Possibilities in an Important Decision
By L. A. S.
A SURPRISING revelation of the insecurity of individual rights under the provisions of the highest legislative and judicial departments of the government, is afforded by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. A Chinaman who was born in this country, and is therefore, according to the Constitution, a citizen of the United States, having made a visit to his relatives in China, was debarred from returning to America by an immigration officer acting under the provisions of the Chinese exclusion law. The Chinaman appealed his case to the Supreme Court, and that body rendered a decision declaring that by act of Congress passed in 1894 the decision of an immigration officer excluding an alien from admission to this country is final, and can not be reviewed by the courts. The petitioner in this case was, as stated, not an alien, but a citizen of this country by birth. Ex-Secretary-of-State John W. Foster, in an article contributed to The Independent, calls this “a decision of most profound importance,” and quotes a statement by three dissenting justices of the Supreme Court, that “such a decision is appalling.” In his review of the case Ex-Secretary Foster says:— If this is to stand as the law in the United States, punishment by banishment may be inflicted upon a citizen of the United States in violation of what have heretofore been held to be inestimable guarantees of the Constitution. Article III, section 2, provides that “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;” and by the Fifth Amendment no person can “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;” and further, “no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” The highest court of our country has decided that due process of law is granted by the hearing before the immigration official; that trial by jury may be in the same way superseded; that a citizen may suffer the infamous punishment of perpetual banishment from the land of his birth by the same procedure, and that the writ of habeas corpus, so dearly prized as “the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty,” is ineffective against the decision of an obscure immigration officer. The dissenting opinion filed by the minority of the Supreme Court (Justices Brewer, Peckham, and Day) says:— The rules of the department declare that the statutes do not apply to citizens, and yet in the face of all this we are told that they may be enforced against citizens, and that Congress so intended. Banishment of a citizen not merely removes him from the limits of his native land, but puts him beyond reach of any of the protecting clauses of the Constitution. In other words, it strips him of the rights which are given to a citizen. I can not believe that Congress intended to provide that a citizen, simply because he belongs to an obnoxious race, can be deprived of all liberty and protection which the Constitution guarantees. If an immigration officer can exclude a citizen of this country on such an interpretation of law as he may see fit to make, and his decision in the matter is final and can not be reviewed by any court, it would seem that not merely a citizen of an obnoxious race may be banished by decision of an immigration official, but one belonging to any class deemed obnoxious is not beyond the possibility of sharing a similar fate. From an “obnoxious” race to an “obnoxious” class is not an impossible step, nor one requiring great length of time to take.