p. 43 | The Russian Empire

Pacific Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Oakland, California · Feb 1, 1877

The Russian Empire.

Never since the great Napoleon have the politics of Europe assumed a more threatening aspect than at present; and never have the nations of that mighty continent been more convulsed with real and apprehended danger.

France, humbled to the very dust before victorious Prussia; Prussia vaulting from the position of a third-rate power into the highest seat of military glory; Spain assuming the principles of freedom amid the throes of revolution, and Russia shaking off the restrictions which jealous treaties have heretofore imposed, and absorbing new provinces in the valley of the Oxus preparatory to a march, sooner or later, to Constantinople; all proclaim the presence of prodigious events, and foreshadow the coming of still greater catastrophes. The dissolution of the treaty of Paris effected by Russia, and the more recent absorption of Khiva in the valley of the Oxus, are initial steps in the execution of a plan which aims at the absorption of a continent.

The ambition of Russia is boundless. Not content with an empire stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and from the Baltic on through northern Asia to the Pacific, she is still ambitious of extending her dominions, and the shadow of this ambition falls ominously across Europe, and darkens all Asia. She dreams of a mighty empire which shall claim oceans for its harbors, and continents for its provinces. The plan which has long filled the outline of her imperial policy is to seize Constantinople, cross the Bosphorus, conquer Persia, and, passing the borders of Afghanistan, dispute with England for the possession of India. Her southern limits thus extended from the Bosphorus to the Ganges, the dominion of the continent becomes inevitable, and thus Asia is annexed as a foot-block to the throne of her empire.

The memories of the Crimea, then, are not obliterated.

England will yet feel, in the robbery of her most flourishing provinces, the vengeance of that ambition which neither the diplomacy of statesmen nor the arms of consolidated soldiers can foil or conquer.

Nor does this plan involve simply territorial acquisition; it grasps at the greatest commercial advantages. Hitherto the commerce of England, France, Spain, and nearly all Europe, with India and China, has been subjected to slow and distant voyages around the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean. But since the opening of the Suez canal, a far more rapid and easy passage is found through the waters of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. But give Russia, Constantinople, and Russian keels will soon guard the Straits of Gibraltar and the ports of Rosetta.

Constantinople controls the Dardanelles; and this passage to the Mediterranean once secured, Russian fleets or policy would soon spread Russian mastery over all the Mediterranean. Thus fetter this important sea, and the commerce and broad markets of all southern Europe lie at the mercy of Russia. Thus Spain, France, Italy, Turkey, and Greece, would be compelled to pay tribute to an empire as much dreaded as its ambition is aspiring. Truly “Constantinople is the key to the world,” as Napoleon said at St. Helena. It was the fear of this plan that disturbed that illustrious warrior, and the fear of it to-day makes Europe tremble. Had Russia less power, the specter would seem less huge and formidable; but powerful as she is in numbers and resources, the apprehensions of Europe are well grounded. The only obstacle which has hitherto prevented the consummation of the scheme, has been the Turkish Empire, backed by the consolidated powers of Europe; and the maintenance of her territory unimpaired, is the only impediment which can prevent it now.

For the preservation of Turkey, the resources of Europe must be pledged. Turkey herself can offer no successful resistance to Russia. For a long time her power has been waning, and nothing has kept her in existence but the jealousies of other nations, fearful of ambitious Russia. As soon as these nations cease to come to the rescue, the terrible doom of Turkey and of the dominion of the Mediterranean is sealed. Let the fleet of Russia once start for Constantinople, unimpeded by rival nations, and the Turkish Empire will be trampled into powder. It is true the valor of the Turks is historic, but valor alone cannot accomplish all things. It may be heroic and desperate, but without material resources it is powerless. But the valor of Russia is at a discount, her resources are well-nigh illimitable. The largest and best accoutered army, a rapidly increasing navy, and the most unmeasured means, when developed, of any nation in Europe, await her imperial nod to convert plan into execution and ambition into conquest.

But it may be urged, if the plans of Russia are so formidable, why did she submit the Black Sea question to a congress of powers? Why did she not improve her opportunity when France and Prussia were grappling, and each was straining every nerve for mastery? Then if ever, it may be thought, her ambition could have been realized, for two of the most formidable nations of Europe were so disposed that, if they could not be her friends, at least they could not well become her enemies. And when the number and power of her adversaries were thus reduced and weakened, why did she not strike if she has intended to strike at all?

Dear as this scheme is to Russia, it may well be supposed that she is too discreet, if not too humane, to unnecessarily forfeit the sympathies of all Christendom by setting Europe at defiance and plunging headlong into an aggressive war. “Peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must,” is doubtless the policy of the Russian Czar. The submission of the Black Sea question to a congress of powers was a master stroke of policy.

