The American Sentinel, Vol. 5, No. 24
ANOTHER evidence that the workingmen are not crying so loudly for Sunday laws, aPage 1
ANOTHER evidence that the workingmen are not crying so loudly for Sunday laws, and that they are not complaining so bitterly of the Egyptian bondage and slavery of being forced to work on Sunday as the Sunday-law advocates claim, is furnished by the Chairman of the Committee of Arbitration in the great Chicago strike which was settled lately. In that, there was no call by the workingmen for the stoppage of Sunday work, there was no complaint about being required to work on Sunday, no demand whatever for any release from Egyptian bondage, nor Sunday labor. There was just this provision in the settlement with regard to Sunday: “Sunday work will be paid for at the rate of double time.” That is, wherever men work on Sunday, they are to have double wages over work done on other days. It is probable that pay for Sunday work has not always been at the rate of double the pay for work on other days; but nearly always more is paid for work on Sunday than on other days. However, whether that be so or not, it is certain that the workingmen are not nearly as anxious about the question of Sunday labor, as the Sunday-law preachers are. The Rights of the People.
By A. T. J.
It is remarkable how everything in the way of State or legislative action is running more and more to the theory of force. Even now it has reached that stage where it is demanded that the people shall be forced to be religious, forced to be English, forced to be educated, forced to vote, and there is no knowing what next will come, nor where it will end. By Sunday laws and the Bible in the public school the people are all to be forced to be religious. By such as the Bennett law in Wisconsin the people are all to be forced to be English. By a compulsory voting law Governor Hill of this State, as a leading executive, and David Dudley Field, a leading lawyer, propose that all the people shall be forced to vote. This theory is subversive of the American principle of government which is the only true principle of civil government. The American principle of government is the principle of rights not force. This Government is a government of rights, not a government of force—a government for protection, not compulsion. “Oh,” it is said “we fully recognize that. We do not propose for an instant to take away anybody’s rights. We simply propose to compel everybody to exercise his rights.” But, the moment that government assumes the authority to compel a person to exercise his rights, that moment it robs him of all his rights. For who is to compel the minority to exercise their rights?—The majority of course. But if the majority may compel the minority to exercise their rights, then that majority have the equal right to compel the minority to exercise those rights as the majority say. Such a proceeding annihilates constitutional government, and substitutes only the government of the mob. The very idea of a constitution is sacredly and safely to guard the rights of the minority against even the slightest encroachment of the majority; whether it be in an attempt to say that any person shall exercise his right, or an attempt to say how he shall exercise it. Any claim of the right to compel a person to exercise his rights necessarily carries with it the right to say how he shall exercise them. All this compulsion that is now advocated is claimed to be for the good of the State; it is claimed to be essential to the peace and safety of the State; that is of the majority. It would be absurd to compel a person to exercise a right and then leave him free to exercise that right to the detriment of the State. It would be suicidal to compel people to exercise their right to vote and then leave them free to exercise it in such a way as to overturn the power that does the compelling. It is destructive, rather than preservative, of the peace and safety of the State to compel people to rest and at the same time leave them free to hatch mischief. Therefore any claim of right to compel anybody to exercise his rights necessarily involves the claim of right to compel him to exercise them in a certain way. And that is only to rob him of his rights and his freedom altogether. It is true that force is the only power at the command of a civil government. But the only proper use that can ever be made of it is for protection. It is not to be used to compel a solitary individual to exercise his own rights; but to compel all to recognize, and not to infringe, the rights of others. Every person in the United States has the natural right to rest, and to worship, and to be religious, and to speak English; and many of them have the political right to vote. Every person has the right to exercise those rights. And every person has an equal right not to exercise those rights.186 Another instance of this same spirit of despotic invasion of the rights of the people, is shown in the act of Congress empowering the Census Bureau to carry on such a political inquisition as to compel the people of the United State to answer such questions as the following:— 22. Whether [he or she is] suffering from acute or chronic diseases, with the name of disease and length of time afflicted. 23. Whether defective in mind, sight, hearing, or speech; or whether crippled, maimed, or deformed, and name of defect. 24. Whether a prisoner, convict, homeless child, pauper. 25 and 26. Is the home you live in hired? or is it owned by the head or by a member of the family? 27. If owned by head or member of family, is the house free from mortgage encumbrance? 28. If the head of the family is a farmer, is the farm which he cultivates hired? or is it owned by him or by a member of his family? 