Review and Herald, Vol. 18, No. 11. (8/13/1861)

Review and Herald

Aug 13, 1861

The Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Aug 13, 1861

The Atonement.

By Albert Barnes

BY ALBERT BARNES.

We present another extract this week from Barnes on the Atonement, in which the relation of the atonement to the law is more particularly discussed. Let that heinous and God-dishonoring doctrine so much vaunted by the opponents of the Sabbath, that Christ by his death abolished that law which made his death necessary, wither beneath the scathing which it receives from the following argument. Nothing is clearer than that by the atonement the estimate which the Law-giver puts upon his law should be expressed, and the majesty of the law be kept unimpaired.—U. Smith.

THE OBJECTS TO BE SECURED BY AN ATONEMENT.

It is now a very material inquiry, What objects are contemplated by an atonement? What is to be secured by it? What is the purpose for which it is to be introduced into an administration of government?

It is clear, from the foregoing remarks, and from the nature of the case, that an atonement must relate to one or all of the following things: to the law itself, that its authority may be maintained; to the penalty of the law, that the object contemplated by the penalty may be secured; to the offenders in whose behalf it is made, or who are to receive the avails of it, that it may make their reformation and future good conduct certain; to the community, that it may have nothing to apprehend if the guilty are pardoned; and to the character of the lawgiver, that that character may stand fair before the world, and be such as to inspire confidence, if the just penalty of the law is remitted.

These objects would manifestly comprise all that could be effected, or that it would be desirable to effect, in administering the law; and I propose now to show why such objects must be contemplated by an atonement, or why it is proper to demand that they shall be secured if an atonement is made. In other words, it is necessary to show that if it is proposed to release the guilty on the ground of an atonement, justice may demand, and the interests of a community will require, that these objects shall be secured.

I. The first point relates to the law itself, that its authority may be maintained. "Law," says Blackstone, "in its most comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action, and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of actions, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. This, then, is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by some superior being." "Municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong."

The following are the usual definitions of law:

"Lex est ratio summa, quae jubet quae sunt utilia et necessaria, et contraria prohibet."—LORD COKE, I, 17.

"Law is a rule which an intelligent being setoth down for the framing of actions by."—HOOKER, Eccl. Pol. B. 1.

From these well-known definitions and descriptions of law in general, we may make the following remarks in regard to its nature and value as bearing on the subject before us, and as showing why it is necessary to have regard to it in an atonement.

(1.) Law, in reference to moral actions, expresses the sense of the law-giver as to what is right, and as to the value of right. It is the measure of his estimate of what should be done, and of the limits by which rights are bounded. The promulgation of the law indeed determines nothing on the question why the thing that is commanded is right, or why the thing which is prohibited is wrong. So far as the promulgation of law is concerned, that may either be (a) because the law-giver wills it; or (b) because it is right or wrong in the nature of things; or (c) because one course of conduct will promote happiness and the other will lead to misery. Which of these is the proper foundation of the distinction between right and wrong, and therefore the reason why the law is ordained, is a question which has never been so determined as to command the assent of all men; but the difference of opinion on these points does not affect the position just laid down, that the law expresses the sense of the law-giver as to right and wrong, and that the law is the measure of his estimate of what is just. We are always sure when we have a law in any case, that we have in that the estimate of the law-giver of what is right; we are not certain, and we need not be certain—for that would not affect the main point—whether this estimate is founded on his own will in the case, his will being essentially, and from the nature in the case, a just estimate of what is right; or on the nature of things; or on the foreseen effects of conduct as bearing on the happiness of an individual or on society. We may be certain, however, that in every case of just law there is some reason why the law in that case is what it is; and in reference to the laws of God we are led ultimately to confide in his infinite wisdom and benevolence in founding his laws on true reason, though we may not be able ourselves to perceive what the reason is.

