THE SOUL AND THE RESURRECTION.
By John Harvey Kellogg
A FEW months ago we received a note from the Rev. Mr. Pettengill, of Philadelphia, a special contributor to the Bible Banner published in that city, asking to exchange his work entitled, “The Theological Trilemma,” for a copy of our little work, “The Soul and the Resurrection.” We very readily complied with the request, and took much pleasure in perusing the “Trilemma,” though finding in it many statements which we could not indorse, and arguments which did not seem to us able to bear the test of logical criticism. In sending a copy of “The Soul and the Resurrection,” we invited Mr. P. to offer such criticisms on the work as might occur to him, which he accordingly did in a lengthy review of the book, which appeared in the Bible Banner of May 22. In his review, Mr. Pettengill seemed in several instances to mistake the meaning of the language employed in the work, and in opposing the positions taken, employed arguments and announced theories which seemed to us to require a review of the reviewer, which the editor of the Banner kindly published in the issue of the journal for Aug. 7. This was followed by a rejoinder from Mr. Pettengill the following week, in the concluding paragraph of which we were given to understand that any further discussion of the subject in that journal was not considered desirable either by the editors or the readers of the same. We have had no communication on the subject from the editor, but letters from several of the readers of the Banner led us to believe that some, at least, of the readers of that paper would be glad to hear more of the subject; and as the last article by Mr. P. not only fails to present our views in a proper light, but assumes positions which are both illogical and inconsistent in a high degree, we have yielded to the solicitations of a number of those interested in the subject, to reply to Mr. P.’s rejoinder through these columns. At the risk of leaving those who do not read the Bible Banner somewhat in the dark respecting the points at issue in the former part of the discussion, we will, for the sake of necessary brevity, pass at once to the consideration of the last article by Mr. Pettengill, published in the issue of the Banner for Aug. 14; and in so doing we shall endeavor to maintain the same courteous manner that has heretofore characterized the discussion. 1. Mr. P. says: “You speak of matter and force as distinct from each other, and then deny your premises in your reasoning; for in your reasoning you make this force to be an essential element, a constituent part of matter, without which there is and can be no matter.” Mr. P. grants that force and matter are always found together, and then goes on to say that “we have here two conceptions, or we should not need two words to express them,—two entities.” The thoughtful reader will see at once the fallacious character of this argument, but it may be well to devote a word to it. Overlooking the inaccuracy of the language employed, we need but to call attention to two errors into which he has inadvertently fallen. a. He seems to think that because we use the two words matter and force, we recognize them as distinct entities, capable of independent existence. If this logic be sound, then we must return to the long-ago-exploded philosophy of the ancient Greek, Plato, of whose views our reviewer in another place speaks with just disparagement. Plato believed in a roundness existing apart from round things; in the separate existence of sweetness, weight, color, form, and all other qualities, independent of the things possessing those properties. Mr. P. would also have us believe that because we form conceptions of these qualities, and have words to represent them, they exist without any relation to material objects. We would respectfully ask him to show us how the smallest degree of sweetness, roundness, weight, resistance, or any other property or form of force can exist without being connected inseparably with some material thing. If he could show this, it would be the easiest task imaginable to establish the existence of an immaterial, conscious, thinking entity, which might be called the soul, and which would answer to all the requirements of the orthodox notion of the soul. This whole fallacy is based upon Plato’s doctrine, which Mr. P. allows was erroneous. With the fall of Plato’s “postulate,” the whole baseless doctrine of a conscious, thinking entity falls to the ground. b. We are much surprised that a writer apparently so good a scholar as Mr. P., should be guilty of so grave a blunder as to suppose that a conception is necessarily an entity. He can undoubtedly form a conception of sound, of light, of heat; yet will he claim that these are entities? Sound is an action produced by moving air impinging upon the auditory apparatus, the ear. Light and heat are other forms of motion. The thing which moves is a substance, an entity; but the motion of the entity is certainly not itself an entity, even though we can form an idea of it, and therefore give it a name. Hence we claim that our reviewer’s point is really no point,—an actual non-entity. 