p. 147 | IN RUSSIA'S GRASP

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Mar 6, 1900

IN RUSSIA'S GRASP.

The secret of that “loan” of six million dollars by Russia to Persia is told in the New York Tribune of Feb. 11, 1900, by Hon. S. G. W. Benjamin, ex-minister of the United States to Persia. The following paragraphs give the secret; and, as will readily be seen, it is a great one:—

The announcement, which has not been contradicted, that Russia has loaned eleven million rubles to Persia, and secured herself by a mortgage on the customs and a concession to lay railways over that country, seems innocent enough to one who is not familiar with the policy and the intrigues that have led up to this startling measure. Turkey and other countries have hypothecated their customs revenues before this without jeopardizing their political integrity. But the conditions in the present case are altogether different. Russia has been nibbling into the northern and eastern frontiers of Persia for ages, as much by craft, intrigue, and steady pressure as by open war. Nothing has prevented her from making a complete conquest of that country except the jealous watchfulness of England, which was so relaxed when Mr. Gladstone was in power—indifferent as he was to England's foreign interests—that Russia at that time nearly accomplished her design of changing Persia from a buffer into a frontier state. That Russia has disclosed her hand so unmistakably at this crisis, when England is seriously embarrassed, shows the unsleeping persistence of Muscovite ambition, in spite of her frequent reiterations to the contrary.

It is not likely that the six million dollars and the concession involved in this far-reaching transaction correctly represent the facts. The late Nasr-ed-Deen Shah accumulated large treasures for an Oriental country, and it is unaccountable that they have been squandered in so short a period, and the revenues so reduced by his successor, Muzaffar-ed-Deen Shah, who had been for many years accustomed to rule as governor of the great province of Azerbaijan, as to require such sacrifices now. It is more likely that when, as crown prince, he was resident near the Russian frontier, he made a deal with the czar whereby the latter guaranteed the prince possession of the throne against the ambition of the older brother, the Zelee sultan. In return, the prince would agree to hold the scepter as vassal to Russia, said vassalage to be gradually broken to the world as convenient opportunity might occur.

RUSSIA'S OPPORTUNITY.

That opportunity appears to have come now during England's supposed powerlessness to oppose decisive objections and resistance, and the miserable loan of eleven million rubles is thrown out as a blind to Europe. It is probable, also, that when the occasion arrived, some pressure was necessary, and the shah's pride and chagrin were mollified by a quasi loan. That pressure was doubtless aided by such of his counselors and courtiers as were willing to accept Russia's douceurs [sweetmeats]. It would not be the first time such corruption has occurred in Asia, and possibly in Europe, unless history always lies.

Eleven million rubles for Persia, the oldest of existing empires after China,—the land of Cyrus, Darius, Ardashir, Anoorshirvan, Abbas Shah, and Nasr-ed-Deen Shah,—the land of Manee, Firdusi, Omar Khayyam, and Hafiz,—the land that conceived Saracenic architecture, that style which gave birth to the Christian architecture of Europe,—a land which, even in its decadence, includes an area nearly equal to that of Germany and France together,—a land whose possession gives Russia the long-sought key to India! No; this six million-dollar loan is only a pretext; there is something behind what appears, which is definitely known only to the chief actors in this tremendous national tragi-comedy. . . .

As for Russia, what will she gain in Persia when her dominion becomes fully developed over that country? An acquisition of nearly half a million square miles is of importance even to an empire already holding more territory than any nation since the foundation of the world. But this is no mere, ordinary Naboth's vineyard on which she now lays her hands. On the contrary, it is one of the choicest spots of Asia, in the right hands; and, furthermore, it borders on the ocean, where winds and climate are favorable; and that coast has ports, and those ports are almost in hail of India! Verily, the chops of the Russian bear must actually water at the prospect of the morsel which destiny has thrown within his reach while the British lion is fighting for dear life on the African sands. . . .

THE COMING DAY OF RAILROADS.

