England’s Responsibilities for Turkey by P. T. MAGAN

Review and Herald Publishing Association · Takoma Park Station, Washington, D. C. · Mar 23, 1911

England’s Responsibilities for Turkey

By P. T. MAGAN

The Treaty of Paris

P. T. MAGAN

The Crimean war was one of the greatest of the wars of the last century. It was waged solely upon the part of England and France for the purpose of preventing Russia from driving the Ottoman power out of Constantinople. As previously stated, it resulted in the complete humiliation of the Russian arms. Alma, Sebastopol, and Inkerman all brought dire defeat for the Tartars. Naturally one would have expected them to win, as they were fighting on their own soil, while the allies (England and France) were many miles overseas from their base of supplies. But an unseen hand was against Russia, and all her efforts were futile.

The mighty Word of God had said that the passing of Turkey would mark the advent of a time of trouble such as never was since there was a nation even to that same time. Dan. 11:45; 12:1. Providence decreed that that time was not yet to be. But the humiliation of Russia was not alone that of her arms on the Crimean peninsula. Greater humiliation was yet to come in that most famous of treaties which brought the struggle to a conclusion.

It was the treaty of Paris, dated March 30, 1856, which sheathed the sword in the Crimea, laid that troubler, the Eastern question, to rest for twenty years, and brought peace to weary Europe. It was, par excellence, an international treaty. Its provisions affected all Europe; consequently it was signed by all the powers,—Austria, France, England, Russia, Prussia, Turkey, and Sardinia.

England was the head and front of this treaty. She dictated it; and if ever one nation dictated a treaty in the interests of another, England dictated this one in the interests of Turkey.

It is impossible to record all its provisions here: reference can be made only to those of first importance:—

1. The Sublime Porte was admitted to participate in all the advantages of the public law and system of Europe.

2. The article of the treaty which refers to the Black Sea is of especial importance; namely: “The Black Sea is neutralized; its waters and ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the powers possessing its coasts or of any other power, with the exceptions mentioned in articles fourteen and nineteen.”

3. A convention respecting the Dardanelles and the Bosporus was made by all the powers. By this convention the sultan maintained the ancient rule prohibiting ships of war of foreign powers from entering the straits, so long as the Porte is at peace. During time of peace the sultan engaged to admit no foreign ships of war into the Bosporus or the Dardanelles.”

4. The abrogation of all existing treaties between Turkey and Russia.

5. A stipulation that Russia should have no arsenal in the Euxine.

6. A stipulation that Russia should have no war fleet in the Black Sea.

7. A stipulation that England should become sponsor for the good behavior of Turkey.

There still lives one man who was a member of the famous Palmerston Cabinet of Great Britain, which was in power when this notable treaty was made. I refer to the venerable duke of Argyll, from whose book, issued a few years ago, I desire to quote a few paragraphs to show how the British Cabinet and people viewed the struggle which they had undergone in behalf of Turkey. I do not know how words could be found which would more thoroughly exemplify and prove the truthfulness of the Scripture idea that somebody would help Turkey. The book bears the significant title, “Our Responsibilities for Turkey.” Here are his words; let them speak for themselves:—

“Let us never forget that it was we—the British government and people—who rescued Turkey from this immediate danger and this otherwise inevitable fate. I have a vivid recollection how patiently, and yet how energetically, we strove to rally the other powers in our support; how, at moments, we feared lest France would fail us; and how at last we succeeded in securing the loyal co-operation of the French emperor. Without his army we never could have accomplished what was accomplished. But, on the other hand, France would never have undertaken it but for us. In a military point of view she took a leading part; but, politically speaking, we did the whole. Ours was the naval base of operation; the direction of attack was chosen which was most accessible to us—most exhausting to Russia. Above all, ours was the policy which dictated the terms of peace. The whole aim of that peace was not only to record and confirm the defeat of Russia for the time, but to put it out of her power to play the same game against Turkey again—at least for some indefinite time to come.

“The treaty of Paris, which terminated the war in 1856, was a concentrated expression of the whole policy on which the war had been undertaken. It made us foremost as a nation in a joint responsibility—by irrevocable deeds and by definite transactions—for the very existence of the Turkish government as a power even pretending to independence. Not only did we save Turkey for the moment from entangling engagements with Russia, which would have left her in the position of vassalage and practical subjection, but we determined,largely and effectually, to disarm her hereditary foe in the whole region of Turkish territory most open to Russian attack. We had exhausted the resources of Russia by a long and bloody campaign, carried on at one extremity of her empire. We had destroyed her fleet. We had ruined her one great arsenal in the Euxine. But not content with this, we imposed on her a treaty stipulating that this arsenal should not be restored, and that no Russian Black Sea fleet was to be formed again, so that Turkey might dwell in peace.”

“This, however, was not all we did for Turkey. We did a great deal more. As Russia was deprived of these means of aggression, so also was she to be deprived of her old and long-standing excuses and opportunities for attack. All the treaties which were the record of her dearly bought victories for more than a hundred years were to be absolutely given up and abandoned.”

“Turkey was to be freed from all of them, so that she might live and rule without embarrassing engagements of any kind to Russia in respect to her Christian subjects, such as had been imposed upon her. But even this does not exhaust all our work for Turkey. She had not been admitted in 1815 within the circle of European states whose rights and territories were settled and acknowledged by the treaties of that memorable epoch. In her last great assault on Turkey in 1828, Russia had warned Turkey of this fact, and had boasted of her own freedom, so far as European engagements were concerned, to deal with the Ottoman dominions as the fortune of war might determine. In the treaty of 1856 we thought it necessary to remedy this defect. The very first important article in our new treaty was to declare Turkey to be a power ‘admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law of Europe.’ That is to say, that Turkey was now, for the first time, to be brought within the European system in the meaning of the treaties of 1814-15; or, in other words, that she was to be regarded as having a recognized place in the balance of power, and, consequently, that her fate was to be acknowledged as a matter of common interest and concern.”

“Such were the immense advantages which we conferred upon Turkey forty years ago, by our active intervention, both in war and in diplomacy. They were advantages which not only gave her a new lease of life, but which conferred on that life a charter of independence, of which, by reason of her weakness, she had been long deprived. In return for these great services, all that we asked from Turkey was an engagement that she would afford to her own people some tolerable government corresponding to her new position—some administrative system recognizing the fundamental principles of European civilization, and extending to all classes of her subjects some security for life, religion, property, and honor. And even this obligation it was our aim—and our only too great care—to impose on Turkey in the form most consistent with respect for that independence which we were for the first time establishing. We therefore made the obligation take the form least obnoxious to the pride, and least offensive to the dignity, of the Porte. Accordingly, it was provided that the edict securing such privileges to all classes of her subject populations was to emanate from the sultan. It was, however, to be recorded in, and annexed to, the treaty. Moreover, Turkey was entrusted with the fulfilment of her own promises. They were not to be, and, indeed, could hardly be, fulfilled by any direct action of the guaranteeing powers on Turkish administration.”—“Our Responsibilities for Turkey,” pages 12-17.

And now I ask, in all seriousness, after the recitation of this lucid summing up of England’s case in behalf of Turkey: Has there ever been in the history of all the world such an example of one nation’s helping another?

As previously stated, the Scriptures have foretold that Turkey shall come to his end, and none shall help him. And this very word of Sacred Writ clearly indicates that the only thing which will have prevented his coming to his end long before he does, is because some one does help him. There is not, of all prophecy, a more remarkable fulfilment than this.

Madison, Tenn.