2. Mr. P. agrees with us that the physical force and the so-called vital force are really but different manifestations of one great force. The facts offered by scientific investigation are such as to make this conclusion irresistible to all candid, critical minds. At this point, however, Mr. P. announces a theory for which he offers no better proof than simple assumption. Speaking of all the different forces manifested in the mineral, vegetable, and animal worlds, he says, “I hold that they are spiritual forces, or a spiritual force.” This hypothesis—for it can be nothing more, and not the slightest evidence or pretense of argument is offered in its support—has at least the advantage of apparent consistency. We have attempted to show, in the work reviewed by our friend, that if man has such a spirit as is claimed for him by Mr. P. and others, the beast must be granted the same. This our reviewer evidently admits—at least he does not deny the force of our arguments—and even goes so far as to announce a theory which requires that a vegetable, a tree, a shrub, a flower, a cabbage, even a lifeless stone or a lump of clay, should possess a spirit, as well as man. According to his theory, what is popularly known as the soul or spirit in man is only a peculiar manifestation of the same force which, in the matter out of which the man is made, before its organization, was manifested as heat, weight, form, color, resistance, etc. According to this theory, also, the dead body of a man possesses the very same spirit which actuated the man during life; the “spiritual force,” which during the period of living activity was manifested in nervous and muscular efforts, thought, speech, and movements of various sorts, being after death occupied in the various molecular processes by which the changes of decomposition are effected, and the living form reduced to its original inorganic condition. As the body returns to dust again, each one of the constituent atoms carries away with it its due proportion of the “spiritual force” which in the aggregate once constituted the individual’s soul.133 Now as Mr. P. declares “that the notion of the resurrection of the same identical particles and parts of the human body” “has fallen by the weight of its own absurdities,” and is now held by “but few intelligent men,” we would respectfully ask him to tell us in what manner he hopes to be able to secure the resurrection of the identical person who dies, since he acknowledges that the atoms will not be the same, and by his theory necessitates that the soul is scattered to the four winds along with the atoms which once composed the individual’s body? 3. Mr. P. asserts that this spiritual force is pure spirit, wholly independent of matter, and yet admits that it manifests itself to our senses only through matter. Again we put to him the question, What other means of information respecting matter and force have we except our senses? Inspiration is silent on the subject. If Mr. P.’s assertion is true, and we believe it is, viz., that force is only manifested through matter, then have we no evidence that force does or can exist independent of matter. The assertion made by Mr. P. and by others of a certain class of pseudo-scientific theologians to the contrary is not sustained by evidence, and cannot be, from the very nature of things. We grant that absolute proof is wanting; but what evidence there is, is on the opposite side. We are bound to believe what appears to be true, until it is proven false, no matter how much it may conflict with anybody’s hypothesis which has no better basis than pure assumption. 4. Mr. P. next makes, in support of his favorite theory, the astounding assertion that scientists recognize the existence of “many gases” of which they have had “no sensible evidence of their existence.” Unfortunately he does not mention by name the gases so recognized. We never have heard of the recognition of any “gases” or any other form of matter of which there was offered “no sensible evidence of their existence.” Mr. P. may recognize some such “gases,” as he confessedly does, of a hypothetical entity; but no such “gases” and no such entities of any sort are known to science. True science deals only with evidence which can be recognized by the senses. When we accept evidence which has no better basis than the imagination, we are in danger of getting sadly befogged, since every person’s imagination may become fertile in evidence which would furnish material for the foundation of as many theories on all these subjects as there are individuals to think. 5. Says our reviewer, “What conception can you form of the attraction of gravity?” “It is certainly not matter itself, and you can conceive of matter without this force.” “I relegate it to the realm of spirit, as I do all the other forms of energy in the universe.” We do not pretend to be able to explain the nature of gravitation. We cannot form any conception of it separate from matter. Mr. P. claims to be able to form a conception of force, yet here questions the possibility of doing so. We may possibly conceive of matter without gravity, but not without some form of force. Every property of matter by which we distinguish it or form conceptions of it, is due to force. Mr. P. says, “I relegate it to the realm of spirit.” We ask, By what authority does he so relegate it? Science gives him no such authority, neither does Inspiration, unless he has a special revelation on the subject, of which he does not apprise us. We call for the evidence. We want more than mere dictum. 6. Again he says, “You admit of a First Great Cause, but you seem to deny it in your reasoning, or rather to regard it as its own Creator.” Certainly we admit, and implicitly believe in, a First Great Cause, in God, the Creator of the universe. As to the origin of God we have not pretended to speculate. That is a question which cannot enter into any human scheme of philosophy. It is above and beyond all human fathoming; but we would respectfully ask if, supposing that everything must have a beginning somewhere, our reviewer has any better suggestion to make than that the Creator is self-existent, self-created? 