American Sentinel, Vol. 9, No. 10
It will not do to say in answer to this, although it be perfectly true, that thePage 1
It will not do to say in answer to this, although it be perfectly true, that the pope’s claims to be the representative of God, or to be God, are a fraud and an imposture, and therefore the Catholic’s belief in the pope and his allegiance to him are a fallacy and are indeed really nothing religiously. This is all true, but that does not touch the point here. The Catholic believes and religiously believes that the pope’s claims are genuine, and that his prerogatives are divine: that is the Catholic’s religious profession. And the point is that he has the inalienable right to believe thus and to hold this religious profession, without question or molestation from any source or for any cause. It is a fundamental American principle and sound American doctrine, that for “each one to believe for himself and to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience is an inalienable right.” And that “our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, more than on our opinions in physics or geometry; that therefore the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to the offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which, in common with his fellow-citizens, he has a natural right.” This, we say, is sound and fundamental American principle and doctrine. And therefore it is clear that any proposition to make the Catholic’s allegiance to the pope a test or impediment against any civil or political right is decidedly un-American. Consequently, any such method as that of opposing the papacy in the United States not only will not succeed but will actually aid her, in that it subverts fundamental principles and breaks down constitutional safeguards. And when these are subverted and broken down for any cause whatever, they are subverted and broken down for every cause—they are indeed no more, and the nation becomes but the prey of the violent and the most violent take it by force. Such procedure can only hasten the success and supremacy of the papacy. And therefore the AMERICAN SENTINEL, being American, and opposed to the papacy, can never indorse, nor engage in, any such method of “opposition.” THEREFORE it is that this question of opposing the papacy requires the most careful thought upon the part of all who would engage in it, lest they be found really aiding her while professedly opposing her, and while really intending to oppose her. This is true in the case at any time, because of the exceeding subtlety of her workings; but now it is doubly true, because, in addition to the subtlety of her workings, she has, as we showed last week, such a clear field and such an immense advantage in every way, for the carrying forward of her avowed purpose to possess America for herself. BISHOP COXE proposed another method of “opposition” to the papacy, which is worth notice, not only because it is an example of how not to do it, but because it has been quite widely indorsed. We have given in these columns the bishop’s clear statement of the situation as regards74the papacy in the United States, and have given him credit for it. And we also give him credit for good intentions regarding opposition to the papacy. But as his raising the alarm is robbed of its force by the fact of his having helped to create the alarming situation, so his proposed opposition is robbed of all its force by the method which he proposes. Here is his proposition as made in his second open letter to Satolli:— When Buddhists shall have 500,000 votes from this country, we shall find out how to prohibit the Grand Lama from sending his “ablegate” here to control them. You may force us to make a general law applicable to the pope and the Grand Lama alike.
But how such a law could be made in accordance with any American principle the bishop does not attempt to say, even if he ever took time to think on that phase of the subject. Such a law as Bishop Coxe suggests could not possibly be anything else than a law respecting an establishment of religion and prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Such a law therefore would be in direct violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which declares that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” And that the bishop means just such a law, as indeed there could be no other, is made certain by his own words in the sentences immediately following the one above quoted. Here are his words to Satolli:— Now, look at the French law, established by the First Consul and accepted by the pope himself. Here it is textually translated:—
No individual calling himself nuncio, legate, vicar or commissary apostolic, or availing himself of any other denomination, shall, without the authorization of the Government, exercise any function relative to the affairs of the Gallican Church upon the soil or anywhere else.
