p. 58 | The Import of the War

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Aug 9, 1870

The Import of the War.

The war which Napoleon has forced upon Germany presents the struggle between the principles of freedom and absolutism in a new aspect. The King of Prussia is really the leader of the hosts of freedom. He stands the accepted representative of the ideas of German unity and independence. The German people, laying aside their sectional jealousies and their political differences, support him with remarkable unanimity. They expect through him to overcome the artificial divisions which have weakened them, and to achieve for their fatherland, consolidation and a strong place among progressive nations. It will also be a free nation, for the German spirit will brook no other.

The French Emperor aims at autocracy. At home he aspires to dictate to France; from France, to dictate to the world. He makes war to prevent his personal aims from being defeated, his will from being defied, to confirm himself as master of the continent.

The bearings of the war upon religious questions may prove to be of great importance. It bids fair to become a war between the Protestant and the Roman principles. The influence of the event of it upon the future of those principles is likely to be great. Interest in the result is heightened by the fact that it has broken out at this particular time, simultaneously with the promulgation of the dogma of infallibility. It can hardly fail to largely affect the measure of influence which that doctrine shall carry, not only in States nominally Catholic, but also in Protestant and free States where the Roman Catholics constitute a considerable proportion of the population.

Germany, now that the provinces of Austria are separated from it, is in every respect a Protestant nation; it is the chief support of the Protestant interests on the continent of Europe. Every increase or decrease of its power will reflect itself in the history of Protestantism. France, on the other hand, is the leading Roman Catholic power of the world. The ignorant masses of the country districts are fully under the sway of the priesthood, and any extension of the influence of France in international politics cannot fail to be injurious to the cause of Protestantism.

Napoleon is the stay of the temporal power of the pope. His soldiers alone have enabled the pope to maintain his position in Rome during the last ten years. If he should be forced to withdraw them, there would be none to replace them permanently. The pope would be driven out at the first onslaught of the Italian revolutionists. Once out, he would not be easily put back. The success of the French in Germany will carry with it whatever influence and authority the Emperor can command, for that which he supports at Rome. If the war becomes general, and the Roman Catholic States are allied on one side, and the anti-papal States on the other, as would probably be the case, the success of the Roman Catholic powers will not only firmly establish the pope in his temporal power, but will go far to give practical extension and effect to the doctrine of infallibility. The success of the German cause may, on the other hand, be expected to relieve Germany fully from the influence of infallibilist superstition. Success of the anti-papist cause in a general war will destroy the temporal power of the pope, and reduce his assumption of infallibility to a very poor and ridiculous pretense.

Hopes that have been founded on Napoleon’s past hostility to the dogma of infallibility will not be realized. Now that it is proclaimed, Napoleon, as a faithful Catholic, instead of opposing it, is more likely to accept it, and, as a skillful statesman, to use it to advance his ends.

The sympathies of Europe, so far as they have been indicated, show already tendencies to division by Roman Catholic and anti-papal lines. England and Russia support Prussia; Austria supports France, and even Spain, which, at the start, seemed Napoleon’s chief antagonist, now sides with him. The alacrity of the Roman Catholic Irish, in expressing their sympathy with France, is a sign the import of which is not to be mistaken.

The war bearing upon the United States politically only through the sympathies of citizens, is likely to affect our business interests directly. It gives no occasion for a money panic. As a neutral people, we shall enjoy the privilege of carrying for and selling to both parties. An impulse will be given our commerce which will employ all the ships we have, and would employ many more if we had them. It will afford an opportunity for us to rebuild our mercantile marine, which it will be almost criminal to let pass. It will open up a demand in Europe for our grain and provisions, and for some articles that we manufacture. A general war will give us the opportunity to secure a monopoly of the carrying trade, and the control of the European markets. Some of our bonds may be sent home, and their values temporarily depressed. They have not been sent home yet; it is not yet decided that they will be sent home in large quantities. Relatively, only a small proportion of our national securities are held abroad. What are sent back will probably be consumed in purchasing the articles which will be needed of us. The drain of gold which some profess to apprehend is only remotely probable. On the other hand, if there is a general war, Europe may be sending us gold, to pay for goods and transportation, for which bonds will not be sufficient. If disturbances occur in our markets, they will be only temporary. The current will soon change, and the influences will be in our favor.—Methodist.