29. If owned by head or member of family, is the farm free from mortgage encumbrance? 30. If the home or farm is not owned by head or member of family and mortgaged, give the post office address of owner. When Congress, and legislatures, and governors, and lawyers, advocate the compulsory speaking of English, and compulsory education, and compulsory voting, and the compulsory telling of every personal defect and every private disease, it is not so much to be wondered at that preachers should advocate compulsory religion. When Congress voluntarily sets on foot a political inquisition it is not to be greatly wondered at that the political preachers and churches should petition the same body to establish a religious inquisition also. Every one of these things is an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of the people. In this Government there are rights of the people, separate from and above both the rights of the States and of the United States. There is such a thing as the rights of the States; there is also such a thing as the rights of the United States; and there is yet further such a thing as the rights of the people. In other words there are State rights, national rights, and personal rights; and each of these is separate from both the others. This is all recognized and expressed in the United States Constitution. The Constitution begins with the words, Then the Ninth Amendment says:— The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Then the Tenth Amendment says:— The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or TO THE PEOPLE.
The makers of this Nation understood this question thoroughly; but it is now almost entirely forgotten. When will the people learn once more to recognize, and to assert, the rights of the people? “THE Protestants and Catholics of Newburyport, Massachusetts,” says the Converted Catholic, “are quarrelling over the saloon license. Through the efforts of a secret society all the licenses for that town have been granted to so-called Protestants, and Father Teeling, the Roman Catholic priest, has protested against this unfair discrimination.” This item illustrates the impropriety of calling Protestants all who are not Catholics, and of denominating Christian all who are neither Mohammedan nor Pagan. Of course, as the Converted Catholic remarks, these people who have received license to sell liquors are not members of any Protestant church, but it is just as proper to call them Protestants as it is to call Christians hundreds of thousands who are so called. A Telling Example.
By A. T. J.
IN The Independent of May 22, we find the following announcement:— A telling example of the evil of intoxicating liquors is that offered by the dismissal of Post-Chaplain John Vaughan Lewis, formerly a popular minister of St. John's Church, the most fashionable church in Washington City, who was appointed to a chaplaincy in the army in 1883. He was compelled to leave his church by his unfortunate, and we must add, criminal habit of drinking. The habit pursued him after he left the church and while a chaplain in the army. A year ago he was confined in an insane asylum for treatment, after having been recommended for retirement by a retiring board. It was hoped that the treatment would result in a partial cure, so that he might be restored to duty; but such has not been the case, and an order has been issued directing his retirement with a year's pay. That is also a telling example of the evil of State chaplaincies. There was a man dismissed from the church for drunkenness, and then by some “influence” or other hocus-pocus was made a chaplain in the army. That is to say, he was not fit any longer to belong to a church, therefore it was proper for the State to take him up and give him charge of the spiritual interests and the moral culture of its soldiers. Addicted to habitual drinking when he was appointed in 1883, he kept it up all these seven years “while a chaplain in the army,” and a year ago he was confined in an asylum for treatment, with the hope of “a partial cure, so that he might be restored to duty.” That is to say, an habitual drinker is worthy to be appointed a chaplain in the army, and so long as he is not entirely gone in besotted inebriety he is capable of performing “duty” as a chaplain. When, however, it is no longer possible to keep him even partially sober then it is proper to retire him “with a year's pay.” Eight year's pay, therefore,—not less than ten thousand dollars of public money—has been paid to this chaplain for doing a drunkard's “duty.” Such a misappropriation of public money however is a very small item in comparison with the infamous and standing insult thus imposed upon every enlisted man in the United States Army. For, to assume—as the appointment of such a character as that to the office of chaplain, and as the keeping of him there knowing him to be such, does assume—that the soldiers of the United States army are so low and degraded that a confirmed drunkard is a fit instructor in morals and a proper person to take charge of their spiritual interests, is nothing short of an infamous insult imposed upon every enlisted man in the service. Considerable has been said lately about bettering the condition of the enlisted men in the army. There is plenty of room for it. And the total abolition of the whole system of State chaplaincies in the army and everywhere else, would be an excellent beginning. Under the circumstances it is difficult to suppose that this man was not known to be what he was, when he was appointed. For President Arthur, who appointed him, was an attendant at the very church of which he was a minister before he was appointed chaplain. It is indeed a telling example.