Any such law as that would be at once to make the Government the head of all religion, which would be but the papacy under another form and under another head. The enactment of any such law, either in word or in principle, would be, at that one stroke, to sweep away every principle of the Government as established by those who made the Government. It would be, at that one stroke, to destroy the Government as it was founded upon American, Protestant, and Christian principles, and to set up in its place a government committed to and actuated by papal principles only. That it would be done by professed Protestants would alter neither the principle nor the prospect. Professed Protestants have done such things before. And in all such instances the only thing that ever kept them from being, in all respects, like the papacy itself, was only the limitations upon their power. The only thing that ever kept John Calvin from being to the fullest extent like Innocent the Third, was that he did not have the power of Innocent the Third. The only thing that ever kept either the Puritans of England or of New England, or the Episcopalians of England or Maryland, from being, in all respects, like the papacy, as they were in so many respects, was that they did not have the power of the papacy. And if the principles here announced by Bishop Coxe should prevail in the United States, we have no assurance that the people would be any better off under the superintendence of Bishop Coxe than they would be under Archbishop O’Flamagan or Cardinal O’Mulligan. And we positively know that with the principles of the Government, maintained as they were originally established, the people would be far better off with ten thousand “ablegates” here, than they could be without one, under the procedure proposed by Bishop Coxe; for this procedure would open wide the door for every bigot—political, religious, or other kind—in the land, to make himself an “ablegate” over everybody else. And the event would prove that they would all make themselves such too. Bishop Coxe’s proposed remedy is far worse than is the real disease, which we dread equally with him. It has been seriously proposed to disfranchise Catholics in the United States who will not renounce allegiance to the pope. But this could never be done on any American principle. The Catholic’s allegiance to the pope is a religious matter—it is a spiritual thing. And to deny or curtail political right on account of religious profession is clearly and entirely un-American. It is a fundamental principle, as well as a constitutional provision, of the Government of the United States, that religious profession shall never have any bearing upon civil rights or political qualifications. To the Catholic the pope is in the place of God, and is the representative of God: he believes that allegiance to the pope is allegiance to God. And it is in this sense that the Catholic professes and holds allegiance to the pope. This cannot fairly be denied. His allegiance to the pope is therefore a religious thing, it is a religious profession, and is to him an essential part of his worship as to God. And to propose to abridge his political rights on account of his allegiance to the pope, is therefore plainly to deny civil or political right on account of religious profession, and is therefore just as clearly unconstitutional and un-American. If opposition to the papacy be conducted upon unchristian principles, it will only increase her antichristian power and influence. If this opposition be conducted upon unprotestant principles the only effect will be to make more widespread the influence of Catholicism. The papacy is un-American, it is true, but if opposition to her is conducted on un-American principles her un-American power and influence is only increased, her hold upon the country is more confirmed, and her taking possession of the country is only hastened. THIS subject of opposition to the papacy in the United States needs to be very carefully studied, lest it be done in such a way as to really help her instead of hindering her. The papacy needs to be opposed and must be opposed in her designs upon the United States and the world as well as in every other thing. But this opposition, to avail anything, must be made upon right principles and must be conducted in the right way. AND being Christian, Protestant, and American, the opposition of the AMERICAN SENTINEL to the papacy, whether in the guise of a professed Protestantism or in her own proper dress, always has been, and always will be, conducted upon strictly Christian, Protestant and American principles. THE AMERICAN SENTINEL is therefore everlastingly and uncompromisingly opposed to every element and every principle of the papacy wherever, and in whatever guise, it may appear. AND the AMERICAN SENTINEL is American. THE AMERICAN SENTINEL is Protestant. THE AMERICAN SENTINEL is Christian. THE reader may be ready to ask, “Do you propose to surrender to Rome altogether?”—Oh, no, never! We propose to have the victory over Rome altogether. It may be inquired then, “How do you propose to do it?” Well, we shall tell that later. But in the meantime we beg leave to remark that the present position and work of the papacy in the United States presents a much greater question than the American people realize, and a question which requires much more careful and critical thought than many people have ever yet given to it. Trial of Seventh-day Adventists in Gainesville, Georgia.
By W. H. M.
