather than restraining it, which latter must remain the true object of government. This, indeed, is the very thing we have all the time been guarding against. We cannot admit this, it being dangerous to the government. Because if the claims of the law may be disregarded in one case, they may in many—they may in all; and then government is at an end. And if the executive sets the example of disregarding the claims of the law, it will show that he does not highly regard the strict claims of the law, and others may thereby be led to follow his example, or all may; and the result is the same—lawlessness and anarchy. And all this from following the example of him who occupies the throne of justice! The very thought is, in the highest degree, abhorrent. Only one way remains, that I can perceive, by which pardon may be granted without trampling on justice, and endangering the government: that is to

2. Make satisfaction to the law by voluntary substitution. If the substitution be voluntary, so that the substitute be satisfied, and the full penalty of the law be inflicted, so that the law and justice be satisfied, all must be satisfied—all conflicting interests and feelings must be reconciled. Let no one say, to oppose this, that such is not the case when pardon is granted in human governments; for these are imperfect, and instead of conforming strictly to justice, they can only hope to approximate it. The interests above referred to are never harmonized in human governments. In these, if the prisoner is punished less than the penalty indicated by the law, then the law is deprived just so much of its due. In such case justice is not reconciled or vindicated; it is suspended. All must see at a glance that the means herein proposed alone obviates all difficulties. Let us further examine its effects.

J. H. W.

(To be continued.)