Identity of the Resurrection body.
THE importance, in the Christian system, of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, can not well be over-estimated; and although of late it has fallen into much neglect, yet, in the New Testament scriptures it is everywhere insisted upon, as the keystone of the arch—the foundation of the Christian faith. "For if there be no resurrection of the dead," says the Apostle, "then is Christ not risen; and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." Infidelity has judged, and rightly too, that if this doctrine could be overthrown, Christianity itself must also fall; hence it is at this point she has aimed keenest shafts; more especially, as this, among the doctrines of revelation, has appeared to be farthest removed from the deductions of reason. The objections have usually turned upon bodily identity, as few have the effrontery to affirm that he who in the beginning created the body, is unable to raise it from the dead. The objections usually urged against the resurrection of the identical body are comprised in the four following propositions, viz.: 1. "That the body is in a constant state of change from birth until death; so that when it is said the body shall be raised, it can not be known what body is meant; as the individual, if he be an aged person, has had several entire changes during life-time; and if any one of these bodies be raised, it would not be the body inhabited by the soul, except for a very small period of human life." 2. "That the body becomes totally decomposed after death, mingling with other elements, forming various and numberless new combinations. That parts of it pass away into impalpable gasses; and these substances again uniting with other substances, and these substances again suffering decomposition, and so on until the identity of the body is utterly destroyed; so that the identical body never can be raised again." 3. "That the resurrection of the identical body implies the resurrection of every identical particle of matter of which the body is composed, neither more nor less." But, 4. "That it is impossible, in the nature of the case, as one body at death becomes parts of other bodies at their death; and, consequently, that two or more souls would claim the same body at the resurrection." The first objection assumes that the body is undergoing a constant state of change, through the destruction and renewal of its particles, so that the man, for instance, who has arrived at the age of seventy has had several totally distinct bodies, so far as their material is concerned; and although this fact has been stoutly denied, by those who defend the doctrines of the resurrection of an identical body, we can not see how, under the present light of physiological science, this denial can be made good; neither do we apprehend that it is necessary to make such denial, in order to sustain the doctrine of identity. On the contrary we shall make use of this very fact, in its proper place, to elucidate what we believe to be the true scriptural doctrine of identity. The second and fourth objections, also assume positions wholly incompatible with the present received notions of identity, and yet it is difficult to conceive how these conclusions can well be avoided by the ingenious mind. They assume that the matter of which the body is composed, is, at death, no longer held by the laws of life, which govern organized matter, but becomes subject to those laws which govern matter generally, and consequently is decomposed, and resolved into its original elements. Thus far we all agree, "Of dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Now that this matter may, unless hindered by the interposition of some special law, enter again into new combinations, and thus as at first, become integral parts of other human bodies at their death, no one will have the hardihood to deny. The question here at issue is, has such a special law been impressed upon the matter which happens to compose the human body at death, forever forbidding it to enter again into the composition of human bodies? We do not for a moment suppose that it is not in the power of God to impress such a special law upon the matter in question, but this we do affirm, that God never works by special legislation to accomplish an end that may as well be attained by original law; and to argue, in the present instance, that original law is insufficient, is to assume that we are acquainted with all its relations and capabilities. Nor can we discover that the special law theory, is supported either by facts or revelation, and on no other ground are we authorized to make such an assumption. And first as to facts; we will, for the sake of brevity, pass over the case where these human remains are supposed to enter into the organization of plants, and these again through the animal into the human, and will come at once to the extreme case of Cannibalism. Here we have man feeding upon his fellow man, and to argue that such food never enters into the organization of the body by way of nutrition, especially where, as in the case of shipwrecked mariners, such flesh has been the only accessible food for days and even weeks, is to our mind wholly gratuitous. But in case one particle of such food becomes organic in the body of such cannibal, and the individual dies in its possession, the commonly received theory of identity becomes untenable. Neither have we been able to find any intimation of the existence of such special law in the Scriptures, where alone we can look for a knowledge of God's special legislation. Others, in order to solve the difficulty, relinquish their claim upon every identical particle, and bring forward the germ theory. This assumes the existence of an indestructible germ in the human body, from which the resurrection body springs. But this theory encounters greater difficulties, than the preceding, inasmuch as it not only encounters all the objections that lie against the former,—since it would require just as truly the presence of a special law to save the germ from re-organization in the human body, as it would to save all the particles therefrom,—but it also affirms that there is a portion of the human body that never dies, which, to say the least, is of doubtful orthodoxy. Nor does the passage, [1 Cor. xv, 36, 38,] teach any such notion, as it would be extremely difficult to show that a single particle of the grain of wheat, much less the indestructible germ of that wheat, passes into each of the