THE cases of Elder W. A. McCutchen and Professor E. C. Keck, Seventh-day Adventists, of Gainesville, Ga., were reached in the City Court of Gainesville during the forenoon of Thursday, February 22. The cases were heard together, and occupied nearly the entire day. The trial was before Judge Marshall L. Smith and a jury. The following morning the Atlanta Constitution contained this special correspondence in reference to the matter:— GAINESVILLE, GA., February 22.—(Special.)—Rich in sensation and replete in novelty was the case of the State vs. Elder W. A. McCutchen and Professor E. C. Keck, of the Seventh-day Adventist sect, which came up for trial in the City Court of Hall County to-day. The defendants were indicted for working on Sunday. The State was represented by Solicitor-General Howard Thompson and W. F. Findley, and the defendants appeared in their own defense. Four witnesses were introduced in behalf of the State, who testified that they saw the defendants at work in the Seventh-day Adventists’ Church here on Sunday of November 19, 1893. They were sawing, scribing and jointing lumber. The defendants made their statements and admitted doing the work, but claimed that they observed Saturday the seventh day, and therefore had no remorse of conscience. Elder McCutchen made a very clever argument in his own defense, lasting one hour and a half. He was followed by Professor Keck, who spoke less than five minutes. Colonel W. F. Findley then closed for the State, consuming an hour, and his honor, Marshall L. Smith, gave a clear and impartial charge to the jury which retired. During the trial the courtroom was crowded. The ministers of the city were on hand in full force to hear the law and gospel both propounded in the courtroom. The jury retired at 4:15 o’clock in the afternoon, and, it being announced at 5:40 that the jury had not agreed and that the same was not likely to agree, by consent it was agreed that should the jury reach a verdict during the night the foreman should hold it until court reconvenes in the morning at 9 o’clock. The case resulted in a mistrial. On the reconvening of court the next morning the jury was still out, and being called in, the foreman declared that there was no likelihood of an agreement being reached. The jury was therefore discharged, and the case will come up for trial again at the next term of the same court which opens the third Monday in May. There has been, very naturally and properly, a deep and wide-spread interest in this case. It could not be otherwise, when it is considered what the principle is which is at stake, and in jeopardy of what, under its penal code and system, the State of Georgia has placed these men. The citizens of the city of Gainesville and the country surrounding have been in a measure aroused to the importance of the case. That the trial resulted as it did is a partial evidence of this. It is not to be supposed that the people of the State of Georgia will allow a case of religious persecution, worthy of the last century, to be carried on among them without, at least, informing themselves as to its merits and developing very decided opinions as to its propriety or impropriety. Those who75have charge of this prosecution and its continuance are placed in a very delicate position in the eyes of the people of their State and the country. There is on the statute books of Georgia a law which is a survival of the Middle Ages, and breathing the religious intolerance from which it sprung. Will they enforce this law? Will they gladly accept the odium which must attach to those who are party to the enforcement of such a relic of semi-barbarism? They certainly are in a difficult position. Those who bring complaint and indict and prosecute, are in a place of much greater difficulty than the men whom they bring to the bar of the court. There is no doubt or uncertainty or shadow of turning in their minds. They are right. The law of the State of Georgia is wrong. There will be no question in the minds of all men of sincere religious conviction throughout the world as to which stand in the nobler and worthier position, the victims of the iniquitous law, or those who put it into operation and execute its injustice. It is not these two men who are on trial in this matter, in reality; but this law of the State of Georgia and the people, as to whether they are willing that it should be enforced, or no. A full statement of the arguments presented before the court will be given hereafter. Gainesville, Ga., Feb. 25. No! Upon American, Protestant, and Christian principles, the Grand Lama has as much right to send an “ablegate” here to control 500,000 Buddhists as he has to send a priest to control five, or as any individual has to be a Buddhist at all: that is, a full, complete and untrammeled right. And under these principles the pope has just as much right to send an ablegate here to control 7,000,000 Catholics, as he has to create a cardinal here, or to appoint a priest here, or as any individual here has to be a Catholic at all: and that is, a perfect right. And no restriction can be put upon that right without, at the same time and in the same act, sweeping away the safeguards of all the rights of all the people. And, surely, every person who will take the time to think must readily decide that