A. T. J. Some Statesmanship.
By W. H. M.
In the course of the discussion in regard to the admission of Idaho into the Union, in the House of Representatives, April 2, Hon. Joseph E. Washington, of Tennessee, as reported in the Congressional Record of April 6, said:— Mr. Speaker: The gentleman from Idaho (Mr. DuBois) in defending the clause in the Constitution of Idaho which disqualifies Mormons from voting and holding office, says:— The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Washington) signs this report. Let us see what the Constitution of Tennessee says on the subject of franchise. By article 9, “Ministers of the gospel are forbidden to hold office, also persons who deny God, or fight duels.” Yet, the gentleman from Tennessee signs a report which says:— “We insist that in Idaho disqualifications for holding office shall result only from a conviction of crime.” The people of Idaho say bigamists and polygamists shall not hold office in Idaho, the people of Tennessee say ministers of the gospel shall not hold office in Tennessee. Now, sir, let me read you in full the parts of the Constitution of Tennessee referred to. (Art. 9. Sec. 1–3.) They are as follows:— Whereas ministers of the gospel are, by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore no minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination whatever shall be eligible to a seat in either house of the Legislature.187 No person who denies the being of God or a future state of rewards and punishments shall hold any office in the civil departments of this State. Any person who shall after the adoption of this Constitution, fight a duel, etc. . . . Sir, these disqualifications are very different from what the statement of the gentleman from Idaho would lead one to suppose. . . . Surely the gentleman cannot object to that clause of our Constitution which excludes from civil office the infidel who denies the existence of a God! How, forsooth, could such a person take an oath to support the Constitution? Upon whom would or could he call to witness the solemnity of his obligation? He could not swear by the earth, for it is God's footstool. He could not swear by any created thing, for it is less than the Creator, whose very existence he denies. . . . But, sir, Tennessee does not stand alone among the States in excluding certain persons from the right to vote and hold office. On the contrary, she has fewer restrictions of this sort than almost any other State. As the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Stewart) alluded to my State, let me read from the Vermont Constitution, chapter 2, section 12, which says each member of the Legislature before taking his seat shall make and subscribe to the following declaration:— “You do believe in one God, the Creator and Governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good, the punisher of the wicked; and you do acknowledge the scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration, and own and profess the Protestant religion.” This prohibits, if enforced, a Roman Catholic from becoming a member of the Legislature of the State of Vermont, and certainly excludes every infidel. I will not consume time by reading from the constitutions of all the States. . . . I have cited these cases to show that Tennessee has done nothing cruel, unjust, unusual, or contrary to the spirit of a free and enlightened government when she placed a few restrictions around the right to vote and hold office, but on the contrary she has not gone to any such length as have the States which those who criticise her represent. The congressman from Tennessee is in error as regards his quotation from the Vermont Constitution, for the clause which he quotes is to be found in the Constitution of 1786, but is omitted in the Constitution of 1793 now in force. However there are other provisions remaining which are, in almost equal measure, out of harmony with the true principles of civil government. But the remarkable fact remains that after a century has elapsed for the development of the principles enunciated by Thomas Jefferson and his compatriots in the establishment of this Government, such views should be expressed unchallenged in the Congress of the United States; and the fundamental law of all the States be called to witness to their propriety and soundness. Such incidents as this would argue it not amiss for our legislators to withdraw occasionally from the consideration of naval and military appropriations and tariff making, to the study of the primary principles of civil government, as found in the act for establishing religious freedom adopted by the Legislature of Virginia in 1785. The following portion of that act would be of special value in such an exercise:— That our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than on our opinions in physic and geometry; that therefore the prescribing any citizen as unworthy of the public confidence, by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to offices of trust and emolument unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which, in common with his fellow-citizens, he has a natural right, etc. This act also provides that opinions and professions in matters of religion shall in nowise diminish, enlarge or affect civil capacities. When in the discussion of a question of disfranchisement for a civil crime, such opinion as to what falls within the proper sphere of legislative cognizance are expressed, and things civil and things religious so inextricably commingled, there is, evidently, a wider field for civil service reform than has yet been dreamed of. Why He Sails Under Cover.
