The Crimean War in Prophecy and in the Eastern Question

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Review and Herald Publishing Association · Takoma Park Station, Washington, D. C. · Mar 16, 1911

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 88, No. 11.

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The Crimean War in Prophecy and in the Eastern Question

P. T. MAGAN
The next great event in the theater of the Eastern question after the failure of the czar to “persuade” England, was the Crimean war. There are many men still living who remember that Titanic struggle, in which the Anglo-Saxon and the Frank helped Turkey against her old enemy, the Muscovite. It ranks as one of the first wars in importance in the last century, and it was wholly waged and settled on the lines of the prophecy.
From all his negotiations with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the czar concluded that nothing was to be expected of England, and that she was standing her ground as the helper of Turkey. He therefore decided, on his own responsibility, that “the time had come to divide,” or rather to help himself to the property of, the Sick Man. Therefore it was not to be expected that he would remain long without seeking an opportunity of quarreling with any one who stood at the side of the Sick Man’s bed, and seemed to constitute himself a protector of the Sick Man’s interests.
The desired opening presented itself over the interpretation of a clause in the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, which treaty had been forced upon the Ottoman Porte by the empress Catherine II of Russia on July 10, 1774. On sea and on land the armies of the great empress had been victorious. Turkey was overthrown, and compelled to give up Azov and Taganrog to Russia, and to declare the Crimea independent of the Ottoman empire. The seventh clause of this treaty read as follows:—
“The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and also to allow the minister of the imperial court of Russia to make, on all occasions, representations as well in favor of the new church in Constantinople, of which mention will be made in the fourteenth article, as in favor of those who officiate therein, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighboring and sincerely friendly power.”
It does not seem that there was room for misunderstanding in regard to the meaning of these words, or that they were capable of misinterpretation by any man in his right mind. Turning to the fourteenth article alluded to, we find that “it is simply permitted to the court of Russia to build a public church of the Greek rite in the Galata quarter of Constantinople, in addition to the chapel built in the house of the minister; and it is declared that the new church ‘shall be always under the protection of the ministers of the [Russian] empire, and shielded from all obstruction and all damage.’ Here, then, we seem to have two clauses of the simplest meaning, and by no means of first-class importance. The latter clause allows Russia to build a new church in Constantinople; the former allows the Russian minister to make representations to the Porte on behalf of the church and of those who officiate in it. What difference of opinion, it may be asked, could possibly arise?”—McCarthy, “History of Our Own Times,” Vol. I, chap. 25, par. 17.
Clear as the language may be, the czar construed it as “amounting to nothing less” than giving him “protectorate over all the sultan’s subjects professing the Greco-Russian worship; that is to say, the great majority of the inhabitants of Turkey in Europe.”
This monstrous claim was urged by the czar because he could not believe that just then “the western powers were in a position to come to an understanding and to act in common,” and he “hoped to triumph over the divan by audacity.” He argued that if audacity should not be victorious, and if Turkey should go to war unaided, the end would be the certain “conquest of Constantinople, the deliverance of Jerusalem, and the deliverance of the Slavonic empire.” But the czar had not calculated aright. Turkey, seeing that these Russian demands meant nothing more nor less than stripping her of her empire, resolved on “making a supreme effort to sell her life dearly, if it were impossible to save it.”
Then it was that the Sublime Porte declared war, and in desperation the “king of the north” went “forth with great fury to destroy, and utterly to make away many.” Dan. 11:44. The Russian government had been ofthe opinion that when it came to the last ditch, the Sublime Porte would yield rather than appeal to the supreme arbitrament of war. But as already stated, Turkey not only showed fight, but went forth to fight Russia with great fury. The real reason for this lay in the fact that some one (England) was telling her all the time to stand her ground, and that she would help her.
For “by an almost miraculous concourse of circumstance, an alliance was formed between France and England, those two ancient and ardent rivals.” Once “Nicholas flattered himself that he could persuade, and carry away the English; but it did not enter into his calculation that Napoleonic France could ever form an alliance with the England of Waterloo, of St. Helena, and of Hudson Lowe. The imprudent confidence to Seymour rendered the strange alliance possible. England took fright, and it was now her turn to urge France with energetic measures. The invasion of the principalities appeared to her to be the first step toward the execution of the schemes of dismemberment.”—Rambaud, “History of Russia,” Vol. II, chap. 14.
But worse things were yet in store for Russia. Great Britain made public Seymour’s report of the interviews with the czar in the ballroom and at the imperial palace. Of course this revelation greatly angered the other powers. They saw in an instant that Nicholas had intended to sacrifice them, “and were stunned by his contempt for all that the others might think or do.”—Id.
Consequently, the “almost miraculous alliance” for the purpose of aiding Turkey was immediately sanctioned by both Austria and Prussia in a “protocol signed at Vienna by the four powers.” “Nicholas had found means to unite the whole of Europe against himself.”—Id.
The astonishment of the czar knew no bounds; but things had set hard against him now, and he could not turn back. In order to gain the sympathy of the Russian people by proclaiming that the war was a religious one with Russia, he published, as the champion of Christianity, an extraordinary manifesto against England and France, in which he said: “Against Russia fighting for orthodoxy, England and France enter the lists as champions of the enemies of Christianity; but Russia will not fail in her sacred vocation. Fighting for our oppressed brothers who profess the faith of Christ, Russia will have but one heart and voice to cry, ‘God, Our Saviour! Whom have we to fear? Let Christ arise, and let his enemies be scattered.’”—“Historians’ History of the World,” Vol. XVII, pages 562, 563.
The result of the war was altogether disastrous to Russia. The Crimea was the principal scene of hostilities, and gave its name to the struggle. The British and French first won the fight of the battle of Alma. The Russians had boasted that the banks of the Alma should be the graves of the invaders. But “the blended vehemence and obstinacy of the English and the French,” or was too much for the Muscovites, who Turkey herself was no mean foe, and Omar Pasha proved himself a leader of remarkable ability and military sagacity.
Later came the charge of the six hundred at Balaklava, which will be famous as long as there is a memory left of English military history. Then followed the battle of Inkerman, and the siege and capture of Sebastopol. Everywhere the allies were victorious, till the Russians were obliged to sue for peace. Once more Russia was humiliated and Turkey was victorious, partly because of her own good fighting qualities, and chiefly because, just as the Bible said, somebody helped this power.
Madison, Tenn.