it is far better to maintain the principles and the safeguards of all the rights of himself and all the people, and bear the presence of an “ablegate,” than to sweep away all the safeguards of all the rights of himself and all the people in an attempt to get rid of the “ablegate.” BUT it may be said, and truly, that the papacy with its ablegate, and in its whole system, is not only religious but political, and interferes in politics and manipulates votes, and thus herself violates the principles of the Government and the Constitution. Yes, that is true. The papacy is nothing if not political as well as religious. “The help of the law and State authority” is an essential element in the work of the papacy. She does interfere in politics and does manipulate votes, and does, thus and otherwise, violate the principles of the Government and the provisions of the Constitution. And there are many professed Protestant church-managers, who have set for her the pernicious example by repeatedly doing the same things. And this is where they are just like the papacy. But even though this were not so, and there were no such example set, it is manifestly vain to attempt or expect to defeat the wrong-doing of the papacy, by doing the same things, and the same way that she does. No person nor anything can be right by being like the papacy. We can be right only by being entirely unlike the papacy in all things. When the papacy violates the principles, or the Constitution, of the Government, it will not help the matter for us also to violate these principles or the Constitution. Violation of American principles by Catholics cannot be stopped by the violation of these principles by people who are not Catholics. One breach of American principles is not cured, but is increased by a good deal more than double, by the committal of another. Such is not the way to oppose the papacy in the United States. And as the AMERICAN SENTINEL is American indeed, we can never join in or indorse any such “opposition” to the papacy. Did the Church of Rome Ever Persecute?
By C. P. B.
It is most emphatically denied by the priests and bishops of Rome that “the church” ever persecuted. In “The Faith of Our Fathers,” Cardinal Gibbons gives this version of the establishment of the Inquisition:— The Spanish Inquisition was erected by King Ferdinand, less from motives of religious zeal than from those of human policy. It was established, not so much with the view of preserving the Catholic faith, as of perpetuating the integrity of his kingdom. The Moors and Jews were looked upon not only as enemies of the altar, but chiefly as enemies of the throne. Catholics were upheld not only for their faith alone, but because they united faith to loyalty. The baptized Moors and Israelites were oppressed for their heresy because their heresy was allied to sedition. It must be remembered that in those days heresy, especially if outspoken, was regarded not only as an offense against religion, but also as a crime against the State, and was punished accordingly. This condition of things was not confined to Catholic Spain, but prevailed across the sea in Protestant England. We find Henry VIII. and his successors pursuing the same policy in Great Britain towards their Catholic subjects, and punishing Catholicism as a crime against the State, just as Islamism and Judaism were proscribed in Spain. It was, therefore, rather a royal and political than an ecclesiastical institution. The king nominated the inquisitors, who were equally composed of lay and clerical officials. He dismissed them at will. From the king, and not from the pope, they derived their jurisdiction, and into the king’s coffers, and not into the pope’s, went all the emoluments accruing from fines and confiscations. In a word, the authority of the Inquisition began and ended with the crown. The massacre of St. Bartholomew is explained by the cardinal in about the same way. He says:— In the reign of Charles IX. of France, the Huguenots were a formidable power and a seditious element in that country. They were under the leadership of Admiral Coligny, who was plotting the overthrow of the ruling monarch. The French king, instigated by his mother, Catherine de Medicis, and fearing the influence of Coligny, whom he regarded as an aspirant to the throne, compassed his assassination, as well as that of his followers in Paris, August 24th, 1572. This deed of violence was followed by an indiscriminate massacre in the French capital, and other cities of France, by an incendiary populace, who are easily aroused but not easily appeased. Religion had nothing to do with the massacre. Coligny and his fellow Huguenots were slain not on account of their creed, but exclusively on account of their alleged treasonable designs. If they had nothing but their Protestant faith to render them odious to King Charles, they would never have been molested; for, neither did Charles nor his mother ever manifest any special zeal for the Catholic Church, nor any special aversion to Protestantism, unless when it threatened the throne. The true attitude of the papacy toward the Inquisition is thus stated by Ranke, in his “History of the Popes,” page 58:— When it was perceived that no conclusion was come to with the Protestants of Germany, and that at the same time, even in