THE opposers of the Bible and of Bible truth have often declared that Christianity is opposed to reason, and that Nature presents to us a revelation more beautiful, harmonious, and important, than anything contained in the Bible. Especially has the doctrine of the Atonement been made the subject of opposition by both professed reasoning and ridicule. The object of this argument is to show that reason is not opposed to the idea of the Atonement, but rather leads to it; that a coincidence of strict justice and mercy demands it; and that a written revelation is but the supply of an acknowledged want; that the gift of such a revelation is a conformity to the plainest, simplest principles of government—of principles which are universally recognized. And, therefore, consistency requires that such revelation be universally received.
That Nature makes to us a better revelation than the Bible, I, of course, deny. Nature, as says the psalmist, “declares the glory of God,” and may thus arouse us to feelings of devotion; but Nature cannot guide us in our devotions; she does not inform us how to please and worship the Creator. The Bible and Nature never come in conflict; but the Bible leads into a field of truth where Nature makes no attempt to follow. We attach no blame to Nature because it does not perform the office of a written revelation. It was not designed for such a purpose. When we have learned all that we can learn from Nature, we find beyond that a plain necessity for a written revelation. I invite the devotees of Nature to an examination of this point.
The present is a mixed state, of good and evil. Confined in our views to the present state, and to observation, or to mere reason without a written revelation, it is impossible to vindicate the justice of the controlling power, whether that power be called God or Nature. Virtue is often trampled in the dust, and ignominiously perishes in its representatives. Vice is exalted on high, triumphs over justice and right, and its very grave is decorated with flowers, and honored with a monument. In the operations of Nature, there is no discrimination manifested, and without discrimination there can be no conformity to justice. True, we see many exhibitions of benevolence, but we see also many things which cannot be reconciled with it. The righteous and the wicked, the just and the unjust, the innocent and the guilty, the aged and the little child, alike share the bounties of Providence, and together fall by the pestilence, or sink beneath some sweeping destruction. These facts have troubled the minds of philosophers, and caused the short-sighted philanthropist to be faint of heart.
Reflecting on these things, some have (singularly enough) denied the existence of a supreme, intelligent Being. Such ascribe everything to Nature, whose laws are fixed, inexorable, and indiscriminating. Having arrived at this conclusion, they seem to consider themselves relieved of all further trouble in the matter, and (more wondrous still) proceed to lavish encomiums on blind Nature, and award to her as much praise as if she never tortured an innocent person, nor suffered the guilty to escape. As before remarked, we find no fault with Nature, but we must find fault with the unreasonable position of her devotees. The laws of Nature answer well their purposes, but this class of philosophers endeavor to make them answer a purpose for which they never were designed. We think a just system of reasoning will expose their fallacies.
First, I inquire, What is meant by the phrase, Laws of Nature? These words are very flippantly used in these days, and I have often thought that many who use them spend but little time in considering their import. There can be only two senses in which the expression may be used. 1. As meaning the laws which Nature has made for the regulation of her various parts or elements, or for the government of her operations. But against this I object, that Nature never made a law—she never knew enough to make a law. Did Nature deliberate? did she counsel? did she plan? did she have a knowledge of the future before her, and possess wisdom to judge what was suitable, and to devise the means adapted to the end? And if she made the laws, she must have existed before she made them; how were her operations then regulated? Is there a man living who will claim so much for Nature? Not one. And if not, all must yield at once that Nature never made a law, and admit that the expression is only properly used (2) As meaning the laws which a Supreme Being has made for the government of Nature: the Infinite One who made Nature, and subjected her to the operation of those laws. It is strange that men will reject belief in a Supreme Being as unreasonable and absurd, and then proceed to clothe the Nature with the wisdom and power, and all the attributes, which such a Being must necessarily possess!
Next, I notice further that the laws of Nature are imperfect and incomplete—not imperfect if considered only in regard to their real object; but altogether imperfect as regards the claims of those who hold them to be all in all. They present no standard of right, and are therefore no fit model by which to shape human conduct. As lovers of the most expansive benevolence, we may strive to imitate Nature when she spreads abroad her bounties, her precious fruits and golden grain. But again she withholds these, and famine is the dire result. Shall we imitate Nature in the desolations of the whirlwind, the earthquake, and the pestilence? Shall we indiscriminately spread ruin and destruction around us, involving alike the innocent and the guilty, the gray-headed and the prattling child? All answer, No. But each hand that is raised to check such a mad career practically acknowledges that Nature, which is so blindly worshiped by many, presents to us no example worthy of our imitation.
Why is it that the laws of Nature do not satisfy the aspirations of man? Why do we not accept them as our standard of action? It is because they are destitute of morality. We cannot trace one moral element in their frame-work or execution. He who studies them intelligently must be convinced that they are designed solely for a natural system; not for a moral system. Hence, they have no penalties, but only consequences; and these consequences are uniform, so that the operations of Nature present an unbroken series of causes and effects, the results being the same whether issuing upon a responsible or irresponsible object, regarding no distinctions of moral good or evil.
In the foregoing question I referred to a truth which I now affirm, namely, that man has aspirations rising above the operations of Nature; that he cannot accept the laws of Nature as a judicial system. In other words, there is implanted in man a sense of justice, or convictions of right, to which he finds no counterpart in Nature. These convictions are on a moral basis. This sense of justice is erected in the human mind as a tribunal, a judgment seat, whereat we determine the nature and desert of actions. And mark this truth: before this tribunal we always arraign the actions of intelligent agents, but never the operations of Nature. This is true of all men; and it shows that all, whatever their theories may be, do in fact and in practice make a proper distinction between moral and natural laws. This distinction may be further examined.
The prime distinction between moral and natural laws is this: the first has respect to intention—the other has not. Fire will burn, and water will drown, whether we fall into them accidentally or rush into them madly. The little child who is yet unconscious of any intention of good or ill, suffers as certainly and keenly on putting its hand into the fire, as the man of mature mind who presumptuously does the same thing. And should the man willfully and maliciously set fire to his neighbor's house, and the child, playfully,507and without intention of wrong, do the same thing, all would blame the one and not the other. And were a judge, in the administration of law, to visit the same penalty upon the man and the child, because the actions and the results were the same, all would detest such a perversion of justice. Thus we not only find men acting upon the difference between moral and natural laws, but we find them also with great unanimity judging of the actions of moral agents according to their intentions.
But the operations of natural law cannot thus be judged, and its consequences, often miscalled penalties, have no regard whatever to the claims of justice. As before said, the child is burned in the fire as certainly as the man; and if the man should hold the hand of the child in the fire, he would alone commit the wrong, while the child would suffer all the pain consequent upon that wrong. I think the most infatuated worshiper of Nature will find no justice in this. Therefore the declaration is justified, that confined in our reasoning to the present state and without a written revelation, justice cannot be attained unto nor vindicated. A Moral System is necessary, and its claims must be vindicated to meet the demands of justice.
We have but one more step to take in this process of reasoning. When the requirements of a moral and natural law conflict, as they often do in this mixed state of good and evil, men uniformly give the preference to the former. And often they are false to their theories to be true to this fact. We sometimes meet with men who deny these distinctions; who assert that there are no laws aside from the laws of Nature; yet they act in conformity with the propositions herein set forth. Should you refuse to rescue one from impending destruction by fire, and plead in extenuation that it would have involved the violation of law, and you might have been injured in the effort, they would, as readily as others, abhor your selfishness. Here they make the distinction claimed, and place the moral duty of doing good to your neighbor, above mere conformity to natural law.