(2.) The value of law, which by the nature of the act of atonement is regarded as so important, is seen everywhere. All things are placed under law. As God made the worlds, and as he has peopled them, and as he has multiplied living forms and physical agencies, nothing is made lawless. There is not, as the universe came from his hand, and as his administration is extended over it, one thing in the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, or the moral kingdom that is placed beyond the control of law or that is not regulated by law. There is not one that is the production of chance, or that is subject to the play of chance; there is not one that in its creation, its position, its developments, or its relations, can be resolved into mere contingency. All sciences are founded on the belief that the universe is controlled by laws, and serve only to develop their nature and illustrate their universality and value. There is not a crystal that is not formed in accordance with law; not a vegetable that grows not in accordance with law; not a star in the heavens that is not

moved in accordance with fixed and certain laws; not an animal upon the earth, not a fish in the waters, not a bird in the air, that is not subject in its origin, formation, and mode of living to definite laws; not a man or an angel that is not made subject to law. The study of these laws, in reference to the material world, constitutes all that there is in natural philosophy; in the animal world, all that there is in natural history; in the affinities and repellencies of particles of matter, all that there is in chemistry; in the movements of the heavenly bodies, all that there is in astronomy; in the developments of life, all that there is in physiology; in the soul of man, all that there is in psychology; in the operations of mind, all that there is in moral philosophy; in the study of the divine nature and the unfolding of the divine plans, all that there is in theology. If there were not laws applicable to everything, there could be no science, no calculations in regard to the future, no basis of confidence in any human effort, no encouragement to plough a field, to construct a vessel, to navigate the ocean, to attempt to restore health when impaired, or to save the soul. All that we see, all that we do, all that we hope for, is based on the existence of law, and is all an illustration of the value of law. The purpose of an atonement, therefore, clearly, cannot be to set aside law; but it is to be presumed that if an atonement is made it will so far accord with the established course of events as to illustrate its importance and value.

(3.) All these laws are kept within their proper bounds, and each class of laws is appealed to and relied on in the department to which it appertains, and is never resorted to to accomplish the purpose of law in another department. God does not govern the stars by the ten commandments; nor does he control the diamond, the oak, or the lion by the laws by which he controls men and angels. Science has arranged, with a good degree of accuracy, all the works of nature into certain great departments or kingdoms,—the material, the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual or moral kingdoms,—each subject to its own laws according to the nature of the objects to be controlled; and, in the actual administration of the universe, these lines are never crossed. The laws of the vegetable kingdom are never made, nor could they be made, to control the action of gravitation, electricity, or the mechanical forces; the laws of instinct are never made to control the formation of the cells in the development of plants, nor could they be; the moral law, the law that governs angels and men, could never be applied to control either the material, the vegetable, or the animal kingdoms. However one may be made tributary to another, the operation of the one never invades the appropriate department of the other. These departments are never crossed, never interfered with. They constitute distinct sciences, and, except in miracles, their absolute dominion always exists in the departments to which they respectively belong.

An atonement must respect this arrangement, and cannot be designed or allowed to disturb this order. Whether anything like an atonement, or a compensation, could occur in respect to the infraction of a physical law, might be a more curious than profitable subject of speculation; but an atonement, in the proper sense of the term, can have respect only to moral law.

