p. 135 | The Atonement-No. 10 by John Harvey Waggoner

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Apr 7, 1874

The Atonement.—No. 10.

By John Harvey Waggoner

There are two methods whereby we may learn to a certainty whether the death of Christ was vicarious or substitutionary. One, the examination of the types which prefigured his death; the other, the examination of the particular texts which speak of his death. And,

1. As the sacrifices of the Levitical law typified the death of Christ, what their death represented in type must be in fact. The forms prescribed in that law plainly show their intent. The requirement to lay their hands upon the heads of their offering was peculiarly significant. “If any man of you bring an offering to the Lord, . . . he shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt offering.” Lev. 1:2–4; 3:2, 8, 13. If the priest sinned, he was required to bring a bullock for a sin offering; “and he shall lay his hand upon the bullock’s head.” Chap. 4:4. If the whole congregation sinned, then “the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock.” Verse 15. Also verse 24; chap. 8:14, 22.

The object of this action is made clear in chap. 16:21, where the same thing is done over the scapegoat. The high priest was there acting in behalf of all the people. “And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat.”

This does not indicate that the scapegoat was a type of Christ. Two goats were presented to the high priest, one for a sin offering, the other for a scapegoat. Now we have seen, as quoted above, that it was the custom to lay hands on the sin offering. This text shows the object of the action, but does not confound the sin offering with the scapegoat. And this could be the only object in all like transactions. Thus the sin was transferred from the sinner to the object or offering upon which his hands were laid; and this opens to us the full sense of Lev. 1:4, and parallel passages. “He shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt offering”—thereby transferring his sin to the offering, so that it bore the sin of the man—“and it shall be accepted for him.” Of course it was accepted as an offering to the broken law, in his stead, for it had his sin.

The same is fully shown by the following: Although the sinner was required to lay his hand on the head of the offering, the priest made the atonement for him, Lev. 4:20, 26, 31, 35, and others. The atonement was made with the blood of the offering. It was early revealed to man that the blood was the life. “But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat.” Gen. 9:4. “Be sure that thou eat not the blood; for the blood is the life; and thou mayest not eat the life with the flesh.” Deut. 12:23. “For the life of the flesh is in the blood.” “For it is the life of all flesh.” “For the life of all flesh is the blood thereof.” Lev. 17:11, 14. Therefore when the Lord said, “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed,” it was equivalent to saying, Whoso taketh man’s life, by man shall his life be taken; for he said again, “Your blood of your lives will I require.” Gen. 9:5.

“The wages of sin is death,” and “without shedding of blood there is no remission.” Rom. 6:23; Heb. 9:22. That is, the sinner has forfeited his life, and the law dishonored cannot be satisfied or vindicated without the shedding of blood, or taking life, for life is its due. This plainly shows that the penalty of the law is executed by shedding blood, or taking life, and also that the remission of sin, or its penalty, to the sinner, does not relax the claims of the law; for when his sin was transferred to the offering, that was accepted for him, and its blood or life was taken for his. “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul.” Lev. 17:11. So the sin was remitted or forgiven the sinner, and laid upon another, who suffered its penalty. With these facts before us, we notice that all those scriptures which speak of Christ’s blood being shed, are a confirmation of the fact that he died, or suffered the penalty of the law. Thus, the wages of sin is death; that is, the life is forfeited by sin; and the life is in the blood, therefore the shedding of the blood is equivalent to taking life; and he shed his blood for us, he died for us, he suffered the penalty of the violated law for us.

That which is done for another is vicarious. Death suffered for another is vicarious death. But in the preceding cases brought from the Scriptures, the sin offerings were never slain or offered for themselves, or for their own wrongs, but always for the sins of others. Their blood was shed in the stead of others; their deaths were truly vicarious. And if we take away from them all ideas of substitution or vicariousness, we take away all possibility of an atonement consistent with justice.

It needs no more than a mere reference to the Scriptures to show the relation those transactions bore to the gospel of Christ, and that the death of Christ was in truth substitutionary and vicarious. “All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.” Isa. 53:6. “Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree.” 1 Pet. 2:24. “So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many.” Heb. 9:28.

