Does the History of Turkey and Egypt Since 1798 Fulfil the Prophecy of Dan. 11:40-44?
By Arthur G. Daniells
In the year 1798 A. D., a war attended by results most pathetic and terrible broke out between France and Egypt and Turkey. This was “at the time of the end,” when Egypt, “the king of the south,” and Turkey, “the king of the north,” were to be at war with another power called “him” in Dan. 11:40. This brings us directly and squarely to the question standing at the head of these articles. This is a most important question. Much, very much, turns on the answer that is given. The truth in the matter should be carefully and earnestly sought. If the events of the war that began in 1798 between France and Egypt and Turkey fulfil the prophecy of Dan. 11:40, God’s people should be as fully assured of it as they are of the history that meets the specifications of other prophecies; and being assured of it, they should proclaim the truth of the facts to all the world. As already stated, most important decisions follow the conclusions drawn at this point in our study. Because of this we have given large place to the question of “the time of the end,” “the king of the south,” and “the king of the north.” And now we should give due consideration to the real facts regarding this war of 1798. So much has been written of this war that it is a little difficult in making selections from history to know where to draw the line, lest we encroach upon the space to which we are not entitled. However, we shall give, in as small compass as seems consistent with the importance of the subject, statements from thoroughly reliable historians regarding the cause and purpose of this war, the preparations made by France, the aggressor, and the resistance offered by Egypt and Turkey. The accounts given by different writers agree regarding the main facts, the principal difference being in the fulness or brevity with which they treat the subject. The following brief statements record the dates of the opening events:— “Bonaparte’s expedition, consisting of forty thousand land troops and ten thousand seamen, sailed from Toulon for Egypt on the nineteenth of May, 1798.”—“Library of Universal History, Vol. VIII, page 2637. “The French fleet arrived at Malta June 9. Only a feeble defense was made by the knights, and on the night of the eleventh a capitulation was signed. “Bonaparte sailed from Malta June 19, . . . and landed safely at Marabout, in Egypt, July 1. The Mamelukes, who then ruled Egypt, were unprepared for defense. Alexandria was immediately taken (July 2) and occupied, and the march was then resumed for Cairo (July 6). “Ascending the Nile to the apex of the delta, Bonaparte learned that the Mamelukes under their beys, with Arabs and fellahs, amounting in all to 30,000 men, were entrenched between Embabeh and Ghizeh, in the plain of the Pyramids, opposite Cairo. “In spite of the desperate valor displayed by the Mamelukes, led by Murad Bey, the French gained a complete victory July 21. This battle, called the Battle of the Pyramids, overthrew the government of the Mamelukes, and opened Cairo to the French, who entered it the following day.”—“History of Modern Europe, Vol. V, chap. 60, pages 275-277, by Dryer and Hassell. “The Porte [government of Turkey] solemnly declared war against France, Sept. 4, 1798, and coalesced with Russia and England. The sultan ordered the formation of an army for the conquest of Egypt. This event rendered the situation of the French extremely critical. Separated from France, and cut off from succor by the victorious fleets of England, they were exposed to the attacks of all the ferocious hordes of the East. They were but thirty thousand to contend against such perils.”—“The Historians’ History of the World, Vol. XII, chap. 16, page 468. These statements show plainly that war was begun between France and Egypt and Turkey in the year 1798, “at the time of the end.” And of this, Abderrahman Gabarty, an Egyptian historian, says:— “In the year 1213 A. H. (or 1798 A. D.) was the beginning of the wars, the calamities, the interruption of the ordinary course of events, in short, the general ruin.” See “History of the Egyptian Revolution,” Vol. I, page 98. Preparations by France for the Conquest
“On the twelfth of April, the directory signed the papers relative to the expedition to Egypt; but the secret was kept, lest the English should take alarm. These decrees placed at the general’s disposal considerable naval and military forces, with a discretionary power in their employment. He had authority to take with him ‘what troops he saw fit,’ to withdraw from Italy the divisions which had been left at Genoa and at Civita-vecchia, as well as those in Corfu, to seize Malta and Egypt, and to drive the English from their possessions in the East, and to pierce the Isthmus of Suez. They gave him, in fact, a foreign kingdom to avoid letting him take possession of the sovereignty of France.” “Bonaparte availed himself freely of the license thus accorded him. He enlisted in his service all the most distinguished artists, savants, and men of letters. . . . He did not confine himself in his choice of generals to his old companions in arms of the army of Italy, but made choice from among all the armies of the republic, thus depriving them of all nerve and muscle. He seemed unwilling to leave any one of worth behind. . . . The directory, in their eagerness to rid themselves of his presence, allowed him to carry off the strength and flower of the nation.”