Italy, controversies respecting the sacraments, doubts concerning purgatory, and other speculations of great moment, as regarded the Romish ritual, were gaining ground, the pope one day asked Cardinal Caraffa “what means he could devise against these evils.” The cardinal declared that the only one was “a thorough searching inquisition.” John Alvarez de Toledo, Cardinal of Burgos, joined with him in this opinion. The old Dominican Inquisition had long ago fallen into decay. The choice of inquisitors was committed to the monastic orders, and it frequently happened that these partook of the opinions which it was sought to put down. In Spain, the earlier form of the institution had been so far departed from, that a supreme tribunal of the Inquisition for that country had been erected there. Caraffa and Burgos, old Dominicans, both of them, both men of harsh and gloomy views of rectitude, zealots for the purity of Catholicism, austere in life, and intractable in their opinions, counselled the pope to found in Rome, on the model of that of Spain, a general supreme tribunal of the Inquisition, on which all others should be dependent. “As St. Peter,” said Caraffa, “vanquished the first heresiarchs on no other spot than Rome, so must the successor of St. Peter overcome all the heresies of the world in Rome.” The Jesuits reckon it to their honor, that their founder, Loyola, supported this proposal by a special memorial. On the 21st of July, 1542, the bull was issued. It names six cardinals, among whom Caraffa and Toledo stood first, to be commissioners of the apostolic see, general and universal inquisitors on this side the Alps, and beyond them. It bestows on them the right to delegate ecclesiastics with similar power, to all such places as it shall seem good to them, to determine absolutely all appeals against the acts of the latter, and even to proceed without the participation of the ordinary spiritual courts. Every man, without a single exception, without any regard whatever to station or dignity, shall be subject to their jurisdiction; the suspected shall be thrown into prison, the guilty shall be punished even capitally, and their property confiscated. One restriction is imposed on the court. To punish shall be its function: the pope reserves to himself the right of pardoning the guilty who become converted. Thus shall everything be done, ordered, and accomplished, to suppress and uproot the errors that have broken out among the Christian community. Caraffa lost not a moment in putting this bull into execution. But even as Cardinal Gibbons states it, it is only shifting the responsibility; it is saying, just as religious persecutors say now, “The State did it.” It was, indeed, the civil power that executed the death penalty, but it was the church that defined heresy and excommunicated the heretics, delivering them up to the civil power. It was, in any event, the religious sentiment engendered by Rome that made the Inquisition not only possible but inevitable. And by no possibility can that corrupt church escape the odium. The position of the Catholic Church upon this question is thus defined by Archbishop Kenrick:— Heresy and unbelief are crimes; that is the whole of the matter, and in Christian countries, where the Catholic religion is an essential part of the laws of the land, they will be punished as other crimes. In the light of this utterance all that any denial of persecution by Rome means is simply that the papal church did not actually inflict the death penalty. The same defense exactly is made in behalf of Calvin who accused Servetus and prosecuted him before the civil courts. Now the disciples of Calvin declare that it was the civil authorities that put Servetus to death. So it was; but who caused the civil authorities to do it?—John Calvin. And who, in Roman Catholic countries, causes the Catholic religion to be made a part of the law of the land?—Rome. And who invokes the civil law against “heretics”?—Rome. Who then persecutes?—Rome, most assuredly. But it is not Rome alone that seeks to shield herself from the charge of religious persecution, behind the civil law. It is denied that there has been persecution in Tennessee and Maryland; it is simply enforcing the civil law, say the modern “Protestant” apologists for modern religious persecution. Speaking of the Judefind case in Maryland, the so-called Christian Reformer recently said:— Of course it will seem to Adventists a most unfair and unjust comparison, but the fact is that the violators of Sabbath law are to be dealt with as the violators of other laws on the statute books of our States. This is strikingly similar to Archbishop Kenrick’s utterance, which we quote again, in order that the reader may have the two side by side. Here it is:— Heresy and unbelief are crimes; that is the whole of the matter, and in Christian countries, where the Catholic religion is an essential part of the laws of the land, they will be punished as other crimes. What a contemptible attitude is this! “Christian” sentiment demands laws which, in effect, define heresy in the interests of the religious dogma, and then the same “Christian” sentiment disclaims the responsibility and says, “The State did it.” Now let us put alongside this National Reform utterance (from the Christian(?) Reformer) and papal