ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE EAST.
We clip the following from the Boston Journal, which seems to indicate the direction of the present political currents from London and St. Petersburgh, condensing the storm-clouds ominously around the “Holy Mountains”:— The relations of Russia and England in Central Asia constitute a problem which perpetually recurs in English Parliamentary debates and the discussions of the English press. This often-repeated declaration that England, if she should find it necessary, would be able by force of arms to protect her Eastern possessions against the menace of Russia, gives particular interest to a pamphlet lately published in Vienna by an Austrian officer, Captain Debelak, who has visited Persia and other countries in Asia, and presents a comparative survey of the strength of England and Russia. He does not hesitate to pronounce England powerless to foil Russia’s designs, to retard her progress or to compel her to stop. The last war in Afghanistan, he says, has shaken the faith of Asiatic nations in the military power of England, while the career of Russia in Central Asia has been unbroken by a single defeat. Moreover, England lacks the power of winning the attachment of the inferior races under her rule, while Russia has been singularly successful in this respect. It is the opinion of this author that Russia will not attempt an attack on India from the north-east, because the passes on that side present almost insurmountable difficulties to the passage of an army; but she will be able by her agents to stir up an insurrection in the disaffected districts of Northern India, and by this means support her operations in the north-west. The Russian army of the Caucasus comprises 178,500 infantry, 44,000 cavalry and 408 guns, with 5000 militia. The Russians are armed with breech-loading guns, and are gallant, disciplined, and well trained. The total force at the disposal of England is 130,000, of whom 100,000 are native troops. Of these, at least 80,000 must be left to take care of the 70,000 miles of territory in India. This would leave 50,000 for the army of operations, of whom 10,000 would be required to keep communications on the long line between Herat and the Bolan Pass. Russia, on the other hand, could concentrate an army of 100,000 trained soldiers between Mero and Herat. It is hardly possible to believe that the 40,000 men in the English army, most of them natives, could defeat so great a force; but if the Russians were beaten they could fall back on Mero and wait for reinforcements. If the English were beaten they would probably be annihilated by the Afghans before they regained the Indian frontier, to say nothing of the danger of a mutiny in India itself, occasioned by the Russian victory. In a word, in the writer’s opinion, Russia would risk nothing and England everything, in case of a conflict. These views have been republished in England, occasioning some discussion and not a little disquietude.