p. 70 | The Atonement-No. 4 by Joseph Harvey Waggoner

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Feb 10, 1874

The Atonement.—No. 4.

By Joseph Harvey Waggoner

As an atonement is made to the law, the perpetuity of the law and the stability of the government is the first consideration, as they are first in importance in our relations and duties, because on them the perpetuity of all private relations and rights depends. Public good should be held paramount to private interest. But these only come in conflict when we place ourselves in opposition to the government. Hence, if our interest conflicts with the government, which is the conservator of general rights, it is proved to be a selfish interest. For, had we honored and sustained the government in our lives or actions, it would justify or sustain us; but if our rights are forfeited by disobedience, the government is not to blame. As right should be the first consideration in all transactions, the interest of the government, which is right, should certainly be held paramount to the good of the transgressor who is wrong. Therefore, in making an atonement, the upholding of law—the maintaining of governmental authority—should be held as of the first importance.

By a single violation of law, we forfeit our rights and privileges; but, by persisting in such violation, or inducing others so to do, and thus disregarding the authority of law, we take the rank of rebels or traitors against the government. And treason is the highest crime. He who commits murder takes a life; but he who seeks to subvert the law seeks the destruction of life's safeguard; of that which is to protect life by preventing and punishing crime. Hence, it is the aggregation of all crime.

And the government has the sole right to dictate the terms or conditions by which the rebels may be restored to citizenship. This is true also, in regard to all crimes for which pardon is desired. If the government has the sole right to dictate terms to rebels, which all must allow, then the transgressor can only change his relation to the government by accepting those terms; and, if he refuses to accept them, he, of course, persists in maintaining his position in rebellion. Or to substitute terms of his own would be no better, but rather an insult to the government, a denial of its right and authority. If a traitor were to dictate how crimes should be treated, government would be a farce, and become the contempt of honest men. Therefore, two things must be required of a transgressor or rebel, which only can be accepted, to wit:—

Unqualified submission to the laws which have been transgressed, and,
A hearty acceptance of the plan or conditions offered for his restoration.

An objection is often urged against this view; viz., that if a substitute be accepted and the penalty of the law be laid upon him, then there is no pardon—no mercy, but justice only in the transaction. For, says the objector, if the debt be paid by another person, it cannot justly be held against the principal; payment cannot be twice demanded.

The fatal fault of this objection is this: It regards crime as a debt, which it is not. A man may owe a debt without any guilt attaching to him; but not so of sin. In the very first step, there is mercy toward the sinner in the acceptance of a substitute in his behalf; and after the substitute has suffered the penalty, the sinner is as deserving of punishment in his own person as he was before. He has done nothing to relieve himself of the odium of his crime. All must see, at a glance, that what has been said about the acceptance of conditions is a necessary part of this system of pardon, as the government not only needs satisfaction for the past, but a safeguard for the future. This the mere payment of a past debt would not furnish. Therefore, the acceptance of a substitute who volunteers to bear the penalty of crime opens the way for pardon to be granted consistently with justice. Now if the criminal accepts that substitute so as to make the offering his own, and fulfills the required conditions, so that he unites his efforts with those of the substitute in honoring the law, then the government has its safeguard against future rebellion. But without this, all the evils of unconditional pardon may accrue from the action of the sinner, even though a substitute have suffered in his behalf.

But if the law be honored by the suffering of the substitute, and the sinner cease to sin, and accept the conditions, as herein proposed, there remains no difficulty. The government is honored in the justice of the transactions, and the sinner is justified and saved by its provision of mercy. But if any of these particulars be lacking, the system will then be defective.

Pardon granted on any other terms tends to iniquity, violating the principles of right and justice, and subverting government. This is a necessary deduction from the very plain facts set forth in this argument. There are two theological systems extant which stand opposed to these principles; one, claiming that man may and will be saved without accepting and complying with conditions, or without substitution. This is Universalism, which really denies the atonement. The other is Antinomianism, claiming that the law is abolished when the atonement is made, instead of being honored and vindicated by it. Both these systems are denials of justice, and tend to subvert the principles of government, as established by reason and the Scriptures. But, as these principles lie at the very foundation of the divine government, the above systems are, though professedly Christian, practically infidel.

It is unnecessary to argue that a substitute, to render satisfaction to justice, must be free from condemnation in his own life; he must be innocent in the sight of the law, or free from its transgression. For one criminal to offer his life for another would not be any satisfaction to justice, seeing his own was already forfeited.