utterance (from Archbishop Kenrick) the following from Judge Hammond’s dictum in the King case in Tennessee:— The courts cannot change that which has been done, however done, by the civil law in favor of the Sunday observers. The religion of Jesus Christ is so interwoven with the texture of our civilization and every one of its institutions, that it is impossible for any man or set of men to live among us and find exemption from its influences and restraints. Sunday observance is so essentially a part of that religion that it is impossible to rid our laws of it. So civil or religious freedom may stop short of its logic in this matter of Sunday observance. It is idle to expect in government perfect action or harmony of essential principles, and whoever administers, whoever makes, and whoever executes the laws, must take into account the imperfections, the passions, the prejudices, religious or other, and the errings of men because of these. We cannot have in individual cases a perfect observance of Sunday, according to the rules of religion; and, indeed, the sects are at war with each other as to the modes of observance. And yet no wise man will say that there shall be, therefore, no observance at all. Government leaves the warring sects to observe as they will, so they do not disturb each other; and as to the non-observer, he cannot be allowed his fullest personal freedom in all respects; largely he is allowed to do as he pleases, and generally there is no pursuit of him, in these days, as a mere matter of disciplining his conscience; but only when he definitely sets up his non-observance by ostentatious display of his disrespect for the feelings or prejudices of others. This is only putting in legal phrase, clothing in judicial language, the same intolerant idea expressed by the so-called Protestant paper, the Christian(?) Reformer and the popish archbishop, Kenrick. The facts of history show that Rome has persecuted; her utterances show that had she the power she would persecute again, while “Protestant” utterances show that such Protestantism is no better than the papacy. C. P. B. “A CHRISTIAN man may believe that his church is far from perfect, and may yet consistently retain his membership in it; but in the very moment in which he reaches the conclusion that it is a thoroughly corrupt organization, he is bound to leave it and lift up his voice against it. If he hesitates, he shows that he is lacking in courage.” Christianity and the Roman Empire.
THE controversy between Christianity and Rome was not a dispute between individuals, or a contention between sects or parties; it was a contest between antagonistic principles. On the part of Christianity it was the assertion of the principle of the rights of conscience and of the individual; on the part of Rome it was the assertion of the principle of the absolute absorption of the individual, and his total enslavement to the State in all things; divine as well as human, religious as well as civil. Jesus Christ came into the world to set men free, and to plant in their souls the genuine principle of liberty,—liberty actuated by love,—liberty too honorable to allow itself to be used as an occasion to the flesh, or for a cloak of maliciousness,—liberty led by a conscience enlightened by the Spirit of God,—liberty in which man may be free from all men, yet made so gentle by love that he would willingly become the servant of all, in order to bring them to the enjoyment of this same liberty. This is freedom indeed. This is the freedom which Christ gave to man; for, whom the Son makes free is free indeed. In giving to men this freedom, such an infinite gift could have no other result than that which Christ intended; namely, to bind them in everlasting, unquestioning, unswerving allegiance to him as the royal benefactor of the race. He thus reveals himself to men as the highest good, and brings them to himself as the manifestation of that highest good, and to obedience to his will as the perfection of conduct. Jesus Christ was God manifest in the flesh. Thus God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, that they might know him, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he sent. He gathered to himself disciples, instructed them in his heavenly doctrine, endued them with power from on high, sent them forth into all the world to preach this gospel of freedom to every creature, and to teach them to observe all things whatsoever he had commanded them. The Roman Empire then filled the world,—“the sublimest incarnation of power, and a monument the mightiest of greatness built by human hands, which has, upon this planet, been suffered to appear.” That empire, proud of its conquests, and exceedingly jealous of its claims, asserted its right to rule in all things, human and divine. In the Roman view, the State took precedence of everything. It was entirely out of respect to the State and wholly to preserve the State, that either the emperors or the laws ever forbade the exercise of the Christian religion. According to Roman principles, the State was the highest idea of good. Neander says: “The idea of the State was the highest idea of ethics; and within that was included all actual realization of the highest good; hence the development of all other goods pertaining to humanity, was