(4.) Moral law has respect to a higher order of agencies than any connected with mere matter. It supposes the existence of understanding and of will. The objects contemplated by a moral law can be secured neither by the laws which pertain to the material, the vegetable, or the animal kingdoms; for men and angels cannot be controlled by mere physical power or by instincts. The department is higher than either of those; and all the arrangements in that department differ essentially from those which pertain to the other departments of the divine administration. Contemplating the subjects of God's moral kingdom as endowed with intelligence, will, and freedom, the things which are essential in that mode of government are two: (a) a rule of conduct prescribed by the supreme authority; and (b) appropriate sanctions, designed to secure obedience and to deter from disobedience. The force which is applied in the material world—as, for example, in the planetary worlds—to secure the observance of law, can never be applied here; for it would destroy the very notion of moral agency. In the control of the planets there are, indeed, rules or laws to secure their regular motion, but the observance of those laws is secured by mere power. Beyond that power there is nothing in the case; and when we contemplate all that beautiful harmony, and all the arrangements for self-adjustment, and all the securities for the permanency and good order of the system, we see nothing in the arrangement but wisdom, nothing in the execution but power. There is nothing of the nature of a sanction or a penalty designed to secure a return to order if a law has been violated; nothing that can operate as a motive to secure such a return or to deter from a future violation of law. The irregularities which would occur if a law should be violated would be indeed an expression of the Creator's sense of the value of law, not, of course, to the material worlds where the law had been departed from, but to moral beings who might observe those irregularities, and they might thus be among the means of illustrating the value of law; but in no sense could they operate to deter from a future violation of law or as a means of securing a return to regularity and order. Laws in a moral government are, however, and must be, appointed for these ends. They express the Creator's sense of the nature and value of right, and they are accompanied with sanctions which are ordained for the purpose of restraining, controlling, and recovering the subjects of those laws. These moral laws are designed in their sphere, as physical laws are in theirs, to control those who are principally the subjects of moral law in all worlds, and as applied to moral agents must have essentially the same nature and be accompanied with the same sanctions. As the worlds which compose our solar system, and the more remote and magnificent worlds of which even our solar system is a part, are all governed by the same simple laws of gravitation, so it is reasonable to presume that the most lofty spirits before the throne of God, and the inhabitants of far-distant worlds, are controlled by the same moral laws which are designed to bind and control men, and that thus the universe is one. The law of gravitation which regulates the fall of a pebble is sufficient to control all the material worlds; the law which requires love to God, and which is sufficient to control the mind of a child, may be all that is necessary to bring into subjection and preserve in their place the loftiest intellects that the Creator has made.

(5.) An atonement must be based on the supposition that there is evil in the violation of law which it is desirable to repair; and, to obtain any correct view of the nature and the design of an atonement, it is necessary to have some just apprehension of the evils of violated law. Unhappily, our earth has furnished most painful illustrations of these evils, and, were there no other world in which this could be seen, a sufficiently full demonstration of it might be found in our own. The history of our race has been little more than an illustration of the effects of violating laws; for all the woes and calamities of earth have arisen from that cause. It is certain that, under the government of a just and holy God, if there were no violation of law there would be no suffering; and it is clear, therefore, that, so far as our world is concerned, all the suffering which has come upon the race has been but a measure of the evils of violated law. Whether this is the only measure of those evils, or whether there may be higher proofs of the evil of a violation of law in other worlds, is a distinct question, not needful now to be considered. All that is necessary now to observe is, that it cannot be doubted, from the history of man, that there are evils in the violation of the laws of God. The sufferings endured in our world can be traced indubitably in numberless instances directly to this cause. No small portion of the bodily pain that exists on the earth can be directly traced to it; a great part of the mental suffering among men has indubitably the same origin; the evils that result from intemperance, and the crimes and horrors of war, rapine, piracy, and slavery, grow out of this; the sufferings which come upon the guilty as the avowed punishment of crime have the same source; the wretchedness that follows the excesses of youth is to be traced to the same cause. Even with our limited vision we can see that the observance of the laws of God would have prevented a great portion of the calamities that have come upon men; and from analogy it is not improper to infer, even where we cannot closely follow out the connection, that all the woes of earth have been caused by the infraction of those laws. From anything that appears, if all those woes could be traced up to their real source, it would be found that—remotely it might be, but in fact,—all the sorrows of earth have had such an origin. If so, then in the history of our own world we have a sufficiently affecting illustration of the evils of violated law.

Now, it is certain that an atonement must have a bearing on law in all these respects: in asserting its true nature, in illustrating its value, in checking and arresting the evils of its violation. In other words, it must either tend to maintain law or to repair it, either to show its importance or to prevent the consequences of its infraction. It must meet in the divine administration what has been found, as seen in the previous chapter, to be a defect in all human governments: it must secure the maintenance of law while pardon is extended to the guilty; it must exert such an influence that they who are pardoned in virtue of the atonement shall become in their future lives obedient to the law. If it can secure these things, then, so far as the law is concerned, the guilty may be released from the infliction of its penalty and be restored to the favor and friendship of the law-giver. For, on this supposition, all that the law aims at will have been accomplished, and no evil will result from discharging from punishment those who have been guilty of its violation. Whether an atonement can do this, is another question, to be considered hereafter. All that is now affirmed is, that it must do this, and that if this is done, then, so far as the claims of the law are concerned, an offender may be forgiven.

