p. 63 | The Atonement: Founded in Justice, No. 3

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Feb 3, 1874

The Atonement: Founded in Justice, No. 3

By Joseph Harvey Waggoner

The Atonement.—No. 3.

2. THAT the atonement is founded in justice is easily shown by an examination of the principles of government, and the effect of sin, and what justice requires when the law is violated.

That government and order is better than anarchy need not be argued; and a government cannot exist without a law and the maintenance of the law. But the penalty gives force to the law, and without a penalty the law is a nullity. The reader is requested to bear in mind the distinction between penalties and mere consequences. Special attention is called to this because it is so often disregarded. No matter what consequences may follow the violation of law, the criminal is not punished until the penalty is inflicted. The judge does not take the consequences into consideration, even though they be more severe than the penalty itself; his office is to see that the penalty prescribed by the law be inflicted. He who violates the law risks both the consequences and the penalty.

Now if it is right and advisable to have government, it is right to inflict penalties upon the violators of law, for in no other way can the government be maintained. One great object of government is the good of its subjects. The same law which punishes the evil-doer secures the rights of the well-doer. Every violation of law is an invasion of the rights of somebody, and if permitted to be constantly repeated without being restrained by proper authority, no rights will be secured.

Transgression of the law insults and abuses the governor, and brings contempt upon the government. This may, at first view, seem to be, comparatively, of minor consequence, but it is of the greatest importance. If the government cannot maintain its own dignity and authority, it cannot maintain the rights of its subjects. Therefore it is the interest of every subject to have the honor and authority of the government maintained. But this can be done only by vindicating the law in the execution of its penalties, in case of transgression. Thus all must agree that sin, or the transgression of the law, ought to be punished.

But an atonement is a remedial system, or a system of salvation; and it is evident that where penalties are rigidly inflicted, there can be no manifestation of mercy. Or, on the other hand, if mercy be shown, if the penalty be not inflicted, then justice is robbed of its due. What method can be devised to reconcile these principles?

We have seen that it would not be right to suffer the law to be violated with impunity and the authority of the government to be disregarded. The criminal might be set free by abolishing the law which proved him guilty, so there could be no further power to punish him. But that would destroy the government, and sacrifice the rights of the innocent to justify the guilty, and so trample all justice under foot. A human governor would be despised if he acted thus; what, then, shall be thought of a system which imputes such action to the government of God? This idea must be dismissed as unworthy of the attention of any lover of truth and justice.

But there is a means by which the authority of the government may be acknowledged and maintained, and mercy be shown also. It is found in conditional pardon. Of course unconditional or indiscriminate pardon is subversive of government, and renders conviction a nullity. Now that pardon, under proper restrictions, may be safely exercised, is seen in that it recognizes (1) the guilt of the condemned. Pardon is inadmissible where there is no guilt. (2) The power of the government. This also is evident, as it would be only a farce to offer a pardon to those whom the government has no power to punish. (3) The justice of the law transgressed. This is nearly parallel with the first reason, for if the law were not just, that fact would extenuate the action of the accused. To pronounce a man guilty is to declare that he has done wrong. In a moral point of view, an unjust law is a nullity, and a prisoner held under it should be released as a matter of justice. But pardon is of favor or mercy. Now, as pardon supposes the guilt of the prisoner, the power of the government, and the justice of the law, in all these it honors the government and vindicates its integrity.

But there are other principles involved. The act of pardon recognizes the claims of law, by recognizing its justice. Thus far, it honors the government. But the question still remains, Are those claims satisfied as well as acknowledged? According to a plain truth before noticed, the sinner ought to be punished; justice imperatively demands it. How then can pardon be granted, and strict justice be administered? In this case, there will arise two conflicting interests, one of sympathy for the accused, leaning toward mercy; the other, strenuous for the integrity of the government, leaning toward justice. How can these principles be reconciled and both parties be satisfied? Here the great difficulty involved in the subject is plainly stated, and there is only one way in which the claims of the law can be fully honored, and pardon be granted at the same time. That is, to make satisfaction to the law by voluntary substitution. If the substitution be voluntary, so that the substitute be satisfied, and the full penalty of the law be inflicted, so that the law and justice be satisfied, all must be satisfied—all conflicting interests and feelings must be reconciled. Let no one say, to oppose this, that such is not the case when pardon is granted in human governments; for these are imperfect, and instead of conforming strictly to justice, they can only hope to approximate it. The interests above referred to are never harmonized in human governments. In these, if the prisoner is punished less than the penalty indicated by the law, then the law is deprived just so much of its due. In such case, justice is not reconciled or vindicated; it is suspended. All must see at a glance that the means herein proposed alone obviates all difficulties.