No one can look at the position of Russia on the map, with a knowledge of her population, commerce, and resources, without instantly perceiving the vital necessity of unrestrained outlet to the Mediterranean. Nearly three-fourths of the commerce of that great nation must be shipped by sea, and the Baltic, the only sea over which she has free control, is open to navigation but little more than one-half the year. Hence the necessity of an outlet through the Dardanelles, which admits of constant commercial advantages. Russia has a large coast too on the Black Sea. But, by the treaty of Paris, her right to coast defense was grievously restricted. She was denied the right of maintaining in the Euxine a fleet of sufficient strength to protect her coast in case of “invasion.” With this restriction, literally binding her in the South, the Dardanelles in a military as well as a commercial point of view, became to her precisely what the lower Mississippi in the hands of a foreign power would become to the United States. Had Louisiana never been purchased from France, or had the Southern States succeeded in establishing a separate confederacy, the parallel between the Northern States and the Mississippi, and Russia and the Dardanelles, both in respect to self-defense and commerce, would be perfect. As long as Russia was denied the right of maintaining in the Euxine a navy sufficient to insure her safety, any European nation that might league with Turkey could at any moment sail up the Dardanelles with hostile navies, sink the Russian fleet almost at a broadside, and ravage her defenseless coast. Thus her most easily assailed parts were exposed to the assaults of foreign enemies.

What nation would thus suffer its commerce to be subjected to the caprices of a foreign power, or would mildly permit its most easily assailed point to be in the hands of a hostile nation? The demands of Russia in this respect were not only wise, but just; and it was to call the attention of the nations to these facts and to press home upon them the justness of these demands, that this submission was resorted to. No policy could have been wiser, or more effective in riving the sympathies of enlightened nations to her cause. Russia was well aware that if her demands were refused, and war was invoked, that intrinsic justice would go far to shield her from the censure of the world. If they were acceded to, she was one step nearer the consummation of her plans. In either case, therefore, the policy pursued would be beneficial to Russia, and injurious only to her foes.

But aside from these considerations, Russia is not yet ready for such a war. However strong her military armaments may be upon land, however rapidly her navy and other elements of strength may be rising into power, she is not yet ready for the threatened blow. The contest, when begun, will not be confined to land and the strife of armies. The sea will reëcho beneath the shock of navies, and her white foam redden at the broadsides of their squadrons. To-day, the combined fleets of England, France, Austria, and Turkey, could sweep the Russian banner from the seas. To oppose the navies of her adversaries with her present naval strength, would be to court irretrievable disaster. She would only repeat the story of the French at Trafalgar or the Turks at Navarino. But as soon as the fleet of the Baltic shall be strong enough to protect the coasts of Russia that lie along the sea (a consummation not impossible nor distant), and the fleet of the Euxine has grown to equal power, we may then believe that the decisive time has come. And it may be, notwithstanding these seeming impediments, sooner than this, England will hear the tread of her embattled legions in India.

Slowly, but surely, the work of Russian absorption goes on east and south-east of the Caspian. The clutch of Russia is already upon Khiva. Nearer and nearer the Russian eagles approach the lines of Afghanistan and Beloochistan, which will soon be the only barrier on the west between Russia and India. With equal slowness, but with equal certainty, the borders of the Russian Empire in Asia enlarge toward China and Hindoostan from the north. Thus gradually the circle of Russian authority widens in Asia, as tribes and clans of semi-barbarous people, with their little States, are absorbed by the great empire. These absorptions justly excite the fears of European nations, for they well know they bring the hour of Russian supremacy nearer and nearer to their doors. It may be, too, that the annexation of Khiva and the provinces around the Caspian, which startled England to her feet ready to unsheath the sword, had for its real object the crumbling of Turkish authority in Asia, by surrounding it on every side by Russian territory and Russian influence.

But it may well be supposed that Russia will never be allowed to absorb provinces along the Bosphorus, through the artful policy of surrounding Turkish power in Asia, without a desperate struggle; but that such a struggle is approaching is indubitable. To calculate the relations of the probable combatants, or the chances of defeat or victory, would be a matter of uncertain speculation. But whatever relations the crisis may necessitate, the world awaits with eager interest the solution of the question of Russian supremacy in the Mediterranean and Asia.

The above appeared in the Pennsylvania School Journal in 1874; and the positions taken in regard to Russian policy is being demonstrated as true to-day. Russia still has her eye on Constantinople, and, under pretense of securing freedom for the Christian provinces now suffering under Turkish rule, is making vast preparations to attack and completely overthrow the Ottoman power in Europe, which would be a crushing blow to the entire empire. Should the other European powers, through jealousy or any other motive, be led to interfere, a struggle of nations such as we have never before witnessed may be expected, the results of which will be awaited with intense interest.