In no human government, as we have seen, has it been found possible to secure this. If a law has been violated, the only way devised of maintaining its honor is by inflicting the penalty; and when that is done, as has been remarked, justice often drives its decisions over some of the finest feelings of our nature; so far as it is not done, or so far as that penalty is remitted by pardon, the strong arm of the law is relaxed, and a proclamation is made that the law may be violated with impunity. The act of pardon, as has been shown, is, for the time, and to the extent to which it operates, a setting aside of the authority of the law.

II. The second point to be secured by an atonement relates to the penalty of the law.

(1.) Penalty is “the suffering in person or property which is annexed by law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime, offense, or trespass, as a punishment.”—Webster.

Punishment or penalty is evil inflicted by a law-giver, or under his direction, to show his sense of the value of the law, or of the evil of violating the law. It is the measure of his sense of that value; it is an expression of his conviction of the evil which must necessarily follow from an infraction of the law.

It may be well to dwell for a moment on this definition; for, in order to a correct understanding of the doctrine of the atonement, it is absolutely necessary to obtain a just view of the nature and design of the penalty of the law.

And, first, according to this definition, it is evil; that is, it is pain, sorrow, suffering, privation, something that shall be felt to be an evil, something to be dreaded. This may pertain to person

or property; it may be confinement in a prison, or it may be a fine; it may be scourging, branding, torture, or the pillory; it may be banishment, or it may be death. The essential idea is, that it shall be something that is felt to be an evil; some form of suffering or privation that is an object of dread or apprehension, and something that may be employed, therefore, to deter from the commission of crime. The very design of it is to inflict pain; and consequently, when a fine is so light or so disproportionate to a man's property that he does not feel it, or when a person is made so comfortable in a prison that it will be no object of dread, or when the sentiments of a community are such that he who is condemned to punishment is regarded as a martyr, it ceases to be punishment, and the end of the appointment is defeated. Much as it may grate on our sensibilities, and harsh as punishment in any form seems to many persons to be, and much as we shrink from its infliction, yet the very end of punishment is to inflict pain, suffering, disgrace, and when that, by any arrangement of society, ceases to be the effect of punishment, its whole purpose is defeated, and the penalty of the law becomes a nullity.

Next, it is an evil inflicted. It is the result of an appointment; it is brought upon a man by design. It does not come as a matter of casualty; it is not the result of natural laws. It is not because the person who suffers is one of a crowd; it is not that he is affected by some general or universal law; it is not that he suffers in common with others, as when an earthquake rocks a city to its foundation, or the pestilence cuts down the aged and the young, or war spreads its desolations among the peaceable habitations of men: it is inflicted of design, and inflicted purposely on the person that suffers. The blow is directed at him, and him alone. The arrow is not shot into a crowd: it is aimed at him; and when he falls he falls by the intention of him who has directed it.

Nothing is more important in estimating the nature and design of punishment than to remember that it is aimed at the offender, and that, in its very nature, it is separated essentially from a mere providential dispensation, a random blow or shot, a casualty. The suffering, indeed, may be the same; but in one case it occurs under a general law by which the guilty and the innocent are swept away together, in the other it occurs under a special and particular law which aims at the individual, and at him alone.

Further, it is evil inflicted by the law-giver, or under his direction. It must be the result of his appointment, or it cannot be regarded as punishment. The falling of a tree on a man cannot be regarded as punishment unless it can be proved that this came upon him as the result of the appointment of a law-giver, and as designed as an expression of his sense of the evil of the course of life which the man was pursuing,—that is, under the general law that men who do certain things may expect that trees will fall on them.

Once more, it is evil inflicted by a law-giver, or under his direction, to show his sense of the value of law, or of the evils of the violation of law. That may be expressed in the words of a statute; but it is more impressively exhibited in the sufferings which he appoints as the effect of the violation of the law. The evil thus inflicted becomes the measure of his sense of the value of the law; and if the amount of evil which attends the infraction of law is ascertained, we have an infallible mode of estimating his sense of the evil.

