Policy.—Leniency and Protection to Rebels.
From every quarter, by army letters published and unpublished, we hear that some of our generals employ their soldiers in guarding rebel property and sometimes in returning fugitive slaves to their masters. Their men are dying with the scurvy for want of fresh provisions; these provisions are constantly before their eyes, but they may not touch them on pain of being shot. The rebel owners are in the rebel army; their wives and slaves at home will not sell, and every chicken is under a guard of soldiers. The very water of their wells and springs is forbidden to the famishing men of the Federal army. We hear most of this sort from the divisions of Grant in the South-West and McClellan in the East. In our view the whole country ought to protest against this war policy. We have the very highest esteem for the amenities of modern civilized warfare, and we hope our army will never infringe them. Leave the barbarities of savage warfare to the rebels alone. But, amenities should not make war a farce. If we must fight, or have no country and no liberty, then let it be such fighting as means something and does something. We wake up from our long cherished aversion to war, almost startled to find that our soberest, solid convictions are demanding a far more stringent policy than Grant and McClellan are pursuing. But our convictions on this point are firm as any convictions can be. Why? 1. We believe a stern and strong war policy is the truest mercy. It will soonest end the war, and with the least sacrifices of life and treasure in the end. When Napoleon had occasion to put down a fearful mob in Paris, he ordered his gunners to charge his cannon with ball cartridges the first shot. Consequently one fire sufficed. Other men would have blown at them with powder only, till the mob had become tenfold stronger, and then been compelled to send balls at last. If there must be war, it should be made fearful—else it avails nothing. 2. This policy sickens the soldiers; would drive them home if they could get home; and stops enlistments. 3. It drives loyal Southern men into the rebel ranks. It has done so until over large districts scarce one is left. The reason is obvious. Rebels are always safe; loyal men are really safe nowhere. The rebel army shields rebel citizens, of course; our army shields them too. Hence rebels are safe, and whoever wants safety soon learns how it is to be had. But the rebel arms rob and murder Union men without mercy. Our army affords them but a doubtful protection. This policy, therefore, has proved terribly fatal to the Union cause. It has mostly suppressed all utterances of Union sentiment. It has postponed peace far away into the unknown future, and has involved thousands of families with the fortunes of the rebels, and in whatever disasters may be necessary to bring them to their place in the Union. 4. This policy fails of the very purpose for which it is adopted. It does not conciliate the rebels a particle. It only exposes the Federals to their contempt. The Union leaders seem to have forgotten that they are fighting slaveholders—men who respect physical force and nothing else—men who are lost to all magnanimity and to all amenity, and to all justice and right. It is most unfortunate for any good results of this war that the policy of not touching the slaves, of not damaging the property of rebels, and, in general, of not hurting anybody very much, has pretty thoroughly lost us the respect of the rebel States, and has been adding to their courage and resources for this war every month since it began.—Sel.