While advocating the claims of the government, I would not lose sight of the truth that the subjects have claims on justice also. As very much is due from the subjects to the government, so something is due from the government to the subjects. It is expected of a government to establish its laws, and of the subjects to obey them; but it should be able to present tangible and substantial claims to obedience. We notice, then,

(1) The government must plainly reveal its laws. It is recorded of a certain tyrant that he caused his laws to be posted at such a hight that they could not be read, and then punished those who did not keep them. This was injustice—it was indeed tyranny. It is law that defines our duty; and in order that obedience may be justly enforced, such declaration of duty should be clear and distinct; not left to supposition, or to doubtful inference. We have before considered that a moral government, a system above nature, is acknowledged; but what is due to that government, our consciousness, or moral sense, does not inform us. On this point, our opinions, if not guided by revelation, will be as various as our impulses, our interests, or the difference of our circumstances and education. But, if our duties be left to our own judgments, with our conflicting feelings and interests, our determinations will be so various that confusion and anarchy must unavoidably be the result. It would in truth be no law—no government. Was ever a government known that proclaimed no laws, but left all actions entirely to the choice of the subjects? No! there could be no government under such conditions. Shall we then admit that God, the Creator of heaven and earth, is a moral Governor, and this we do by admitting a moral system, and yet deny his justice, his wisdom, and, in fact, his very government, by denying the revelation of his will, or law, to man? Such a denial is too unreasonable for me; it involves conclusions too absurd and derogatory to the divine character. It is really sinking Deity below our ideas of a human governor.

But again: As it is the prerogative of the government to ordain its laws, so it is its sole prerogative, as we have seen, to determine the means whereby a rebel may be restored to citizenship, and, as the law must be plainly revealed to serve the purposes of justice, so,

(2) The government must plainly reveal the conditions of pardon. The right to ordain conditions being exclusively in the government, the subjects or offenders can have no means of ascertaining them, except by direct revelation. If left without this, they can never be restored; for it would be absurd to leave the offenders to devise their own means. That would be to place the dearest rights of the government into the hands of criminals; a thought unworthy of consideration. In all this, we plainly see that one demand of justice is a written revelation. And so reasonable is this, so consistent with the plainest principles of justice, that instead of objecting to a written revelation, every one who is capable of reasoning correctly should expect such a revelation as strictly necessary to the moral government of God.

REMARKS AND QUESTIONS.

1. If God has instituted morals, he is a moral governor, and has a moral law; for there can be no government without a

law. If there is a moral law, it must be the only standard of morality; and it follows that we can only determine a man's character in a moral point of view by comparing his life with the law of God—the moral rule. And whoever has violated that law has lost his moral character by such violation, as surely as that morality consists in obedience to moral law. But we are all conscious of having violated the principles of right and justice; most of our race in a most glaring manner. All around us are evidences that man has ruined himself by sin. How may he be acquitted and restored?

2. We have considered that the government has the sole right to dictate the terms whereby man may be restored to favor. We trace plain distinction between the systems of nature and morality; but in neither can we discover the measure of obedience due to the divine government, or the method or means whereby we may be reconciled to our Creator. How shall we obtain this information?

3. We have seen the utter inability of man to save himself from the penalty of his transgressions, and the imperative necessity of a mediator to atone for us, and to vindicate justice in our pardon. And our fellow-men are all in the same condition, as helpless and unworthy as ourselves. Who shall act as our mediator?

Dear friends, turn not hastily away from these thoughts; pause and reflect. You have talked of reason; boasted of reason: “Come, now, let us reason together.” Can you deny or invalidate the positions taken in the preceding pages? If not, as we believe you cannot, can you answer the three questions above? Can you tell with certainty what duty you owe to your Creator? or on what principle you expect to be justified before God? or by whom or by what means you may be restored after offending? Can you tell how and where we may learn all this? Is it in nature? Do you not need a written revelation?

Again, would it not serve the cause of justice and the true purposes of government to have the laws of our lives, moral laws, published for the benefit of those amenable thereto? Surely, it would. So far from being astonished at the idea of a written revelation—a publication of the divine laws—we should expect it; justice demands it. And, if we could not produce such a document, would you not esteem it an oversight in the governor?

Once more: An atonement has been supposed to lead to immorality. But according to what has been proved, it is the only possible method of restoring the sinner to favor which does not lead to immorality. It is readily granted that any theory by which the atonement is claimed to have abolished the law, or relaxed its claims, leads to immorality. But can that lead to it which acknowledges the justice of law, removes rebellion, and restores the wrong-doer to obedience? You will see that this objection arises, not from any defect in the system of the atonement, but from the ignorance of the objector as to what that system is. We readily admit that, to abolish a good law because it has been disobeyed, and thereby leave men free from its obligations, is to license the crime committed and to utterly subvert all government. Nothing is here claimed for an atonement on such grounds. Though some systems of “theology” involve such conclusions, nothing should be accepted as “the gospel,” or as emanating from Heaven, which leads to such unreasonable results. The Bible presents a pure system of morality, and, through the atonement, a means of pardon consistent with every requirement of justice and every correct principle of government. It neither favors indulgence nor gives license. Pardon maintains law; license upholds crime. There is as great difference between pardon and license as there is between liberty and licentiousness; and he who cannot discern the difference as recognized in the atonement may well be pitied.

We take our stand on reason; reason is not discarded by pleading the Bible and for its truths. Reader, do not abuse your reason by a vain effort to make it answer a purpose which it will not answer, and for which it was never designed. Reason is not evidence; nor can it create evidence. It can only weigh the evidence, when presented. But revelation and evidence are the same. And now if it can be shown, as is here claimed, that the Bible is in perfect harmony with these principles, and enforces them strictly, there will remain no reasonable objection against it as a revelation from the great “Lawgiver.” To this, then, we must next turn our attention.

J. H. WAGGONER.