In this definition I have purposely left out an idea which is commonly supposed to be connected with the notion of penalty or punishment,—that it is designed to reform the offender. I shall have occasion to show that mere punishment, however it may check an offender, has no tendency to reform him, and that of itself it never produces that result; and, if this is so, then the reformation of an offender is no part of the proper design of the punishment. That looks at the violation of law as an evil, and is designed to express that fact and that alone. The legislator regards the law as valuable, and its violation as an evil; and he expresses that fact in the appointment and infliction of the penalty consequent on its violation. A man is hanged, not for purposes of reformation, and not to deter others from the commission of the same crime, but as a public expression of the sense which the law-giver entertains of the guilt of the act of murder. Whatever incidental effects, either in reference to the individual who suffers the penalty of the law, or to others, may follow from the infliction of the penalty, the one prime, main thought in the case is that murder is an evil, and the execution of the guilty man expresses the sense entertained by the law-giver of the nature of the evil.

(2.) All law has a penalty. We may conceive, indeed, that a law could be made, or a rule of conduct prescribed, where there was no penalty appointed to express the sense entertained by the law-giver of the evil of the violation of the law. But such a case, in fact, has never occurred. "It is but lost labor," says Blackstone, "to say, 'do this, or avoid that,' unless we also declare, 'this shall be the consequence of your non-compliance.' We must, therefore, observe that the main strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed to it."

A law without a penalty would be counsel or advice, but it would cease to convey the notion of law. It might affect us by its being the result of the wisdom of him who appointed it; by leading us to follow it from our confidence in his experience, integrity, sagacity, or ability, but it would not make the impression on us which is always produced by law. . . . Even the ten commandments would cease to have the effect of law on us if there were no implied penalty or sanction to express the sense of the law-giver as to their value and as to the evil of violating them.

PSALM XCI.

He that within the secret place Where God Most High stores up his grace, Hath chosen his abode, Shall lodge, where fears shall ne'er invade— Beneath the everlasting shade Of God—Almighty God.

Of the Eternal I will say— He is my refuge, and my stay, My strong combatted tower; My Lord, in whose protecting arm, I will confide, amid alarm, When gloomy dangers lower.

By guile shalt thou not be decoyed. For he will help thee to avoid The subtle fowler's snare; His favor shall preserve thy life, When noisome maladies are rife, And plagues infest the air.

With love, paternal, o'er thy head His feathers will be kindly spread, To foster thee in youth; Beneath his wings shall thou repose, Thy shield and fortress from thy foes, His everlasting truth.

To thee the dangers of the night Shall bring no terror, nor the flight Of deadly shafts by day; Nor pestilence, that darkling walks, Nor fell destruction, when it stalks Abroad at noon to slay.

A thousand at thy side shall die, On thy right hand ten thousand lie; But thee it shall not reach; Only thine eyes shall surely see What retribution their's shall be Whom nought can wisdom teach.

Because the Lord, my safe retreat, Even God Most High, with heart discreet, Thy dwelling thou hast made; No evil shall on thee alight No pestilence thy person smite Or thine abode invade.

He will appoint an angel guard, From danger all thy paths to ward; Thou shalt not walk alone; Their hands shall bear thee up with care, In case thou injure unaware Thy foot against a stone.

Since he has set on Me his love, For him deliverance from above, I surely will provide; Him will I raise to highest fame, Because he has to know My name, His heart and mind applied.

Mine aid shall he invoke in prayer, I will attend, and him My care Shall, 'mid distress and woe, Deliver, and to honor raise; To him will I give length of days, And my salvation show.

[Jewish Chronicle.]

The Teachings of Paul and James on the Subject of Justification.

By Editor

THE communication of a highly valued correspondent in our last paper, in reference to an article which appeared in the Church Monthly, furnishes us an opportunity of saying a word on the apparent doctrinal difference between Paul and James, on the subject of justification. It is supposed by many, that the difference is so complete and radical, as not to admit of reconciliation. By following, however, an obvious rule of interpretation, which requires us to place ourselves, as far as possible, in the circumstances of the writer, and to consider the object he has in view; and especially by carefully attending to the train of argument, the apparent inconsistency vanishes; and then it appears, that so far from contradicting each other, Paul actually teaches the doctrine of James, and James, the doctrine of Paul.