By W. A. Colcord
M. A. GAULT, in Christian Nation, April 30, says:— Brother Crafts is now making a tour of the West, but does not announce his meetings definitely, I presume in order that these organizers of the opposition may not get on his track. Yes; that is what we presumed some time ago. But why does he not wish these opponents to get on his track? Is he fearful of the results of an open conflict when overtaken by them? or doesn't he want such large crowds, anyway? Evidently he is not advocating doctrines which admit of such profound reasoning and unanswerable arguments that those who have attacked him once dare not ask him any questions after that. On the contrary, he seems anxious to avoid having to answer the questions a second time. But a lack of definiteness in making appointments may not only keep the opposition off his track, but his friends and abettors also. To such inconvenience is error put when pursued by truth. Why does not Mr. Crafts stand his ground?—W. A. Colcord. The Contest in Wisconsin and Illinois.
By Editor
As Judge Prendergast had something to do in assisting the Board of Education of Chicago to frame educational bills to be presented to the Illinois Legislature in 1889; and as the Illinois educational law and the Wisconsin law are both now the subject of great discussion, the Chicago Herald requested the Judge to prepare a review of the whole subject, embracing both laws. He did so, and the review was printed in the Herald of May 27. For the benefit of the readers of THE SENTINEL, we shall reprint the material part of the article. It will make two installments, the second of which will be a history of both the Illinois law and the Bennett law. We think the propositions set forth in the part here printed will bear the test of all fair criticism. Judge Prendergast says:— A brief review of recent statutes of the States of Illinois and Wisconsin concerning education is undertaken at the request of the Chicago Herald, and from a belief that by reason of grave misunderstanding as to the provisions and effects of both these laws, good citizens, who have in common the laudable purpose of educating youth and forming individual character, are moving, if they have not already moved, into opposing lines. The rights of parents and of the State are already so well defined by decisions of the highest judicial tribunals of both States, that it ought not to be difficult to compose the present dispute without drawing into the arena of politics, questions so fundamental and yet so easy of misrepresentation. It is wholly foreign to this statement to discuss the relative merits of the public and of the private, or denominational, school methods of instruction. To precipitate such a topic into the discussion of the relation from the general legal standpoint of the parent and the State to the education of children, would be to introduce a factor not at all relevant. The statutes mentioned are laws, and undertake to treat of and enforce rights which, in the legislative judgment, reside in different subjects, i. e., the parent and the State, and shall be considered with reference to their bearings upon legal rights. I venture to say that the opposition to the so-called Bennett law of Wisconsin is directed against what that law is believed to be rather than against what it is, and further, that those who approve unqualifiedly the Illinois statute do so without accurate knowledge of the real ground of complaint against it. Denunciation of those who oppose both these statutes proceeds on the assumption that they are enemies of popular education and of the public school, and that they deny to the State its just share of authority in the field of education. This view would seem not to be grounded on fact. The Bennett law has been generally published and understood to be a copy of the Illinois law. Beyond the fact that both treat of education, there is but little similarity between them. The Bennett law, while open to some objections, is yet replete with provisions recognizing and guarding parental rights, and at the same time it accords to the State recognition of its proper function. [From a careful study of the Bennett law, we are sure the Judge need not be so tender of it as he here seems to be. It is scarcely less violative of rights than is the Illinois statute.—EDITOR SENTINEL.] And in these respects it differs essentially from the Illinois act, which, as to some of its provisions, is violative of rights heretofore considered inviolable. Before examining these acts and the history of them, it may be well to consider a few general principles, so as to find, if possible, a common ground upon which fair-minded men may stand, and which are conformable to law. Cannot agreement be had to the following propositions? 1. To determine and direct the education of the child is a natural right of the parent. 2. There arises out of this parental right the duty to provide education. 