Of course Russia will cover Persia with a network of railways. They will be good, like most Russian railways. Perhaps American engineers may be employed to lay them, as has already been done in Russia; and such roads will be the making of Persia. . . . As Xenophon's men shouted, “The sea! the sea!” when they reached the long-sought shores of the Euxine, so when at last Russia reaches Mohammerah and Bushire and Bender-Abbasi and Bahrein, her legions will shout, “The sea!” and her sailors will give back the glad cry, and Moscow and St. Petersburg will hear and re-echo the song of victory; and it will ring through the halls of Germany and France and Italy, and chiefly England, and even to America across the ocean, and the nations will stop to listen and consider what it means to them, to their arts and trades, to their revenues, their armies, their fleets, their glory, and their future. Well may they pause and consider, for it will mark an era in the records of time.

Yes, so intertwined are the interests and destinies of nations in these days that the triumphal march of such a power as the United States, Great Britain, or Russia attracts universal attention; and the hour when Russia builds fleets and gathers armies on the shores of the Indian Ocean must arouse the apprehension of every power in Christendom.

RUSSIA'S RESISTLESS MARCH.

Of course, these presumed results of the present turn of affairs in Persia may not follow at once. Naturally, they may take time. If England should soon gain the upper hand in South Africa, Russia might temporize, might defer her ultimate triumph. But she would not recede. Russia never does that. She thinks long and carefully; but when she puts her foot down, it only rises to go farther, and the wonder is that the world, and especially the Anglo-Saxons of England and America, have not yet learned to understand these methods of Russia's policy. The Briton and the Yankee have never yet understood the character of the Russian government; have never yet learned that with her, profession and practice rarely go together; that no nation occupies a more isolated position as to Europe, because she is able to do so on account of her geographical position, and since the Crimean War has preferred to do so, and thus, like a man who is unmarried, she can keep all her designs to herself. It is not likely that she takes the French alliance very seriously. It tickles France, and does not hurt Russia.

With the Persian Gulf in her hands, and a littoral reaching almost to India, Russia would bisect the passage between Suez and India. Under altered modern conditions, England has become obliged to depend chiefly on the canal for quick transit to her Eastern possessions, and the real reason why England has seized Egypt—for it amounts to that—is to control Suez, and to have ports south and independently of it, such as Suakim, in order to communicate with India; this reason has also made it of the last importance to her that Russian fleets should not be able to come down from the Black Sea to threaten Suez. She was justified in this policy under the higher law that self-preservation is the right of nations as well as of individuals.

But what comes of this effort to protect Suez if Russia can bisect the road from Suez to Bombay, and send out fleet cruisers to destroy English merchant ships after they have passed Suez safely? To prevent this, England would have to maintain vast fleets along the Russo-Persian coasts, and still would not feel safe; while the railways would bring down armies that could co-operate with the fleets of Russia by approaching India, where the mountain passes are less severe than in the north; and England, between the two, would find herself drawing chronically on her utmost resources. I say chronically because, if occasionally obliged to pause, Russia would busily employ the interval of peace to intrigue with the restless East Indians on her border. . . .

These results, I repeat, will not come at once. Doubtless Russia is busy making the usual explanations to England now. But the greatest step has already been taken, if the statements are correct that Russia is to gridiron Persia with railways, and otherwise control the internal affairs of that country. The rest will follow in due course. England does well to seek the dominion of Africa. On that continent the world's greatest colonizing and civilizing power will make her final stand, and develop there her last colonial efforts for the amelioration of humanity. Then old England can rest from her labors, content that she has accomplished her mighty mission well.

But in proportion as Russia gains in the East Indies, the Christian powers besides England will be forced to look sharply after their own commercial and territorial interests in Asiatic quarters. Nor will the United States, so confiding in the oft-reiterated friendship of Russia, find that friendship of any avail then. It holds good on the part of Russia only so long as American interests do not clash with hers, or so long as we are alert and powerful enough to maintain our rights and demands. That, in a nutshell, is the position of our relations with Russia; and the sooner our exporters and our statesmen in or out of Congress understand it, the less of money, prestige, and blood will it cost us in the end.