There is a quaint phrase which often occurs in the writings of the older theologians, which was intended to reconcile the apparent differences between the two apostles, fides sola justificat, sed non quae est sola. The two apostles are treating of different kinds of faith. Paul says, "a man is justified by faith, without deeds of the law." James says that "by works a man is justified, and not by faith only." The object of Paul was, to expose the mistake of those who went about to establish a righteousness of their own, and expected justification by obedience to law. He shows that such obedience cannot justify; and therefore a man is justified only by that faith which receives Christ just as he is offered in the gospel, and depends upon his righteousness alone for salvation. This faith of which he speaks is a living faith; a faith which works by love, and which instead of giving or admitting any license to neglect good works, manifests its genuineness by a practical obedience to all the requirements of the gospel. In excluding works therefore from having anything to do with a sinner's justification, and ascribing all to faith as the instrument, all his writings, as they abound in illustration of the connexion between faith and obedience, most manifestly show that the faith of which he is speaking, is one which is accompanied by every Christian grace, and is productive of good works.

James seems to be combating a practical error of his time, into which some had fallen, who perverted the doctrine of Paul, and while professing to have faith, had not works. Such a faith, the apostle declares cannot justify, because it is a dead faith; it is such a faith as devils have, for he says, "they also believe and tremble." Such a kind of faith, therefore, could be of no avail, because the faith by which a man is justified, must be manifested and made perfect by works.

In what respect then do they differ? In no respect whatever. James is speaking of a faith, which, being without fruits, cannot justify. Paul, of a faith, which, being fruitful in all good works, does justify. The latter does not affirm that a dead faith can justify; nor does the former deny that a faith which exhibits its genuineness in the fruits which it brings forth, does justify.

Who among all the sacred writers is more urgent than Paul, in explaining the connexion between a living faith and a holy life; and enforcing the necessity of that obedience, which is the necessary fruit of faith in Christ? When therefore he says, "I will that thou affirm constantly, that they who have believed in God, might be careful to maintain good works;" and again, "though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing," he does in reality teach precisely the same doctrine which James taught.—Western Episcopalian.

Getting on too Fast.

A PIOUS old slave had a wicked master. This master had much confidence, however, in the slave's piety. He believed he was a christian. Sometimes the master would be serious and thoughtful about religion. One day he came to the old slave, with the New Testament in his hand, and asked if he could explain a passage to him. The slave was willing to try, and asked what it was.

“It is here in Romans,” said the master.

“Have you done all it tells you to do in Matthew, Mark, Luke and John?” inquired the slave seriously, fixing his eyes upon his master’s.

“No, I hav’n’t,” said he.

“Then you’re getting on too fast,—too fast, master. Go back to the beginning of the book. Do all it tells you, till you get to Romans, and you will understand it easy enough then; for the good Book says, “If any man will do my will, he will know the doctrine.””

If any of our readers ever heard anybody arguing about a hard text in Romans, or somewhere else, and worrying to know what it means, just tell them this story about “getting on too fast.”

A THOUGHT FOR THE RICH.

The following paragraph, from an English paper, may possibly have some application to the rich christians of this country:

"What an awful thing it is to die rich! Imagine the Master auditing the account of a servant who has left behind him a million! If that poor wretch who had but one talent was cast into outer darkness because he laid it up, instead of using it in his Master's service, what will be the doom of those who, with their half-millions and millions (while giving, it may be, a few thousand's for decency's sake) have year after year hoarded up countless treasures which they could never use? Think of the poor saints pinched with cold and hunger! Think of the Redeemer's cause languishing for the want of that filthy lucre which they hold with close-fisted selfishness! Yet listen to their talk! 'I am but a steward.' 'I am not my own.' 'Every believer in Jesus is my brother or sister.' What a mockery! Will not this be the Master's language to many a professor: 'Out of thine own mouth will I condemn thee?'

The above remarks are equally applicable to many persons who do not possess such gigantic fortunes.

Continue reading: AS HE HATH DECLARED TO HIS SERVANTS THE PROPHETS