3. When one who, by natural or human law, owes a duty to another, fails to perform that duty, the State can (a) enjoin or compel performance, (b) punish for non-performance, (c) supply the lack where, to the injury of society, non-performance is wrongfully persisted in. 4. The citizen is a partner in the sovereign power and a partaker in its activities, hence the aggregate of citizens may require that those who are to exercise functions of citizenship be fitted to their proper discharge. 5. Compulsory education, in the sense188that parents who violate or neglect their parental duty may be compelled to its performance, or punished for non-performance, is licit. 6. Compulsory education, in the sense of controlling, or seeking to control, or dislodging from their rightful place those parents who are discharging their parental duty commensurately with the state of life of parent and child, is not allowable, even to the State. 7. For the education of his children one parent may select the public school; another may select the private or denominational school; still another may furnish proper education without the aid of any school, and each of the three in so doing exercises a right protected by the law of the land as well as by the law of nature, and for doing which, he need offer neither excuse nor apology. 8. The public and private or denominational schools are in law neither related nor are they subordinate one to the other, nor need they be antagonistic. There lies within the bare proposition that “the State may compel all parents subject to its jurisdiction to give to their children instruction in the English language” much more difficulty than would at first appear. I will illustrate by the statement of a case within my own knowledge. I know a citizen, not a German, who for some years has educated several of his children in Germany, and instruction has there been given them altogether in the German language. In the Illinois act, as at present framed, if valid, this parent could be punished, for he does not send his children to a school within a district where they reside; nor are they given instruction in the English language. Another instance within my knowledge is that of a parent, not a German, who is about to remove from a comfortably and conveniently located home to another place where he can send his children to a school in which German is—to a considerable extent—the medium of instruction and of conversation among the pupils. He does this so that his children, in youth, may become proficient in that language. It may be said that these are extreme cases, but what of that? They are facts, and what is the right of these parents is the right of every other parent. Is it competent for the State to punish either or both of these parents for such exercise of their parental rights? It is doubtful. He was a wise man who said, “It is good also not to try experiments in States, except the necessity be urgent and the utility evident.” In such cases and in the case of German parents who send their children to German parochial schools, is it not to be presumed that the parents are sensible of the manifest advantage to their children of a knowledge of the English language, and that to parental interest and affection, rather than to penal statutes, should be committed the task of providing instruction? The right of the State to fix, by penal law, a given language as the language of instruction in schools has seldom been exercised. The only instances in mind are where drastic measures have been imposed on conquered or overborne peoples, as in Poland, Ireland, Alsace-Lorraine. This requirement for the teaching of certain studies in the English language involves questions of great delicacy. To enforce every right would often lead to offending against judiciousness. What danger sufficient to arrest legislative attention dwells in the fact that in a few rural communities the language brought by foreign-born citizens from the place of origin may obtain supremacy in a school-room. Will not this wear away? . . . Is it not fair to presume that those who in addition to the payment of taxes for the support of the free public schools, voluntarily assume the burdens of private schools, desire that their own children become intelligent, well-informed and useful members of the community, and that they know as well as others what is for the advantage of their children? At the fiftieth anniversary of the Philadelphia Sunday Association, Mr. John Wanamaker had quite an important place. He made a speech in behalf of Sunday laws, in which he employed the following allegory, which the Pearl of Days says “thrilled the vast audience:” — Just this is on my heart. I have an old friend born in another country years ago. He lived in a garden more beautiful than any other in all the world, where there were no cities and no railroads. I’d like my friend to speak to you. He arrived here last night. Listen to what he says: “Friend, you are very old?” “Yes, I have lived a great many