made dependent on this.” It will be seen at once that for any man to profess the principles and the name of Christ, was virtually to set himself against the Roman Empire; for him to recognize God as revealed in Jesus Christ as the highest good, was but treason against the Roman State. It was not looked upon by Rome as anything else than high treason; because as the Roman State represented to the Roman the highest idea of good, for any man to assert that there was a higher good, was to make Rome itself subordinate. Consequently the Christians were not only called “atheists,” because they denied the gods, but the accusation against them before the tribunals was of the crime of “high treason,” because they denied the right of the State to interfere with men's relations to God. The common accusation against them was that they were “irreverent to the Cæsars, and enemies of the Cæsars and of the Roman people.” To the Christian, the Word of God asserted with absolute authority: “Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man.” Eccl. 12:13. To him, obedience to this word through faith in Christ, was eternal life. This to him was the conduct which showed his allegiance to God as the highest good,—a good as much higher than that of the Roman State as the government of God is greater than was the government of Rome. This idea of the State, was not merely the State as a civil institution, but as a divine institution, and the highest conception of divinity itself. The genius of Rome was the supreme deity. Thus the idea of the State as the highest good was the religious idea, and consequently, religion was inseparable from the State. Hence the maxim, Vox populi, vox Dei,—the voice of the people is the voice of God. As this voice gave expression to the will of the supreme deity, and consequently of the highest good; and as this will was expressed in the form of laws, hence again the Roman maxim, “What the law says is right.” It is very evident that in such a system there was no place for individuality. The State was everything, and the majority was in fact the State. What the majority said should be, that was the voice of the State, that was the voice of God, that was the expression of the highest good, that was the expression of the highest conception of right;—and everybody must assent to that or be considered a traitor to the State. The individual was but a part of the State. There was therefore no such thing as the rights of the people; the right of the State only was to be considered, and that was to be considered absolute. “The first principle of their law was the paramount right of the State over the citizen.” It is also evident that in such a system, there was no such thing as the rights of conscience; because, as the State was supreme also in the realm of religion, all things religious were to be subordinated to the will of the State, which was but the will of the majority. And where the majority presumes to decide in matters of religion, there is no such thing as rights of religion or conscience. Christianity was directly opposed to this, as shown by the words of Christ, who, when asked by the Pharisees and the Herodians whether it was lawful to give tribute to Cæsar or not, answered: “Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.” In this Christ established a clear distinction between Cæsar and God, and between religion and the State. He separated that which pertains to God from that which pertains to the State. Only that which was Cæsar's was to be rendered to Cæsar, while that which is God's was to be rendered to God, and with no reference whatever to Cæsar. The State being divine and the Cæsar reflecting this divinity, whatever was God's was Cæsar's. Therefore, when Christ made this distinction between God and Cæsar, separated that which pertains to God from that which pertains to Cæsar, and commanded men to render to God that which is God's, and to Cæsar only that which is Cæsar's, he at once stripped Cæsar—the State—of every attribute of divinity. And in doing this he declared the supremacy of the individual conscience, because it is left with the individual to decide what things they are which pertain to God. Thus Christianity proclaimed the right of the individual to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience, while Rome asserted the duty of every man to worship according to the dictates of the State. Christianity asserted the supremacy of God; Rome asserted the supremacy of the State. Christianity set forth God as manifested in Jesus Christ as the chief good; Rome held the State to be the highest good. Christianity set forth the law of God as the expression of the highest conception of right; Rome held the law of the State to be the expression of the highest idea of right. Christianity taught that the fear of God and the keeping of his commandments is the whole duty of man; Rome taught that to be the obedient servant of the State is the whole duty of man. Christianity preached Christ as the sole possessor of power in heaven and in earth; Rome asserted the State to be the highest power. Christianity separated that which is God's from that which is Cæsar's; Rome maintained that that which is God's is Cæsar's. This was the contest, and these were the reasons of it, between Christianity and the Roman Empire.