THE opposers of the Bible and of Bible truth have often declared that Christianity is opposed to reason, and that Nature presents to us a revelation more beautiful, more harmonious, and more important, than anything contained in the Bible. Especially has the great truth of the atonement been made the subject of opposition both by professed reasoning and ridicule. The object of this argument is to show that reason is not opposed to the idea of the atonement, but rather leads to it; that a co-incidence of strict justice and mercy demands it; and that a written revelation is but the supply of an acknowledged want; that the gift of such a revelation is a conformity to the plainest, simplest principles of government—principles universally recognized. And hence, consistency requires that such a revelation be universally received.
That Nature makes to us a better revelation than the Bible, I, of course, deny. The Bible and Nature never come in conflict; but the Bible leads into a field of truth where Nature can make no attempt to follow. We attach no blame to Nature because it does not perform the office of a written revelation. It was not designed for such a purpose. When we have learned all that we can learn from Nature, we find beyond that, a plain necessity for a written revelation. I invite the devotees of Nature to an examination of this point.
The present is a mixed state, of good and evil. Confined in our views to the present state, and to observation, or to mere reason without a written revelation, it is not possible to vindicate the justice and benevolence of the controlling power, whether that power be called God or Nature. Virtue is often trampled in the dust, and perishes in its representatives. Vice is exalted on high; triumphs over justice and right; and its very grave is decked with flowers, and honored with a monument. In the operations of Nature there is no discrimination made, without which there can be no conformity to justice. True, we see many exhibitions of benevolence, but we see also many things which cannot be reconciled with it. The righteous and the wicked, the just and the unjust, the innocent and the guilty, the aged and the little child, alike share the bounties of providence, and together fall by the pestilence, or sink beneath some sweeping destruction. These facts have troubled the minds of philosophers, and caused the short-sighted philanthropist to be faint of heart.
Reflecting on these things, some have (singularly enough) denied the existence of a God, or Supreme intelligent Being. Such ascribe everything to Nature, whose laws are fixed, inexorable, and indiscriminating. Having arrived at this conclusion, they seem to have relieved themselves of all further trouble in the matter, and (more wondrous still) proceed to lavish encomiums on blind Nature; awarding to her as much praise, as if she never tortured an innocent man, or suffered the guilty to escape. As before remarked, we find no fault with Nature, but we find fault with the unreasonable position of her devotees. The laws of Nature answer well their purpose, but this class of philosophers endeavor to make them answer a purpose for which they never were designed. We think just reasoning will remove their false props.
In the first place I inquire, what is meant by the phrase Laws of Nature? These words are very flippantly used in these days; and I have often thought that many who use them spend but little time in considering their import. There can be only two senses in which the expression can be used. 1. As meaning the laws which Nature has made for the regulation of her various parts or elements. And this is the sense in which it is commonly used by the opposers of the Bible. But against this I object that Nature never made any laws—she never knew enough to make a law. Did Nature deliberate? did she counsel? did she plan? did she have a knowledge of the future before her, and possess wisdom to judge what was suitable, and to devise the means adapted to the end? And if she made the laws she must have existed before she made them; how then were her operations regulated? Is there a man living who will claim so much for Nature? Not one. But if not, all must yield at once that Nature never made a law, and allow that the expression must properly be used (2) as meaning the law which a Supreme Being has made for the government of Nature: the same Infinite One that made Nature and subjected her to the operation of those laws. It is strange, and somewhat amusing, to hear men reject a belief in a Supreme Being as unreasonable and absurd, and then proceed to clothe Nature with all the wisdom and power, and all the attributes that such a Being must necessarily possess!
In the next place I assert that the Laws of Nature are imperfect or incomplete. Not imperfect if considered only in regard to their real object; but altogether imperfect as regards the claims of those who hold them to be all in all. They present no standard of right; and are therefore no fit model by which to frame human conduct. As lovers of the most expansive benevolence, we may strive to imitate Nature when she spreads abroad her bounties; her precious fruits and golden grain. But again she withholds these, and famine is the dire result. Shall we imitate Nature in the desolations of the whirlwind, the earthquake, or the pestilence? Shall we, reckless of consequences, spread indiscriminate ruin and destruction around us, involving alike the innocent and the guilty, the gray-headed and the prattling child? All answer, No. But each hand that is raised to check such a mad career practically acknowledges that Nature, who is so blindly worshipped by many, presents to us an example utterly unworthy of our imitation.
Why is it that the Laws of Nature do not satisfy the aspirations of man? Why do we not accept them as our standard of action? It is because they are destitute of morality. We cannot trace one moral element in their framework or execution. He who studies them intelligently, must be convinced that they are designed solely for a natural system; not for a moral system. Hence, they have no penalties, but only consequences; and these consequences are uniform. So that the operations of Nature present an unbroken series of causes and effects, the results being the same, whether issuing upon an animate or inanimate object, making no distinctions of moral good and evil.
In the foregoing question I referred to a truth which I now affirm, namely, that man has aspirations rising above the operations of Nature; that he does not accept the Laws of Nature as a judicial system. In other words, there is implanted in man a sense of justice, or convictions of right, of which he finds no counterpart in Nature. These convictions are on a moral basis. This sense of justice is erected in the human mind as a tribunal, a2judgment seat, whereat we determine the nature and desert of actions. But, mark this truth: before this tribunal we never arraign the operations of Nature; but we always do the actions of intelligent agents. This remark is true of all men; and it shows that all men, whatever their theories may be, do in fact, and in practice, make a proper distinction between moral and natural laws. This distinction will now claim our notice.
The prime distinction between moral and natural law is this: the first has respect to intention—the other has not. Fire will burn, and water will drown us, whether we fall into them accidentally, or rush into them madly. The little child, who is yet unconscious of any intention for good or evil, suffers as keenly and as certainly for putting its hand in the fire, as the man of mature mind who presumptuously does the same thing. But should the man willfully and maliciously set fire to his neighbor's house; and the child, playfully and without intention of wrong, do the same thing, all would blame the first, but not the other. And then should a judge, in the administration of law, visit the same penalty upon the man and the child, all would readily detest such a perversion of justice. Here we should find the decision unanimous in favor of placing a different estimate upon the actions of the two individuals, although the results of the actions were precisely the same. Thus we not only find men acting upon the difference between moral and natural laws, but we find them also with great unanimity referring moral actions to the standard of intention.
We have but one more step to take in this process of reasoning. It is this. When the claims of a moral and natural law come in conflict, as they often do in this mixed state of good and evil, men uniformly give preference to the moral. And often are they false to their own theories to be true to this fact. We sometimes meet with men who deny these distinctions entirely; who claim that there is no moral law aside from the laws of Nature; yet they act in conformity with the propositions herein set forth; with this last as well as the others. For instance: we find one making the denial referred to: his house is on fire; his child is sleeping in the midst of destruction. To rush in and save its life at the hazard of being severely burned is the first impulse of your moral nature. But should you let it perish, and in justification plead his own theory, that the only moral laws were the laws of Nature, that these were inexorable, and that to rush into the flames would be a violation of law for which you would be immediately and severely punished; I doubt not his very soul would loathe you as a monster of selfishness. Here, in his own mind, he makes all the distinction that I have claimed, and places the moral duty of doing good to your fellow being far above mere conformity to the Laws of Nature.