This shows in what sense “he was made sin for us,” it was in that of standing in our stead before the violated law; he bore our sins; they were laid upon him. And when he took our sins, the wages of sin being death, as a necessary consequence, “he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities.” “For the transgression of my people was he stricken.” “His soul” was made “an offering for sin.” Isa. 53:5, 8, 10. He that doeth not all the words of the law is cursed; but Christ is made a curse for us to redeem us from the curse of the law. Deut. 27:26; Gal. 3:10–13. “Christ died for the ungodly.” Rom. 5:6. “Was delivered for our offenses.” Chap. 4:25. “Christ died for our sins.” 1 Cor. 15:3. He died for all, for all were dead, or condemned to death, for all had sinned. 2 Cor. 5:14. He “suffered for sins, the just for the unjust.” 1 Pet. 3:18. “Christ hath suffered for us.” Chap. 4:1. In all these expressions the idea of substitution is prominent, as it was in the type.

Again, the same truth is taught in all those scriptures which speak of Christ’s having redeemed us. He gave “his life a ransom for many.” Matt. 20:28. “Who gave himself a ransom for all.” 1 Tim. 2:6. “Ye are not your own; for ye are bought with a price.” 1 Cor. 6:19, 20; 7:23. “Denying the Lord that bought them.” 2 Pet. 2:1. “Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ.” 1 Pet. 1:18, 19. “Hast redeemed us to God by thy blood.” Rev. 5:9. Which he hath purchased with his own blood.” Acts 20:28. Now the sole idea of redeeming, purchasing, and paying, with a price is that of substitution by equivalent, or receiving one instead of another.

Probably the chief reason why men differ so widely and come to conclusions so widely different on this subject is that these specific declarations and the object of the types are not always kept in view, but often conclusions are drawn from mere abstract reasonings, such as declaring that if Christ paid the debt it could not in justice be demanded a second time, and the principal, the sinner, must go free unconditionally. The fallacy of this has been shown. But other points need to be noticed.

A writer in New York of some note, George Storrs, who rejects the idea of Christ’s dying “in the room and stead” of the sinner, says the atonement must correspond to man’s nature and to the demands of the law, for “it is such a satisfaction as justice rightfully demands.” But it certainly cannot be shown why the atonement must correspond to man’s nature, and to the claim that justice has on man, if the death of the atoner be not substitutionary. How otherwise could it meet the claim? Again he says that “by dying, though death had no claim on him, justice was vindicated.” Now if “death had no claim on him,” how could justice be vindicated in his death? Is justice ever vindicated in the death of one on whom it has no claim? No; it is rather a perversion of justice. But all admit that death had no claim on Christ, so far as his own actions were concerned; therefore if justice was upheld or vindicated in his death, it was because he died “in the room and stead” of those on whom death had a claim. Now there was a transfer of sin; our sins were laid on him. But we have seen that death has a claim on the sinner, for the wages of sin is death. And if the sin was transferred, of course the claim of death was also. So death had a claim on him; but only as he stood in our stead. He was made sin for us; therefore he was made a curse for us. 2 Cor. 5:21; Gal. 3:13. It seems to me that the idea of vicariousness, or complete substitution, is as plainly taught as language can teach it.

Many authors who indorsed the view of the vicarious death of Christ have, with a strange inconsistency of which they seem to be quite unconscious, argued on the other side of the question, assuming that if it were a transaction meeting the demands of justice, then no further punishment could be visited upon the criminal. Thus Burge on the atonement says:—

“If a man engage to perform a certain piece of work, for a reward which is proposed, it makes no difference whether he do the work himself, or procure another to do it for him. Let the work be done according to agreement, and he is entitled to the reward. So, if Christ has done for believers the work which the law required them to do, God is now bound, on the principle of strict justice, to bestow the promised reward, eternal life. There is no grace, but stern, unbending justice, here.” pp. 202, 203.

Barnes takes substantially the same view, and both aver that Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law, but something substituted for the penalty. In the proposed illustration above, there is really no analogy to the thing supposed to be illustrated.