7. Mr. P. asks, “What is your idea of God?” We believe in the God of the Bible, the God whose “back parts” Moses saw, of whom Christ was the express personal image, who has a definite, tangible form, who is the ruler of the universe, and has a definite, actual throne at his seat of government, from which go out his angels as “ministering spirits.” We can form no conception of a God who is an immaterial entity, whose form is indefinite, whose throne and abode are everywhere and nowhere in particular, who is, in fact, nothing better than an idea, a metaphysical abstraction. The popular theory, which our friend seems to hold, appears to us to be nothing more than a flimsy “cloud-shadow of God,” a “divine abstraction.” After a stirring exhortation to us of the danger we are incurring of running into infidelity because we do not believe in the sort of a God last referred to, our reviewer continues, “You should remember that we have two sources of knowledge,—nature and revelation.” This fact we fully believe, and have endeavored to keep in mind. Our effort has been to show that these two sources of knowledge harmonize when correctly understood. Our chief complaint against our worthy friend is that he insists, practically, on adding another source of knowledge which he does not mention, but continually draws from, viz., the human imagination. We are willing that all evidence which can be drawn from either the book of Inspiration or the book of nature should be adduced as argument in this discussion; but cannot yield to unestablished hypotheses. 8. Our reviewer next asserts, “You leave no room for a religious faith.” Our friend is mistaken. We have a religious faith, but he readily sees that our arguments leave no room for the essential tenets of his religious faith, whence he draws the erroneous conclusion that no room is left for any religious faith. He further says, “The great spiritual truths of revelation . . . you exclude from your philosophy.” Not so. We only exclude the metaphysical abstractions concerning the nature of God and of his creature, man, which are the modern remnants of an exploded heathenish philosophy, and which are based upon the human imagination rather than upon either Inspiration or nature. As we have already prolonged this article much beyond the limits intended, we must overlook several minor points to which we would like to call attention, and notice in conclusion an argument which is directed at our view respecting the resurrection. Says Mr. P., in speaking of man in the intermediate state, “Under what condition he exists until the resurrection, in which we both believe, or in what way his identity is maintained if he is unconscious, I do not know, and therefore I do not attempt to say or guess. But it seems to me that the continuity of something—of some entity—is necessary to the preservation of his identity. If a knife were to lose its blade and receive a new one, I might perhaps call it the same knife; or even if it were to lose both blade and handle successively and have them replaced at different times, I might not possibly dispute the identity of the knife. But if both were to be destroyed together and another one made, however closely the model of the old knife might be imitated in the new one, I could not say it was the same identical knife. And yet, this is your theory of the identity of man in the resurrection.” By no means is this our theory. Our friend could not possibly have made a greater mistake than to suppose that we believe man in the resurrection to be in the same case as a new knife made in imitation of an old one. He cannot have read with attention that portion of our book devoted to the subject of identity, or he would not have been guilty of so gross a blunder. It is quite probable, too, that a little more careful reading would have enlightened his mind upon the subject of identity in general sufficiently to have saved him from so grave a mistake as to suppose that a knife which has lost its blade and had a new one put in place is the same as the original knife. He even admits that if the handle were afterwards replaced by another, the identity of the knife would still be preserved. To show the monstrous absurdity of such reasoning we have only to inquire, Suppose that some one should find the original blade and the old handle, and should place them together, what knife would that be? Such an occurrence is entirely possible. It is this style of reasoning, jumping at conclusions without going carefully over each step of the line of evidence, that leads so many to adopt the popular views concerning the nature of God and man, which we cannot accept, although we may be accused of infidel tendencies in consequence. We have no sympathy with infidelity in any guise; neither have we a whit more of sympathy with a scheme of theology which is supported by such flimsy arguments. Mr. Pettengill admits that by his theory he is unable to explain how identity is preserved in the resurrection. As we endeavored to show in a former article, published in the Banner, his theory leaves no chance for identification. According to his theory, the resurrected man is in precisely the situation of a knife made like another, but not identical with it. He might have similarity, but could not have identity. He admits that “the continuity of something—of some entity—is necessary to the preservation of his identity.” The doctrine that this entity consists of the original particles composing the body has, as he well states, “fallen by the weight of its own absurdities.” He admits, also, that all the spirit which man possesses is simply the common force which actuates all matter, and is possessed by stones as well as men. The Bible clearly shows that there is no conscious existence in death, that the whole man is dead. Are we not, then, shut up to the conclusion arrived at in the work which gave rise to this discussion, that it is the organization of the individual as distinct from the matter organized, which constitutes the means of identification in the resurrection—which bridges over the dark chasm between death and the resurrection? So it seems to us; and by means of this view we are enabled to so harmonize the teachings of science with the truths of Inspiration as to allow us to believe in both as avenues of heavenly truth to the human mind.