p. 162 | One God by A. J. Dennis

Pacific Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Oakland, California · May 22, 1879

One God.

By A. J. Dennis

WHAT a contradiction of terms is found in the language of a trinitarian creed: "In unity of this Godhead are three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." There are many things that are mysterious, written in the word of God, but we may safely presume the Lord never calls upon us to believe impossibilities. But creeds often do: Let us see what is involved in the above words, quoted from a well-known collection of "Articles of Religion." We would not approach the subject, but with that reverence and godly fear which becomes the creature when speaking of the Creator.

Webster, in giving an illustration of the word "person," quotes from Locke: "We must consider what person stands for; which I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places." Webster certainly approved this illustration or he would not have used it. We approve of it too: it seems to cover the whole ground, and we are sure it will recommend itself to the reason of all.

We have here, then, three "thinking, intelligent beings," each one capable of "considering itself as itself." We are told by trinitarians these three persons are of "one substance, power, and eternity." Now as to the oneness of substance of the Father and the Son. If the oneness referred to be understood to be similar to what is meant when it is said of a man and wife that they are one flesh, we have no objections; and if the oneness of power refers to possessorship simply, not to authorship, we have no objections here, for we believe the Father to have exalted the Son to equal power with himself. "Where, then," you say, "is the contradiction you speak of?" It is here—"Of one eternity." Webster, among other definitions of eternity, says it is "continuance without beginning or end," or "duration without end." Whether we take the first or last definition, matters but little. One of them must be taken, and either of them involves the advocate of the theory in hopeless difficulty. If the first, we have two self-existent beings of equal power, for it is impossible for a being whose existence never had a beginning to depend on any other being for that existence. The irresistible conclusion from such premises, would be that we have two Gods. But the Lord says, "I am the Lord. Beside me there is no God." But suppose the other definition be taken, and it is said simply, that they have both duration without end. May not the same be said of Enoch or Elijah, of the last generation as saints (for Paul says, we shall not all sleep, or die,) and, indeed of all who obtain eternal life?

If the latter definition be received, then it cannot be said we have any God; for if it is impossible for a being whose existence has no beginning to depend on another being for that existence, it is equally impossible for a being whose existence has a beginning, to be independent of every other being, or self-existent.

If it be said the first applies to the Father, and the last to the Son (which, after all, we believe to be the real faith of many so-called trinitarians), we agree with them there. But, if that be true, are not the words of the creed ill-chosen? Such, we believe will be the conclusion of every candid-minded person who will carefully weigh the evidence on either side of the question. A. J. DENNIS.