That in voluntary substitution is found the only means of obviating all difficulties will be apparent when we consider what is implied thereby. (1) It recognizes the claims of the law. For if the law could be shown to be unjust there would be no satisfaction either to justice, or to the condemned, or to his substitute. To satisfy all interests there must be acquiescence in the condemnation, which is a recognition of the justice of the law. (2) It honors the authority of the government. This, of course, would also be done by punishing the condemned one, but then there could be no mercy, no pardon. And the authority of the government is as really recognized by inflicting the penalty on a voluntary substitute, as it would be if the infliction fell upon the offender. But as (3) it dispenses mercy, all the objects of government—justice and mercy, or truth and love—meet in this arrangement. This is precisely the true idea of an atonement: not a thing to be deprecated, as some have vainly imagined; but to be loved and esteemed, as a certain vindication of right and justice, and a beneficent dispensation of love and mercy.

We notice here that the atonement affects our relation to the government in two respects, looking to the past and to the future. To the past, in that it frees from condemnation for past offenses; and to the future, in that it recognizes the claims of the law, thus binding us to future obedience to the law.

By this it will also be seen that the two acts, pardoning the transgressor and abolishing the law, cannot, in any case, be united. For, if the law were abolished, pardon would be out of the question; the offer of it would be mockery and a farce. Nor would justice be vindicated by such a course. It would be trampled down, and the government dishonored. It is very easy to see that an atonement on any other grounds than those herein laid down would be inadmissible in any government which had a due regard for right and justice. Therefore the claim put forth by some religionists that Christ abolished the law of the Father is reproachful to the gospel and to the divine government.

The necessity of an atonement to reconcile the different interests previously noticed is further shown by the evident truth that future obedience will not justify the guilty. Primarily, justification is by law; that is, the law will justify the obedient, and therefore the law must contain justifying principles. But there is a wide difference between justifying the innocent and the guilty. The innocent are always justified by law; the guilty cannot be. While the innocent are justified by the law if they remain innocent, that is, if they continue to obey, the transgressor, who is already condemned, cannot be freed from condemnation of past offenses by future obedience. Present justice may answer a present demand, but it leaves the past unsettled.

Some are so unreasonable or short-sighted as to urge that it cannot justly be required of us to keep a law if it will not justify us. But the law condemns only the transgressor, who ought to be condemned; that he is condemned is his own fault, and not a fault of the law. And if he was at first condemned for violating the law, it cannot be right for him to continue to violate it. The law condemns the thief, and he can only be cleared by pardon; but the granting of a pardon does not release him from obligation to keep the law—it does not leave him free to steal thereafter. This shows the absurdity of the theory of certain religionists who teach that the gospel of Christ absolves from observance of the law of the Father.

Again, the necessity of an atonement in our behalf is shown in the fact that we have no ransom to bring. The demands of government is obedience, and it is perpetual. A suspension of obedience is a break in the moral chain which we cannot restore. Hence the transgressor could not save himself by future obedience, even if he retained his original strength to obey.

But, further, we become weak and incapable in a degree, by immoral practices. We are subject to temptation, and the more we yield, the less are we able to resist it. When wrong-doing becomes a habit, it is hard to overcome. We are all conscious of having done more or less wrong; and it is but reasonable to say we have done more than we are conscious of, inasmuch as we have not been sufficiently tenacious of the right, nor very watchful to observe our own wrongs. And, according to the plain truth herein stated, we have become weak according to the wrong we have done; and so much the more need of the assistance of a third party to set us right with the power whom we have offended.

J. H. Waggoner.