Man is a rebel, condemned to death: the law can only be satisfied with the taking of life. Now, in regard to rendering satisfaction to a broken law, there cannot possibly be anything existing between sinful man and his Creator, answering to the nature of a contract, as this illustration supposes. But its defect is most plainly seen in this, that man does not, and cannot, procure a substitute. If man by his own efforts had procured the substitutionary sacrifice of Christ, atonement would rest on an entirely different footing from what it now does. Any illustration based on such an utter impossibility, which is so contrary to evident truths, and to the whole revealed plan of the atonement, cannot aid in a correct understanding of it. God has set forth his Son to be a propitiation—to suffer death, the penalty of the law, for us; so that his substitutionary sacrifice is the gift of God, even as Christ himself was the gift of God. “For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.” If we take for granted that the death of Christ meets every demand of the law, yet so long as he is the gift of God, there is mercy in the transaction. But Dr. Barnes thinks there was no mercy if it met the requirement of the law. He remarks:

“If it should be said that there was mercy in the gift of the Saviour, and that, so far as that is concerned, the transaction is one of mercy, though so far as the law is concerned, the transaction is one of justice, it may be replied that this is not the representation of the Bible. The idea of mercy pervades it throughout. It is not only mercy in providing an atonement. It is mercy to the sinner. There is mercy in the case. There is love. There is more than a mere exaction of the penalty. There is more than a transfer. There is a lessening of suffering,” &c. pp. 232, 233.

No one doubts that in the atonement there is mercy to the sinner, and yet the death of Christ may be a matter of justice so far as the law is concerned. The death of Christ either met the demand of law and justice, or it did not. If it did, then it was, so far, a legal transaction; then “stern, unbending justice” was honored in his death. But if it did not, then how is divine justice vindicated in granting pardon through him? How can God be just in justifying the believer any more than he could have been in justifying an unbeliever, seeing that justice had no part in the transaction? We have been accustomed to regard this declaration of the apostle (Rom. 3:24–26) as positive proof that justice was satisfied in his death, in order that pardon might be granted to the believer without slighting the claims of the law; and we are unable to vindicate the system on any other principle than this. And if we only admit that Christ suffered the penalty of the law, which was death, as the Scriptures abundantly show, then there is no difficulty whatever in the view.

The point (and fallacy) of Dr. Barnes’ position will be more clearly seen if we examine the question: Is remission of sin relative or absolute? We affirm that it is only relative; but according to his view it is absolute, as he says “the idea of mercy pervades it throughout,” and that it (the gift and death of Christ) is not a transaction of justice. Let us look at the gospel facts, and see if they will justify his statement.

Man is a sinner, condemned to death. Justice demands his life. But God loves the world, and gives his Son to die for man. The Son volunteers to die; the plan is fixed and determined. After years of toil, privation, suffering, and scorn, he sees the hour of his death approaching. Alone with his Father he pleads—“Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me.” Not once only does he cry. His soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. Great drops of sweat, as it were blood, burst through the pores of his skin, so intense is his agony, as he prays again and again, “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me.” Soon he is betrayed, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, a crown of thorns placed upon his head, falsely accused and unjustly condemned, made to bear his own cross till he faints under the burden, and finally, nailed to the cross, a most cruel means of death, in agony he expires.

Now, in all candor it may be asked, was there nothing but mercy in that transaction? Was there any mercy to the Saviour? It is acknowledged that “mercy pervades it throughout,” so far as the sinner is concerned; but was it so toward the Saviour? The sinner was not the only one concerned in that transaction. No one can make or indorse this statement of Dr. Barnes, unless he looks to the benefit accruing to the sinner, without considering the sufferings and death of the Saviour. And that is surely a very limited consideration of the nature and object of the death of Christ which leaves his death altogether out of view!

It may be objected here that Dr. Barnes claims an absolute excess of mercy, because the sufferings of Christ were but a small part of the sufferings that were justly due to the guilty world. But that makes not the least difference; for the question of the justice or the injustice of that part endured by him must be settled by the same principles that would govern the case had he endured the whole. The objection, however, is wholly inadmissible, involving a material error in itself; for death is the penalty of the law, and the just due of the sinner. This, Christ suffered, and to deny this were to deny the whole gospel.

J. H. WAGGONER.