years and I have traveled a great deal, first in Palestine, then in Europe, and finally to this country in the Mayflower with the Puritans. I have seen strange things and many changes. I’ve been to India and to Africa and I go among the Indians of America.” “No, only seven of us, and I am the oldest. A great many like me best because I am a friend of the poor. I stop the factories and light up the homes.” “Do they treat you well?” “The boys laugh at me sometimes, and some men sneer at me. Some call me Sunday and others the Sabbath, but the devout people call me Lord’s Day. I used to be the last in the family, but after the resurrection of Christ they put me first. I want to go all over, not merely to hospitals, but to all people and make them and their homes brighter.” “Dear old friend, we love you, and we would even kiss your feet. We hope that you may continue to go about the world and fill every land with joy and blessings in the name of Him who sent you.” That is rather a queer sort of personage indeed! First, he was the youngest in the family, and continued to be so for about four thousand years; then, all of a sudden by virtue of the resurrection of Christ, he became the oldest in the family: and all this without the loss of a single member of the family! Accordingly he has been the oldest now for about eighteen hundred and sixty years. That the resurrection of the Saviour should cause the youngest member of a family to become the oldest while they all remain alive is an “allegory” indeed, or something worse. No wonder the vast audience was thrilled by the relating of such a phenomenon! But when people can be thrilled with such namby-pamby balderdash as that they must be exceedingly impressible. A great deal of dignified nonsense has been written on the recognition of God in government, union of religion and the State, and kindred subjects, and we expect much more. Some think it absolutely necessary that religion be connected with the State, and God recognized by the Government, and that no harm will follow in the way of intolerance or persecution, as some anticipate. An article of this kind has appeared in the Arena for May, over the signature of Canon W. H. Freemantle. The writer anticipates no trouble from the recognition of God in government, because “this Christianity [of the Bible] can never beget a church which is the foe of progress.” He further says, in speaking of what is vital in Christianity: “In this I trust the two countries are agreed. I see in both189an increasing desire to legislate for the moral good of the people, and I cannot doubt that in the sphere of practical life the two organisms—a church thoroughly nationalized and a nation thoroughly Christianized—will blend together to be the first-fruits of the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.” Now all this sounds very well, but there are some things worthy of consideration in this connection. 1. The Christianity of to-day is no more the Christianity of the Bible, than was the Christianity of the third and fourth century. Yet out of those centuries came the worst system of iniquity which ever cursed the world. Yet this system recognized God in the Government, and was used for the conservation of what was then considered vital to Christianity. Was the union of religion and the State during the Dark Ages a friend to progress? 2. Pure Christianity, that of the Bible, will never form a union with the world, nor with worldly powers. 3. “A church thoroughly nationalized” is a spiritual harlot according to the word of God; and a “nation thoroughly Christianized,” as far as the aegis of law can make it so, is but a repetition of the Dark Ages. A true Christian nation will be seen only when Christ destroys the national governments of earth and reigns in glory over a people redeemed by grace, not law.—Signs of the Times. At the recent anniversary of the Garrett Biblical Institute, in Chicago, Dr. C. W. Bennett, of the Chair of Historical Theology, preached the Baccalaureate sermon from Mark 4:28; subject: “The Era of Religious Harmony. What Signs of Its Approach? What Can We Do to Hasten It?” Among other things, the Doctor thought this era might be hastened “by recognizing that we cannot produce moral effects by mechanical contrivances, cannot make men moral by statute. Placing the name of God in the Constitution and the Bible in the public schools will not make the Nation righteous.” This is good; but the speaker spoiled it all by saying: “There should be a conference of all the churches to select suitable moral precepts from the Bible for a text-book on which all can agree for use in the public schools.” “The Bible,” said he, “may be so used by godless teachers as to promote skepticism.” Just so; “godless teachers” are incompetent to give religious instruction; and for this reason, if for no other, teaching the Bible, either in whole or in part, should not be attempted by the State, but should be left to the Church and the home.