numerous grains that spring therefrom. The most that can be said here is, that in wheat and other seeds, there is a living germ which, nourished by the decay of the main body, is enabled thus to spring forth into the beginning of vegetative life, henceforth to draw its life from independent sources, so that whatever particles of the grain of wheat enter into the new organization, are expended long before the new grains which form the type of the resurrection body are brought forth. But we shall refer to this idea again in its proper place. The great blunder in the argument of those who support the commonly received theory, consists in the unqualified admission of the premises laid down in the third objection cited above, viz.: "That the resurrection of an identical body, implies the resurrection of every identical particle of that body." Let these premises be admitted, and the conclusions contained in the fourth objection must inevitably follow. But we deny the premises and loudly affirm that the resurrection of an identical human body does not necessitate the resurrection of one single particle of the body that is laid in the grave. The difficulty has arisen from misapprehending the true application of the term human body. This does not imply a determinate portion of matter, but a peculiar organization of matter, so that its identity as a human body resides not in the matter itself, but in its organizations and functions, and as the bodily organs themselves produce from totally different substances, an identical kind of flesh, so God may, in the resurrection, from entirely different material, raise a body that shall be identical with the one that was laid in the grave. Material is a matter of indifference, provided it possess identity of organization and function, so that what we really mean by the resurrection of an identical body is, peculiar organization of matter that was lost in death, is resumed in the resurrection. This idea of identity exactly agrees with the facts of science alleged in the first objection, so that what was brought forward as an objection, becomes a main pillar in support of the doctrine opposed. A man, for instance, is let down into a mine, and emerges at the end of ten years, clothed in the same identical body, though not actually in possession of a single particle of the matter which composed his body when he entered. The same illustration also, sufficiently refutes the objection, that if the new body does not contain the same identical matter, it becomes a new creation, and not a resurrection. If this be a new creation, then yonder aged man has139during his life, undergone a number of new creations. This view is also scriptural. In answer to a similar objection of identity, contained in 1 Cor. xv, 35, the Apostle exclaims, "Thou fool! that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die: and that which thou sowest; thou sowest not that body which shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or some other grain." From this we learn, that as the production of the new wheat cannot take place without the death of the seed, so the production of the spiritual body cannot take place without the death or change of the natural one; and that as neither the wheat, nor even the germ that is cast into the ground, is the same with the grains that shall be produced, though these sustain to it the relation of fruit; so the resurrection body is not the same that was laid in the tomb, though sustaining to it the relation of fruit; and as the grain produced is identical in quality, appearance, and functions, though not in matter, with that which was cast into the earth, so the resurrection body is identical in quality, appearance and function, though not in matter, with that which was laid in the tomb, with only this difference, that was sown in corruption and weakness, but this is raised in incorruption a glorified body. "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him." "All flesh," continues the Apostle, "is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of man, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds?" Now what but the power of God has made this variety? Not the difference in the material, certainly, of which they are composed, for the same kind of food may have entered into the composition of the flesh of a man and a beast, but the one is totally different in composition from the other. All we can say is, that God has so constituted men and beasts, that while the same kind and quality of food may enter into nutrition of each, the change it undergoes in each is different, constituting a different flesh in each. Then what becomes of your material identity? for if the body consists in identity of material, the same material must produce flesh in man and beast. Again, a great variety of material enters into the composition of the human body, and yet it is the same identical flesh; and this same identical body has, in the course of a man's life, been several times collected from different parts of the earth; then cannot God, in the resurrection, accomplish, without the intervention of bodily organs, what he has so often done through such organs? Hence the Apostle himself, clearly makes the distinction between material and bodily identity, and his entire argument becomes an overwhelming refutation of the former notion. But it is objected to this view of identity, that Christ, who is the first-fruits of the resurrection, was raised with the identical body containing the identical matter in which he was crucified. All this is granted, but it does not effect in the least the position we have taken. The identical body that was crucified was raised, and in this case the identical material, but the body would have been equally identical, according to this view, had the material been different. But the body of our Saviour had not yet suffered decomposition; hence the identity of material. A similar case, we apprehend, will occur at the resurrection, with regard to those that have recently died, while those who are yet alive, will be changed without death. If it be objected that these last may contain matter that has entered into the composition of the bodies of the dead, I reply that this objection stands not against my position, but yours. Finally, the view of bodily identity, here advocated, answers all the demands of scientific facts, appears to me eminently scriptural and rational, and as such, it is respectfully submitted to the consideration and criticism of my brethren.—Messenger.