—“The History of Napoleon,” Vol. I, page 265, by Lanfrey. “The land forces belonging to the expedition were of the most formidable description. Twenty-five thousand men, chiefly veterans selected from his own Italian army, had in their list of generals subordinate to Napoleon the names of Kleber, Desaix, Berthier, Regnier, Murat, Lannes, Andreossi, Menou, Belliard, and others well known in the revolutionary wars. Four hundred transports were assembled for the conveyance of the troops. Thirteen ships of the line and four frigates, commanded by Admiral Brueis, an experienced and gallant officer, formed the escort of the expedition; a finer and more formidable one than which never sailed on so bold an adventure.”—“The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte,” chap. 30, page 248, by Sir Walter Scott. The Purpose of the Invasion
“He [Bonaparte] proposed not merely to colonize Egypt, itself a formidable undertaking, . . . but completely to revolutionize the whole of the Eastern dominions. . . . To secure the English settlements in India, to chase the Turks from Constantinople and drive them into Asia by means of an immense rising of the Greek and Christian populations, and thus return to Europe la prenant a revers, to use the picturesque expression of the author of these gigantic plans—such was the conception that haunted an imagination that knew no rein, and of which the occupation of Egypt was only the moderate pretext.”—“The History of Napoleon,” Vol. I, page 261, by Lanfrey. “Bonaparte, on his side, accepted the command, because it opened a scene of conquest worthy of his ambition. A separate and uncontrolled command over so gallant an army seemed to promise him the conquest and sovereignty, not of246Egypt only, but of Syria, Turkey, perhaps Constantinople, the queen of the East; and he himself afterward more than hinted that but for controlling circumstances, he would have bent his whole mind to the establishment of an Oriental dynasty, and left France to her own destinies. “‘If Saint-Jean d’Acre had yielded to the French arms,’ said he, ‘a great revolution would have been accomplished in the East; the general-in-chief would have founded an empire there, and the destinies of France would have undergone different combinations from those to which they were subjected.’”—“The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte,” chap. 30, page 248, by Sir Walter Scott. “On the thirtieth of June the French fleet appeared before Alexandria. . . . The place of disembarkation was the creek Marabout, whence the troops immediately marched to Alexandria, which they took without difficulty. There Bonaparte halted for a week. Egypt was at that time regarded as a dependency of the Ottoman Empire, but the sultan was only represented by a pasha, who resided at Cairo, holding an honorary office without any substantial authority. “The real power rested with the Mamelukes, a service dating from the time of Saladin [1171 A. D.], and resembling no other military body in history. Recruited by slaves purchased when children in Georgia and Circassia, and governed by twenty-four chiefs under the name of beys, this force formed a strange kind of order, which recognized no other religion than that of military fraternity, and no other law than the will of their masters. “The right of sovereignty which the Porte maintained over the Mamelukes had long been nominal, and the sultan was fortunate not to have even that disputed.”—“History of Napoleon,” Vol. I, page 273, by Lanfrey. “The disembarkation of the French army took place about a league and a half from Alexandria, at an anchorage called Marabout. . . . As soon as five or six thousand men were landed, Bonaparte marched toward Alexandria, when the Turks, incensed at this hostile invasion on the part of a nation with which they were at profound peace, shut the gates, and manned the walls against their reception. But the walls were ruinous, and presented breaches in many places, and the chief weapons of resistance were musketry and stones. The conquerors of Italy forced their passage over such obstacles, but not easily nor with impunity. Two hundred French were killed. “From the moment that Bonaparte conceived the idea of invading Egypt, the destruction of the power of the Mamelukes must have been determined upon as his first object; and he had no sooner taken Alexandria than he announced his purpose.”—“The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte,” chap. 30, pages 250, 251, by Sir Walter Scott. The purpose, as expressed by the decrees of the directory of France, and many times by Napoleon, was to take possession of Egypt and Turkey, and thus to either give France a dominating place in Europe and the Orient or found a new empire with Napoleon at its head. In organizing the expedition for this great undertaking, we are told that Napoleon selected the “most distinguished artists, savants, and men of letters” in France. He chose the ablest and most experienced generals in the armies of the republic, thus depriving what remained of “all nerve and muscle.” He “seemed unwilling to leave any one of worth behind,” and therefore carried off “the strength and flower of the nation.” All this was to enable him “completely to revolutionize the whole of the Eastern dominions” and establish an “Oriental dynasty” for himself. It was this colossal scheme, backed by the power, ambition, and military genius of Napoleon and the resources of France, that Egypt and Turkey met in Napoleon’s invasion.